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1 Introduction  
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This thesis comprises three essays on corporate bankruptcies, their prediction, their 
collection, and their proceedings. In particular, it focuses on (1) the improvement in the 
performance of bankruptcy prediction models through the construction of a predictor 
variable, (2) the impact of data quality on the parametrization and the evaluation of 
bankruptcy prediction models, and (3) the characteristics and implications of a typical 
bankruptcy proceeding. 
Some historical default filings, such as those of General Motors, Lehman Brothers, 
or WorldCom, have been associated with serious financial losses. Thus, bankruptcies have 
the power to affect entire economies to a high degree. Particularly, the forecast of 
bankruptcies is of great interest to financial agents: prediction models are used by investors 
to decide how to allocate their assets, by managers to determine corrective actions to be 
taken, by banks to decide whom to grant loans to, by rating agencies to develop their 
ratings, and by supervisors to monitor the financial health of banks, insurance companies, 
and other institutions (e.g., Tian and Yu, 2017). Likewise, these forecasts serve as an input 
for pricing models of, e.g., defaultable bonds or credit derivatives (e.g., Jarrow and 
Turnbull, 1995; Linetsky, 2006; Carr and Wu, 2010). Therefore, all three essays in this 
thesis deal with corporate bankruptcies and their prediction.  
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The extensive literature on predicting corporate bankruptcies starting with the study 
of Beaver (1966) can be broadly divided into four approaches. First, traditional models 
mostly use accounting information and a classification technique. For instance, Altman 
(1968) and Blum (1974) use discriminant analyses and Ohlson (1980) uses logistic 
regressions. As these classification techniques require the independence of firm-years, 
these studies match a single bankrupt firm-year of a firm with a single non-bankrupt firm-
year of another firm. Zmijewski (1984), for instance, argues that using this matched pair 
sample yields biased estimates, because it typically oversamples bankrupt firms. Thus, 
second, more recent models use hazard models that allow the use of the entire firm history 
instead of one observation per firm (e.g., Shumway, 2001; Chava and Jarrow, 2004). 
Typically, such models also include predictor variables that are based on stock market 
movements. Third, structural models apply Merton’s (1974) option pricing theory and 
view the market value of equity as a call option on the market value of assets (e.g., 
Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lundstedt, 2004; Bharat and 
Shumway, 2008; Charitou, Dionysiou, Lambertides, and Trigeorgis, 2013). Fourth, studies 
since the 1990s apply artificially intelligent systems such as support vector machines, 
neural networks, or random forests to predict bankruptcies (e.g., Boritz, Kennedy, and 
Albuquerque, 1995; Neves and Vieira, 2006; Jones, Johnstone, and Wilson, 2017). 
All these bankruptcy prediction models use a statistical method along with a set of 
predictor variables. For calibrating and evaluating bankruptcy prediction models, 
bankruptcy information is a critical input. The first essay uses existing bankruptcy 
databases but does not collect or investigate bankruptcy information. Instead, it improves 
the prediction methodology by developing a model that enhances the accuracy of state-of-
the-art models, simultaneously expanding their scope of application. The second essay then 
deals with bankruptcy information. It describes a methodology to gather accurate details of 
bankruptcy events from public sources and analyzes the impact of data quality on the 
estimation and evaluation of bankruptcy prediction models. At the same time, it moves 
away from U.S. corporations, which have been the focus of the literature and investigates 
German public firms. Meanwhile, the third essay gathers information of privately held 
firms as well. It predicts their bankruptcies, analyzes the impact of firm size on the 
prediction, and examines the course of bankruptcy proceedings, even after the initial filing. 
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The first essay (chapter 2) is based on the working paper “Predicting Bankruptcy via 
Cross-Sectional Earnings Forecasts” (2019), co-authored by Dieter Hess. In this paper, we 
develop a bankruptcy prediction model. There have been considerable efforts to improve 
the performance of bankruptcy prediction models. Altman (1968) was the first to introduce 
a multivariate model by using a linear discriminant analysis and five accounting-based 
variables. Ohlson (1980) points out that the assumptions needed for discriminant analyses1 
are violated and suggests using a logistic regression along with nine accounting-based 
variables. To overcome the shortcomings of matched pair samples, Shumway (2001) uses 
hazard models along with five accounting-based and market-based predictor variables. 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) compute default probabilities that are based on a firm’s 
market equity and use six variables in total. However, recent performance boosts 
associated with models relying on market data come at a high cost, because the use of 
these models is limited to firms that have access to capital markets. Altman, Iwanicz-
Drozdowska, Laitinen, and Suvas (2017) point out that predicting the bankruptcies of 
private firms is equally important, for example, for the task of managing large loan 
portfolios. We add to this stream of literature by improving the out-of-sample performance, 
simultaneously providing a model that can also be applied to the vast number of privately 
held firms. 
We develop a model to predict bankruptcies, exploiting that negative book equity is a 
strong indicator of financial distress. Accordingly, our key predictor of bankruptcy is the 
probability that a firm’s book equity becomes negative. In other words, we derive a closed 
formula for calculating the probability that future losses will deplete a firm’s book equity. 
For this purpose, we use the distribution of earnings forecasts that is obtained from cross-
sectional regression models in the spirit of Hou, van Dijk, and Zhang (2012). Their 
approach comprises the use of lagged variables of all sample firms to gain earnings 
forecasts for an individual firm. We present three bankruptcy prediction models: our 
negative book equity model includes only the probability of negative book equity. Our 
accounting model accounts for the possibility of firms intentionally operating on negative 
book equity without being financially distressed. Thus, it adds accounting variables, that 
we find to discriminate between healthy and bankrupt negative book equity firms. Our 
market model finally adds two stock market variables. 
                                                 
1 These assumptions are, for example, the multivariate normal distribution of the independent variables and 
the equality of their variance-covariance matrix. 
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The main results confirm that a firm’s negative book equity is closely related to its 
bankruptcy risk. In particular, book equity and earnings diminish in the years before 
bankruptcy, most severely in the final year before bankruptcy. Accordingly, using a rolling 
evaluation technique, we show that the out-of-sample performance of our accounting 
model is better than the alternatives that solely use accounting variables, and our market 
model outperforms other models that allow market information to be included. 
Importantly, the performance of our accounting model is close to that of state-of-the-art 
market-based models. In addition, we show that the explanatory power of book equity and 
earnings forecasts does not change over time. Our study most closely relates to the paper of 
Correia, Kang, and Richardson (2018), who also use earnings figures to predict 
bankruptcy. Specifically, they show that earnings’ volatility measures have incremental 
predictive power regarding bankruptcy. However, they focus solely on the earnings’ 
volatility. We also use the earnings forecasts themselves and develop a new predictor 
variable by associating earnings forecasts and their volatilities with book equity. 
Additionally, we show that the inclusion of additional variables that are chosen based on 
this new predictor variable yields a higher accuracy than state-of-the-art models. 
The findings of the first essay suggest that our accounting model performs best if the 
situation demands a model to be applicable to private firms. Meanwhile, our market model 
produces the best results if market-based predictors are allowed. Using our accounting 
model, we can provide accurate bankruptcy predictions for a wide range of firms, 
including firms that have no access to capital markets. Our work thus contributes to both 
researchers and practitioners, as it provides a model that is not restricted to publicly traded 
firms and simultaneously performing as well as benchmark market models. The empirical 
analysis of this essay is only based on public firms for consistency with literature. To show 
that our accounting model outperforms existing models for privately-held firms as well, the 
third essay (chapter 4) finally includes private firms in the sample. We further contribute to 
the discussion on whether the credit relevance of accounting measures has changed over 
the past decades (e.g., Collins, Maydew and Weiss, 1997; Lev and Zarowin, 1999; 
Beisland and Hamberg, 2013) by showing that book equity and earnings are still useful 
predictors. 
The second essay (chapter 3) is based on the working paper “The Quality of 
Bankruptcy Data and its Impact on the Evaluation of Prediction Models: Creating and 
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Testing a German Database” (2019), co-authored by Tobias Lorsbach. While the first essay 
focuses on the methodology of bankruptcy prediction models, the second essay 
concentrates on bankruptcy information as a critical input for these models. In particular, 
we investigate the quality of the commonly used bankruptcy databases and its impact on 
the estimation and the evaluation of bankruptcy prediction models. The methodology and 
the choice of predictor variables for prediction models have been intensively addressed. 
However, previous studies have paid little attention to the quality of bankruptcy data. One 
related stream of literature analyzes the data providers’ quality of financial information, 
which is crucial for the reliable decision making of both practitioners and academics (e.g., 
Allen, Cho, and Jung, 1997). Obviously, there should be no differences between the 
financial statement and the data provided by commercial data providers. However, several 
studies have investigated the accuracy of commercial data providers and found significant 
differences between these two. For instance, Rosenberg and Houglet (1974) and Bennin 
(1980) compare price information of U.S. firms between the Compustat and CRSP 
databases. Kinney and Swanson (1993) compare tax items extracted from Compustat 
directly with the official figures in financial statements. San Miguel (1977) does the same 
for research and development costs; Kern and Morris (1994) for sales and total assets; and 
Tallapally, Luehlfing, and Motha (2011) for cost of goods sold. Furthermore, Nam, No, 
and Lee (2017) show the importance of data quality by investigating the impact of faulty 
financial information on the performance of Ohlson’s (1980) bankruptcy prediction model. 
However, all these evidences are restricted to information of financial statements. To the 
best of our knowledge, there has been no study to analyze the quality of bankruptcy 
information. We investigate whether high-quality data on bankruptcy events is as crucial 
for an effective decision making as is financial data. We add to this stream of literature by 
answering the following research questions: (i) is the bankruptcy information provided by 
commercial databases reliable and (ii) if there are data differences between public sources 
and commercial providers, do these differences impact the estimation and evaluation of 
bankruptcy prediction models? 
To this end, we develop a systematic methodology to obtain bankruptcy information 
from free-access online sources. We develop a bankruptcy database by crawling mainly 
two information sources.2 First, we parse financial disclosures of ad-hoc news providers 
                                                 
2 The term “crawling” refers to the use of computer programs to systemically browse and analyze websites. 
The General Appendix shows an exemplary Python program to crawl the German business register. 
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for bankruptcy-related key words; second, we crawl official online releases made by 
bankruptcy courts. We apply this methodology to Germany for two reasons. First, for 
Germany, none of the commonly used bankruptcy databases stream their data directly from 
public sources, like, for example, the United States’ LoPucki Bankruptcy Research 
Database. Second, Germany is one of the largest stock markets in Europe. We compare our 
database with Compustat Global and Bureau van Dijk (BvD) data in terms of the 
completeness and correctness of bankruptcy events and dates. We then use our bankruptcy 
data to conduct two empirical analyses. First, we compare our database with BvD data and 
investigate whether the quality of bankruptcy data affects the parameter estimates as well 
as the out-of-sample evaluation of bankruptcy prediction models.3 Second, we compare the 
performance of several bankruptcy prediction models on the German market. While the 
number of studies that predict bankruptcies for U.S. firms is large, the literature on 
international firms is sparse (e.g., Altman et al., 2017; Tian and Yu, 2017; Dahiya and 
Klapper, 2007). However, a domino effect of bankruptcies may trigger a global financial 
crisis and, thus, prediction models for international markets are important as well (e.g., 
Srivastava, Lin, Premachandra, and Roberts, 2016; Tian and Yu, 2017). 
We find that our bankruptcy database includes a higher number of bankruptcy events 
than those in the frequently used databases of BvD and Compustat Global. While our 
database includes 277 bankruptcy events in total, BvD and Compustat cover 63 and 27 
events, respectively. For example, BvD does not include the 2009 bankruptcy case of 
Arcandor AG, a warehouse business valued at 500 million euros. Furthermore, our 
database carries more accurate bankruptcy dates than those in BvD and Compustat Global. 
For 25% of the firms, our database reports bankruptcies two months earlier than BvD and, 
for 50% of the firms, our database reports bankruptcies 24 months earlier than Compustat 
Global. Importantly, we show that the higher quality of bankruptcy data has a significant 
impact on the size and significance of parameter estimates and, finally, on the out-of-
sample evaluation of bankruptcy prediction models. For example, the use of BvD 
bankruptcy data would suggest a similar performance for Altman (1968) and Ohlson 
(1980), whereas the use of our information shows that Ohlson’s model significantly 
outperforms Altman’s. Furthermore, we show that market-based bankruptcy prediction 
models outperform accounting-based models for German public firms. 
                                                 
3 Since Compustat Global includes too few bankruptcy events, we cannot provide a thorough comparison of 
our dataset with that of Compustat Global. 
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This study is the first to show that crawling public sources free of charge creates a 
database of bankruptcy events with a higher quality than those of Compustat Global and 
BvD. As such, it is also the first to be able to make a broad comparison of bankruptcy 
prediction models for Germany using an accurate database. Importantly, we speak to the 
consequences of training bankruptcy prediction models with noisy bankruptcy data. By 
showing that the quality of bankruptcy data significantly impacts the interpretation of the 
results, we prove the sensitivity of prediction models with respect to data. Therefore, the 
evidence presented by studies that use bankruptcy data from Compustat Global and BvD 
may need to be revised. It may be the case that those studies present biased parameters and, 
as a result, uninformative out-of-sample assessments. Moreover, accurate bankruptcy 
information is crucial for several other applications, for example, analyzing systemic risks 
or credit spreads. We contribute to the literature on data quality by showing that not only 
high-quality financial data, but also high-quality bankruptcy event data is essential for an 
effective decision-making. Another contribution is that we add to the sparse evidence on 
bankruptcy prediction for the international market by finding models that perform best for 
German public corporations. 
The third essay (chapter 4) is based on the single-authored working paper 
“Bankruptcy Proceedings, Annual Report Timing, and Bankruptcy Prediction: Crawling 
the German Business Register” (2019). While the second essay focuses on publicly traded 
firms, the third essay also analyzes privately held firms. Collecting a database of German 
bankruptcy events that also include private firms, I can analyze the properties of German 
bankruptcy proceedings, the implications of a bankruptcy filing for the publication of 
annual reports, as well as the impact of firm size on bankruptcy prediction. As stated 
above, there have been many studies on how to improve the prediction of bankruptcies. 
However, few studies investigate bankruptcy proceedings themselves after bankruptcy has 
already been filed (e.g., Crhova and Pasekova, 2013). Bankruptcy proceedings are 
important constructions that serve mainly two goals: first, satisfying the creditors and, 
second, bringing productive assets back to the productive process (e.g., Crhova, Fiserova, 
and Pasekova, 2016). I choose to analyze the proceedings of German private firms for two 
reasons. First, most bankruptcy studies focus on publicly traded firms and, thus, mostly on 
very large firms. However, considering the relatively few number of listed firms, one can 
state that private firms are crucial to most economies, thereby requiring specific research 
(e.g., Dietsch and Petey, 2004; Filipe, Grammatikos, and Michala, 2016; Altman et al., 
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2017). Second, the literature on non-U.S. firms is sparse (e.g., Tian and Yu, 2017; Dahiya 
and Klapper, 2007; Lohmann and Ohliger, 2017). 
I crawl the German business register to collect bankruptcy events of German firms. 
In contrast to the second essay, which concentrates on public firms, the third essay also 
takes privately held firms into account. I compare the number of bankruptcy events in the 
business register and in BvD with the official figures from Destatis (“Statistisches 
Bundesamt”). While the second essay quantifies the impact of the limited bankruptcy 
information contained in traditionally used data sources on the parametrization and the 
evaluation of models, the third essay makes an analysis of the German business register 
events. In particular, it investigates the different types of events, their respective number, 
their order, and the duration between certain events. I further extract the annual report 
publishing dates from the business register. By combining them with bankruptcy dates, I 
analyze the relationship between bankruptcy events and the timing of publishing annual 
reports. Moreover, I use the large sample to compare bankruptcy prediction models for the 
German market. Finally, splitting the sample into small, medium-sized and large firms, I 
analyze the impact of firm size on the results of prediction models.  
For recent years, the business register includes more events than BvD. However, the 
coverage of the business register for earlier years is low because details of bankruptcy 
proceedings must be deleted six months after their termination. Furthermore, I find 
significant differences between public and private firms: while for limited liability firms, 
bankruptcy proceedings are opened 75.2 days on average after the court orders protective 
measures, this duration is significantly higher for joint-stock firms (86.0 days). Moreover, 
limited liability firms are refused bankruptcy proceedings due to insufficient assets more 
often than joint-stock companies are. In addition, filing for bankruptcy significantly 
impacts the timing of the subsequent annual report: firms take more time to publish an 
annual report after bankruptcy proceedings have been opened. Moreover, I show that Hess 
and Huettemann’s (2019) accounting model performs best among the accounting-based 
models for the German market. As the empirical analysis of this essay uses privately-held 
firms, I validate that the accounting model of the first essay outperforms existing 
accounting-based models not only for the scope of public firms, but also for private firms. 
Finally, I show that the bankruptcies of large firms can be predicted more accurately than 
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those of small and medium-sized firms. Thus, firm size affects the results of prediction 
models. 
The findings of the third essay help understand a typical German bankruptcy 
proceeding. In particular, I show differences in proceedings for public and private firms. 
Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to find a relationship between 
bankruptcy dates and annual report dates. I contribute to the literature on non-listed and 
international firms by investigating their typical bankruptcy proceedings and by predicting 
their bankruptcies. I further show that regularly crawling the business register yields a 
bankruptcy dataset that is more complete than BvD. This is highly relevant to the 
practitioners and academics who conduct firm-level distress analyses. In addition, I add to 
the sparse literature on the choice of bankruptcy prediction models for the German market 
and for private firms. I further provide first evidence for a positive correlation between 
firm size and the accuracy of prediction models. 
Taken together, the three essays in this thesis provide new insights into corporate 
bankruptcies, their prediction, their collection, and their characteristics. First, including the 
probability of negative book equity enhances the performance of bankruptcy prediction 
models, simultaneously enlarging their scope of application. Thereby, it adds to the broad 
literature on the search for a superior model. Second, the quality of bankruptcy information 
impacts the results of prediction models, which contributes to the literature on the quality 
of financial data. Third, properties of bankruptcy proceedings differ by company type. In 
addition, there is a relationship between a bankruptcy filing and the date of the subsequent 
annual report as well as between firm size and the results of bankruptcy predictions. These 
results add to the literature on corporate bankruptcy proceedings as well as to the literature 
on their predictions. All three essays help to identify superior prediction models, not only 
for public U.S. firms, but also in the context of non-U.S. and privately held firms. 
  
2 Predicting Bankruptcy  via Cross-Sectional Earnings Forecasts  
Chapter 2 
Predicting Bankruptcy via Cross-
Sectional Earnings Forecasts*  
2.1 Introduction 
General Motors, Lehman Brothers, and WorldCom are only a few examples of 
bankruptcies that have had huge impacts on capital markets4. Therefore, predicting 
corporate bankruptcies is critical for investors, managers, regulators, and banks. For 
example, the ability to predict bankruptcies enables investors to avoid specific securities, 
managers and regulators to take corrective actions, or banks to decide whom they should 
grant loans. We develop a new bankruptcy prediction model based on the assumption that 
negative book equity is a good predictor of financial distress.5 We predict next year’s book 
equity based on a firm’s current book equity and its forecasted earnings. Thus, our key 
                                                 
* This chapter is based on Hess and Huettemann (2019). For their insightful discussions and suggestions, we 
are grateful to Leif Atle Beisland, Jacqueline Garner, Thomas Hartmann-Wendels, Stoyu Ivanov, Ashok 
Kaul, Alexander Kempf, Roman Liesenfeld, Peter Limbach, William Liu, Tobias Lorsbach, Martin 
Meuter, Betty Simkins, and Hartmut Jakob Stenz, as well as the participants of the FMA Applied Finance 
Conference 2018 in New York City, the EAA Annual Congress 2018 in Milan, and the FMA European 
Conference in Kristiansand. The paper has also greatly benefitted from the comments by the seminar 
participants at the University of Cologne. We are grateful to Sudheer Chava for kindly providing us with 
his bankruptcy data. 
4 For example, May (2014) quantifies the costs for firms that lost access to the credit lines committed by 
Lehman Brothers. 
5 A firm has negative book equity if the value of its assets is below the value of the obligations it must 
service. 
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variable is the probability that current book equity is insufficient to cover upcoming losses. 
Strictly out-of-sample tests show that our approach leads to more accurate predictions than 
benchmark models. 
To calculate the probability of negative equity, we need to estimate the distribution 
of a firm’s future earnings. We build upon cross-sectional earnings regression models 
proposed by Hou, van Dijk, and Zhang (2012) and Li and Mohanram (2014) to obtain 
earnings forecasts. In addition, we use the standard errors of these forecasts to obtain a 
measure for earnings risk, i.e., the range of a firm’s possible earnings (or losses). Using 
this information, we can derive a closed form solution for the probability that a firm’s book 
equity becomes negative. Our approach shares the use of the loss distribution with the 
value at risk concept. Value at risk is defined as a loss value that is not exceeded by a pre-
specified probability. However, we start with a specific value (book equity) and then 
measure the probability that a firm’s loss exceeds this specific value. 
Our paper is related to Correia, Kang, and Richardson (2018) who find that different 
fundamental volatility measures based on both historical and forecasted earnings6 have 
incremental out-of-sample predictive power for bankruptcy. We expand this idea. We use 
both the dispersion of future earnings forecasts and the earnings forecast itself and 
combine these figures with the current level of equity. By this, we obtain a measure of 
future over-indebtedness, indicating whether a firm’s current risk capital will suffice to 
survive adverse conditions. Hence, the volatility of earnings forecasts that Correia et al. 
(2018) use is a subset of the explanatory variables of our model. 
In most jurisdictions, illiquidity, i.e., the inability to pay off expired debt, triggers 
bankruptcy filings. In contrast, over-indebtedness appears to be lower ranking. For 
example, in the U.S., firms with negative equity are not required to file for bankruptcy. 
However, in several European countries the inability to offset its debt with assets requires 
firms to take immediate action. For example, in Germany and Austria, among others, firms 
are required to inform their lenders immediately, and if they cannot negotiate some 
agreement, to file for bankruptcy protection. This supports our notion that negative book 
equity is a good predictor of financial distress. We claim that negative book equity is a 
strong indication of financial distress independent of the national bankruptcy regulation as 
                                                 
6 They use the cross-sectional quantile forecast model of Konstantinidi and Pope (2016) that resemble those 
of Hou et al. (2012). 
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it makes it less likely for a firm to obtain further credit and ultimately pay its debts when 
they become due. In fact, we show that our probability measure that a firm’s book equity 
turns negative provides strong out-of-sample predictions for insolvency filings of U.S. 
firms. Note that, theoretically, negative book equity is an even better predictor of 
bankruptcy in countries in which it is a formal criterion for bankruptcy. 
Firms may experience negative book equity for different reasons (e.g., Ang, 2015). 
First, they may suffer from persistent losses which is related to a default event. Second, 
firms may experience a non-recurring shock which could be a write-off or restructuring 
costs that could be strategically reported by managers. Furthermore, the shock could 
emerge from share buybacks or accounting rules such as the undervaluation of assets or 
major goodwill write-offs after takeovers. This non-recurring shock may not be directly 
related to distress. For firms that become bankrupt, we indeed observe that their book 
equity decreases successively during the years preceding bankruptcy. This supports the 
notion that the first case is prevalent, i.e., weakness in earnings drives most firms into 
bankruptcy. Cross-sectional earnings forecasts are good in capturing a persistence in 
earnings (or losses), rather than predicting one-time shocks. Thus, the probability of 
negative book equity (PNBE) covers rather the first case that is relevant to bankruptcy than 
the second case that is not related to distress. By this, is a good predictor of bankruptcy, not 
only empirically but also theoretically. 
Our paper is also related to approaches that use Merton’s (1974) option pricing 
theory to compute default probabilities, as they use the market value of equity as an 
indicator for the distance to default (e.g., Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Hillegeist, Keating, 
Cram, and Lundstedt, 2004; Bharath and Shumway, 2008; Charitou, Dionysiou, 
Lambertides, and Trigeorgis, 2013). They view the market value of equity as a call option 
on the market value of assets where the strike price is the book value of liabilities. Thus, if 
the market value of assets falls below that of liabilities, market equity goes to zero and the 
firm goes bankrupt. Hence, although the underlying idea is quite different, our probability 
of negative book equity resembles the distance-to-default (DD) models in the sense that the 
resulting probability of default is decreasing in equity and increasing in volatility. Studies 
using DD models show that a decreasing market equity is a trigger of bankruptcy. One 
motivation of this study is to show that a decreasing book equity is an even better 
predictor. Focusing on stock prices, DD models and other market-based models (e.g., 
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Duffie, Saita, and Wang, 2007; Giesecke, Longstaff, Schaefer, and Strebulaev, 2011) are 
only applicable to firms that are actively traded in the stock markets. A strength of our 
model is that it does not require stock market data, as we focus on the fundamental 
volatility, i.e., possible fluctuations of earnings. Hence a major advantage of our approach 
over DD models is, that we can also provide bankruptcy predictions for smaller firms 
without access to capital markets. In addition, we do not require a closed theory such as 
option pricing theory, which is accompanied by assumptions and restrictions (e.g., that a 
firm’s assets follow a certain stochastic process or that it has just a single zero-coupon 
bond outstanding). Furthermore, we use cross-sectional models to forecast earnings, 
instead of time series models that are used within the DD models. Cross-sectional models 
exploit the history of all firms and a broader dataset, and by this can provide forecasts for 
firms with a short or even no history. Thus, we further expand the scope of application 
compared to the use of time series models in DD models. 
We present three versions of our bankruptcy prediction model: The first version 
includes only our core variable, i.e., the probability of negative book equity. For simplicity, 
we call it the “negative book equity” model. However, firms with negative book equity do 
not inevitably become bankrupt. For example, firms might intentionally operate with 
negative book equity to avoid tax. Therefore, our second model version adds additional 
accounting variables which allow to better discriminate between negative book equity 
firms that continue operating and those that become bankrupt. Haowen (2015), for 
example, finds that non-bankrupt negative book equity firms tend to have a higher book 
leverage ratio, have more capital expenditure, pay less tax, have lower profitability, and be 
smaller in size. These findings, however, have not yet been incorporated into bankruptcy 
prediction models. This version is called the “accounting” model. The third version adds 
stock market variables, primarily to allow for a fair comparison with other models drawing 
on such data. In particular, it replaces the book leverage ratio with the market leverage 
ratio and adds two common market-based variables: excess return and its standard 
deviation. We call this version the “market” model. For example, Shumway (2001) and 
Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) show that market variables improve model 
performance. In contrast, Reisz and Perlich (2007) and Agarwal and Taffler (2008) show 
that accounting models perform similarly to market models. We analyze the out-of-sample 
performance of our three models and compare them to leading alternatives. Specifically, 
we re-estimate the most popular models: Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980), Shumway (2001), 
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and the best model version of Merton’s DD approach, as outlined in Bharath and Shumway 
(2008). To eliminate the effects of different statistical methods or sample periods, we 
embed all these models into hazard models that employ firms’ entire histories and the same 
data.  
The empirical results of our study can be summarized as follows. First, we find 
justification for our overall approach of tying a firm’s bankruptcy risk to negative book 
equity. In fact, we show that book equity and earnings diminish in the years before 
bankruptcy, with the most dramatic fall happening in the last year before bankruptcy. This 
finding suggests that negative book equity is a good predictor of bankruptcy, even in the 
United States whose bankruptcy law does not mandate firms to file for bankruptcy if assets 
fall below liabilities. Second, we provide evidence that the functional form we use for the 
probability cannot be completely replaced by a linear combination of the variables used to 
calculate this probability. The functional form remains significant even if we include all 
components as individual variables in the model. Third, we find strong differences in the 
means of certain variables for bankrupt versus non-bankrupt firms with negative book 
equity. While this validates, for example, Haowen’s (2015) results for the market leverage 
ratio, profitability, and size, it also suggests that we can improve our negative book equity 
model by including further accounting variables. In fact, by means of rolling out-of-sample 
analyses, we demonstrate that our augmented accounting model outperforms those models 
that rely solely on accounting information. Fourth, performance can be further improved 
by adding stock market information. The out-of-sample analysis shows that our market 
model performs best with respect to all three accuracy measures: the goodness-of-fit 
deciles, the area under the ROC (receiver operating characteristic) curve, and the economic 
value. Overall, our market model thus outperforms all leading alternatives of bankruptcy 
prediction, including those that use market information. Moreover, it shows significantly 
better results than our accounting model. This finding supports Shumway (2001), Beaver, 
McNichols, and Rhie (2005), Campbell et al. (2008), and Beaver, Correia, and McNichols 
(2012) who demonstrate that market variables add explanatory power. However, the 
performance boost associated with models relying on market data comes at a high cost, as 
the use of these models is limited to firms that have access to capital markets. Altman, 
Iwanicz-Drozdowska, Laitinen, and Suvas (2017) point out that predicting bankruptcies of 
private firms is equally important. Managing large loan portfolios, for example, requires 
models that can also assess small- and medium-sized firms. Therefore, it is all the more 
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important to note that our accounting model improves out-of-sample performance, coming 
close to alternative market models, but at the same time not restricting applicability to 
public firms. Using the rolling regression technique, we further show that our market 
model performs better not only on average but for most prediction years. Fifth, there is no 
difference throughout the whole evaluation period in the performance of our negative book 
equity model compared with the other models. Thus, we demonstrate that book equity and 
earnings are credit-relevant even in a fair value accounting regime. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes and 
motivates the variables that we use in our bankruptcy prediction models. In Section 2.3, we 
describe our sample selection, report the descriptive statistics, and explain our methods. In 
Section 2.4, we present and discuss our results. Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 Constructing bankruptcy measures 
2.2.1 Negative book equity model 
We exploit the fact that negative book equity is a strong indicator of financial 
distress. Negative book equity may arise because of persistent losses or a non-recurring 
shock. While the first case is directly related to distress, the second case is not. Thus, we 
construct a model that only identifies firms as bankrupt if persistent losses diminish the 
book equity and not if firms experience a shock. As cross-sectional earnings forecasts by 
nature translate past losses into future losses rather than capture non-recurring shocks, our 
probability of negative book equity reflects rather the first than the second case. By this, it 
is a good predictor of bankruptcy. 
Our basic model comprises just one variable, the probability that a firm’s future 
losses will deplete its book equity. We call this model our “negative book equity model.” 
Let BkEqi,t denote the current book equity of firm i. Book equity is equal to a 
stockholder’s equity (Compustat item SEQ). If SEQ is missing, we take common equity 
(CEQ) plus the value of preferred stock (PSTK). If CEQ or PSTK is missing, book equity 
is evaluated as total assets (AT) minus total liabilities (LT) minus minority interest (MIB). 
Further, let Earni,t+12m denote future earnings (change in retained earnings) for this firm 
for the subsequent twelve months, where earnings are equal to net income (NI) minus 
dividend payments (DVT). We calculate the next year’s book equity as the sum of current 
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book equity and earnings. Then, book equity turns negative if future losses (i.e., negative 
earnings) exceed current book equity: 
 −𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡+12𝑚 > 𝐵𝑘𝐸𝑞𝑖,𝑡.  (2.1) 
Thus, our key predictor is the probability that a firm’s future losses exceed the 
currently available book equity: 
 𝑃𝑁𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡  =  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡+12𝑚 <  −𝐵𝑘𝐸𝑞𝑖,𝑡).  (2.2) 
where PNBEi,t represents the probability of negative book equity for firm i at time t. 
To calculate this probability, we use the mean of an individual firm’s conditional earnings 
estimate, μ(Earn̂i,t+12m). This estimate is obtained from a rolling cross-sectional 
regression model in the spirit of Hou et al. (2012) and Li and Mohanram (2014). We 
describe this approach in detail in Section 2.2.2. The regression also provides us with a 
measure of the uncertainty of earnings estimates, namely the standard deviation of a firm’s 
conditional earnings estimate, σ(Earn̂i,t+12m).
7 Assuming normality of earnings, we can 
use the means and standard deviations of the earnings estimates to directly calculate the 
probability that firms’ future earnings might fall below a given threshold, i.e., that losses 
exceed the current book value of equity: 
 𝑃𝑁𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡  =  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡+12𝑚 <  −𝐵𝑘𝐸𝑞𝑖,𝑡)  
 =  𝛷 (−
𝐵𝑘𝐸𝑞𝐼,𝑡+𝜇(𝐸𝑎𝑟?̂?𝑖,𝑡+12𝑚) 
𝜎(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡+12𝑚̂ )
), (2.3) 
where Φ(⋅) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution.8 The probability of default depends on the sum of a firm’s current book equity 
and its mean earnings estimate relative to the standard deviation of its earnings estimate. 
                                                 
7 σ(Earni,t+12m̂ ) denotes the standard deviation of a predicted response of an individual firm for given data 
rather than the standard deviation of the estimated conditional mean. Thus, it yields the prediction interval 
rather than the confidence interval. In addition to the uncertainty in estimating the conditional mean, 
σ(Earni,t+12m̂ ) also reflects the variability of an individual observation in this conditional distribution: 
σ(Earni,t+12m̂ ) =  σ̂√(1 + xi(X′X)−1xi)
̂
, where σ̂ = √
1
n−2
∑ (yi − yî)
n
i=1  is the standard deviation of the 
residuals, xi is the explanatory vector of firm i, X is the data matrix, yi is the outcome of firm i, and yî is 
the predicted outcome of firm i. 
8 Linear regression estimates follow a t-distribution with n − p degrees of freedom, where n denotes the 
number of observations and p the number of independent variables. Owing to the large number of 
observations, n − p is consistently far above 40. Therefore, the t-distribution is well approximated by a 
standard normal distribution. 
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Option pricing models view market equity as a call option on the market value of a 
firm’s assets, where the strike price is the market value of the firm’s liabilities. Although 
this is a different setting than in our model, Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Hillegeist et al. 
(2004) develop a formula with a similar structure. Their probability of default depends on 
the ratio of expected future market equity and asset volatility, where future market equity 
is calculated as the current market value of assets minus current liabilities plus the 
expected asset changes according to a geometric Brownian motion. Our PNBE and the 
default probability extracted from option models have in common that a lower volatility 
and a larger equity lead to the assessment that a default is less likely. As option pricing 
models largely depend on market information, their use is restricted to firms that are 
actively traded in stock markets. In contrast, our approach does not require stock market 
data, as it builds on fundamental figures. Hence, a major advantage of our approach over 
option pricing models is, that we can also provide bankruptcy predictions for smaller firms 
without access to capital markets and, thus, enlarge the scope of application. 
2.2.2 Earnings forecasts 
We use earnings forecasts for the subsequent twelve months to calculate the PNBE.9  
Following Hess, Meuter, and Kaul (2017), who compare the performance of several cross-
sectional models, we implement the RI model of Li and Mohanram (2014) on a per-share 
basis as this model shows a somewhat better performance.10 To avoid a look-ahead bias all 
predictor variables are lagged by three months, i.e., we make predictions three months after 
the fiscal year end. This ensures that we do not use information before it is actually 
available. However, we differ from previous studies such as Hou et al. (2012) and Li and 
Mohanram (2014) who make predictions only once a year (i.e., each June), as we run 
regressions every month to forecast earnings exactly three months after the fiscal year end 
and not only at end of the following June. This ensures that the estimation is made 
promptly as soon as all information is at hand. Nevertheless, the forecast horizon is twelve 
months, and thus, the same as in Hou et al. (2012) and Li and Mohanram (2014). 
Following Hou et al. (2012), we employ a rolling regression technique based on windows 
                                                 
9 To forecast the mean and the standard deviation of earnings, we use cross-sectional earnings forecasts 
models (e.g., Hou et al., 2012; Li and Mohanram, 2014) instead of quantile regression models 
(Konstantinidi and Pope. 2016) due to their wide acceptance. 
10 We also perform empirical tests that use the cross-sectional earnings forecast model of Hou et al. (2012) 
and the EP model of Li and Mohanram (2014) and level earnings instead of per-share earnings. The tenor 
of the results remains unchanged. 
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that comprise the most recent ten years of accounting data. Every month, we run the 
following cross-sectional regression: 
𝐸𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐸𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛼2𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐸𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛼3𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
 + 𝛼4𝐵𝑘𝐸𝑞𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛼5𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 ,  (2.4) 
where Ei,t denotes the change in retained earnings per share of firm i at time t, 
NegEi,t is a dummy that takes the value of one if firm i reports negative earnings at time t, 
and NegEi,t ∙ Ei,t is an interaction term. BkEqi,t is the book value of equity per share, ACi,t 
are accruals per share, and τ = 1, 2. We calculate accruals following Hou et al. (2012). Up 
to 1988, accruals are the change in non-cash current assets (Compustat items ACT and 
CHE) minus the change in current liabilities (LCT) plus the change in short-term debt 
(DLC) plus the change in taxes payable (TXP), excluding depreciation and amortization 
costs (DP). From 1988 onwards, we define accruals as income before extraordinary items 
(IB) minus cash flow from operations (OANCF). Missing values are set to zero. 
Using the coefficients from this regression, we can easily calculate the out-of-sample 
predictions for the two subsequent fiscal years. Weighting these predictions, we construct 
earnings forecasts (and corresponding standard deviations) with a horizon of twelve 
months ahead.11 
2.2.3 Accounting model 
A central assumption in our basic one-variable model version is that negative book 
equity directly leads to bankruptcy. However, firms with negative equity do not inevitably 
become bankrupt. Instead, they might intentionally operate with negative book equity to 
reduce taxes, for example. To further discriminate between healthy and bankrupt firms, we 
introduce an extended model version, our “accounting model,” which adds independent 
variables. In particular, we follow Haowen (2015), who finds that non-bankrupt negative 
book equity firms tend to have a lower leverage ratio, more capital expenditure, pay less 
tax, have lower profitability, and be smaller than bankrupt negative book equity firms. 
However, the variables suggested by Haowen have not been incorporated into bankruptcy 
prediction models yet. Therefore, we perform profile analyses to analyze whether these 
                                                 
11 As we make estimations three months after the fiscal year-end, the predictions for the next fiscal year-end 
have a weight of nine-twelfths and the predictions for the fiscal year-end after that have a weight of three-
twelfths. 
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variables can indeed explain differences between bankrupt and non-bankrupt firm-years. 
The results clearly show that these additional variables increase the predictive power. In 
contrast to our negative book equity model, which contains only one variable, the 
augmented accounting model can better discriminate between bankrupt and non-bankrupt 
firm-years. 
Besides the probability that book equity becomes negative, our accounting model 
therefore comprises the following accounting-based measures: We use a dummy that takes 
the value one if book equity is negative, and zero otherwise (NegBkEq). Similarly, we add 
a dummy that equals one if the earnings forecast is negative, and zero otherwise 
(NegEarnFrc). Moreover, we use the book leverage ratio (BLR), calculated as the sum of 
long-term debt (Compustat item DLTT) and current debt (DLC) divided by total assets 
(AT). CAPXTA denotes capital expenditure (CAPX) divided by total assets (AT), TXT is 
the total amount of paid taxes (TXT), EBITTA is calculated as earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets, and Size is measured by the logarithm of sales 
(SALE). EBITTA is also used by Altman (1968) and Size is used by Ohlson (1980). 
2.2.4 Market model 
There is ongoing debate whether market variables consistently add explanatory 
power compared with models that solely consider accounting variables. For example, 
Shumway (2001), Hillegeist et al. (2004), Beaver et al. (2005), Campbell et al. (2008), and 
Beaver et al. (2012) demonstrate that market variables can improve accuracy. In contrast, 
Reisz and Perlich (2007), Agarwal and Taffler (2008), and Xu and Zhang (2009) show that 
accounting-based models have similar performance. To test these hypotheses, we add two 
market variables that are taken from Shumway (2001) into our accounting model: the 
stock’s past excess return (ER), which is the last year’s stock return minus the last year’s 
value-weighted index return, and the standard deviation of the stock’s return (STDER). 
Moreover, we replace the book leverage ratio by the market leverage ratio (MLR), 
calculated as the sum of long-term debt (Compustat item DLTT) and current debt (DLC) 
divided by the sum of long-term debt, current debt, and market equity. Market equity is the 
fiscal year-end equity price (PRCC_F) multiplied by the number of common shares 
outstanding (CSHO). We call this augmented specification our “market model.” 
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2.3 Data and method 
2.3.1 Sample description and summary statistics 
We use bankruptcy information taken from Chava and Jarrow (2004), which is 
updated in Chava (2014) and Alanis, Chava, and Kumar (2016).12 This data comprises the 
bankruptcy events between January 1964 and December 2014 of all firms trading on the 
NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ, independent of their size. Bankruptcy is defined as filing for 
Chapter 7 or Chapter 11. We make earnings forecasts three months after the fiscal year-end 
to ensure public availability of the information that we use. That is, we predict the book 
equity of 15 months after the fiscal year-end. Accordingly, we declare a firm will become 
bankrupt during the subsequent year if the bankruptcy date lies between the last fiscal year-
end plus three months (our estimation date) and the last fiscal year-end plus 15 months. 
Thus, the dependent variable equals one if the firm becomes bankrupt during this period, 
and zero otherwise. Our bankruptcy forecast horizon is twelve months for all firm-years. In 
contrast, many previous studies use the fiscal year or calendar year as their horizon. As we 
have bankruptcies until the end of 2014, our sample comprises observations with a fiscal 
year-end before or equal to the end of September 2013. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the information about these bankruptcy events. The second 
column shows the number of active firms in a given year, the third column shows the 
number of firms with a bankruptcy dummy equal to one and the fourth column presents the 
corresponding percentage. We observe 1,490 bankruptcy events during our sample period. 
Chava and Jarrow (2004) retain a total of 464 for their sample period from 1963 until 1998 
and Shumway (2001) uses 300 bankruptcies between 1962 and 1992. The overall 
bankruptcy rate is 0.79%, with substantial fluctuation over the years. Bankruptcies were 
rare until the late 1970s, whereas the bankruptcy rate had a high in 1985 of 1.20% and a 
peak of 2.47% in 2001.  
Our initial sample comprises all firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ in 
the intersection of the annual Compustat North America fundamentals files and the daily 
and monthly CRSP files between 1958 and 2013. We obtain out-of-sample bankruptcy 
predictions with a two-step methodology.  
                                                 
12 We are grateful to Sudheer Chava for kindly providing us with his bankruptcy data. 
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In the first step, we use a rolling regression technique to obtain earnings forecasts. 
We obtain the one-year-ahead earnings forecasts for 1969 to 2014, requiring ten years of 
data for these cross-sectional earnings regressions. The first earnings forecasts are made in 
1968 for 1969 using accounting data from 1958 to 1967 and the last forecasts are made in 
2013 for 2014 based on data from 2003 to 2012. These forecasts are free of a look-ahead 
bias as we only use information up to the point in time when the forecasts are made. 
 
Table 2.1 Number of bankruptcies per year 
Year 
Active 
Firms 
Bankruptcies (%) Year 
Active 
Firms 
Bankruptcies (%) 
1968 1,210 0 0.00 1991 4,447 41 0.92 
1969 1,427 1 0.07 1992 4,592 33 0.72 
1970 1,654 3 0.18 1993 4,799 32 0.67 
1971 1,867 2 0.11 1994 5,257 22 0.42 
1972 1,961 5 0.25 1995 5,505 27 0.49 
1973 2,999 10 0.33 1996 5,791 28 0.48 
1974 3,284 15 0.46 1997 6,227 35 0.56 
1975 3,290 8 0.24 1998 6,293 58 0.92 
1976 3,286 11 0.33 1999 5,990 65 1.09 
1977 3,245 11 0.34 2000 5,711 112 1.96 
1978 3,227 13 0.40 2001 5,501 136 2.47 
1979 3,384 15 0.44 2002 5,071 93 1.83 
1980 3,502 22 0.63 2003 4,788 64 1.34 
1981 3,622 24 0.66 2004 4,515 22 0.49 
1982 3,846 36 0.94 2005 4,502 26 0.58 
1983 4,001 24 0.60 2006 4,422 16 0.36 
1984 4,267 44 1.03 2007 4,326 29 0.67 
1985 4,330 52 1.20 2008 4,225 38 0.90 
1986 4,383 40 0.91 2009 3,994 21 0.53 
1987 4,616 39 0.84 2010 3,829 16 0.42 
1988 4,715 53 1.12 2011 3,723 23 0.62 
1989 4,519 41 0.91 2012 3,642 20 0.55 
1990 4,399 47 1.07 2013 3,577 17 0.48 
        Total 187,761 1,490 0.79 
This table lists the number of active firms, the number of bankruptcy dummies, and the percentage of 
bankruptcy dummies among active firms for every year of our sample period of 1968 to 2013. The 
bankruptcy dummy takes the value of 1 if a firm becomes bankrupt in the three months after the fiscal 
year-end and 15 months after the fiscal year-end. 
 
In the second step, we use the resulting earnings forecasts to predict bankruptcies. To 
produce strictly out-of-sample forecasts here as well, we use a rolling estimation technique 
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again. That is, we estimate parameters based on sample windows including the most recent 
ten years of data and then calculate one-year-ahead out-of-sample predictions. Our first 
estimation period comprises data from 1968 to 1977 to predict bankruptcies for 1978 and 
our last period comprises data from 2003 to 2012 to predict bankruptcies for 2013. This 
rolling regression technique resembles the procedure of practitioners. 
As in the earnings regression, all our bankruptcy measures are lagged by three 
months to ensure that they are observable when we use them for the estimation. That is, we 
assume that the accounting and market information is available three months after the 
fiscal year-end. For the bankruptcy predictions, we use those earnings forecasts that are 
made three months after the fiscal year-end. Accordingly, we make our one-year 
bankruptcy predictions three months after the fiscal year-end. We delete observations with 
missing variables that are required in the earnings forecast model or in any bankruptcy 
prediction model. These include the variable sets of our negative book equity, accounting, 
and market models as well as those of the models used for benchmarking, namely the 
Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980), and Shumway (2001) models and the DD model used by 
Bharath and Shumway (2008).13 Appendix 2.A describes the variable construction for 
these bankruptcy prediction models. To reduce the effect of outliers, we winsorize all 
variables (except the indicator variables and probabilities) annually at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. 
Table 2.2 provides summary statistics for the variables described above. Panel A 
presents the measures used to forecast bankruptcy and Panel B presents the measures used 
to forecast earnings. We report the mean, median, standard deviation, and certain 
percentiles of the 189,251 firm-years with complete data availability for 1968 to 2013. 
Most importantly, the overall firm-year average of the probability that losses exceed 
current book equity (i.e., the PNBE) is 11%. At the same time, only 25% of all firm-years 
have a PNBE greater than 9%. For 1% of all firm-years, the PNBE is greater than 96% and 
half the firms have a PNBE that is zero. Based on this, the PNBE might be a good proxy 
for the probability of default. As the overall bankruptcy rate is only 0.79%, a possible cut-
off point of PNBE to discriminate between bankrupt and non-bankrupt firm-years might be 
                                                 
13 DD models use Merton’s (1974) option pricing theory and have been shown to be good predictors of 
bankruptcy by Hillegeist et al. (2004) and Vassalou and Xing (2004). We use the DD version model that 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) find to perform best, which they call “Model 7.” It comprises their naïve 
version of Merton’s DD probability, the inputs of this probability as individual measures, and the ratio of 
net income and total assets. 
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above 50%. For 33% of all firm-years, the cross-sectional earnings models forecast 
negative earnings. The statistics for EBITTA, ER, and STDER are consistent with former 
bankruptcy prediction studies such as Shumway (2001). 
Table 2.2 Summary statistics (N=189,251) 
Panel A: Variables in bankruptcy prediction models 
Variable Model Mean STD 1% 25% Median 75% 99% 
PNBEt 
NBE / 
A / M 
0.11 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.96 
NegEarnFrct A / M 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
BLRt A 0.33 0.36 0.00 0.07 0.29 0.50 1.55 
CAPXTAt A / M 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.39 
TXTt A / M 34.47 145.89 -26.66 0.00 1.45 12.05 708.00 
EBITTAt A / M 0.01 0.34 -1.27 0.00 0.07 0.13 0.35 
Sizet A / M 4.83 2.22 0.37 3.23 4.64 6.30 10.35 
MLRt M 0.26 0.25 0.00 0.03 0.19 0.42 0.90 
ERt M 0.02 0.64 -0.96 -0.34 -0.07 0.22 2.35 
STDERt M 0.12 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.10 0.15 0.43 
Panel B: Variables in earnings forecast models 
Variable  Mean STD 1% 25% Median 75% 99% 
Et  37.00 274.70 -303.00 -1.65 1.55 13.81 995.00 
NegEt  0.34 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
NegExEt  -14.45 90.29 -303.00 -1.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BkEqt  579.26 2,444.08 -38.61 10.94 47.93 233.48 9,709.55 
ACt  -78.49 375.50 -1572.00 -23.33 -2.78 0.18 71.00 
EarnFrct+12m  6.16 1511.40 -1.84 -0.28 0.33 0.99 5.03 
STDEarnFrct+12m 1.81 29.94 1.09 1.46 1.58 1.67 1.88 
This table reports the summary statistics of the following forecast variables ($ millions for all values 
except dummy variables and probability values). For more details, see the data construction in Appendix 
2.A. PNBE is the probability that losses deplete current book equity, NegBE is a dummy for negative 
book equity, NegEarnFrc is a dummy for negative earnings forecast, BLR is the book leverage ratio, 
CAPXTA are capital expenditures over total assets, TXT are taxes, EBITTA are earnings before interest 
and taxes over total assets, size is the logarithm of sales, MLR is the market leverage ratio, ER is the 
excess return, STDER is the standard deviation of the return, E is the change in retained earnings, NegE is 
a dummy for negative earnings, NegExE is an interaction term of the dummy for negative earnings and 
earnings, BkEq is the book equity, AC are accruals, EarnFrc is the 12-month earnings per share forecasts, 
and STDEarnFrc is the corresponding volatility. Panel A shows those variables used to forecast 
bankruptcy and Panel B shows those variables and the results of earnings forecasts models. Each 
observation represents one particular firm in one particular year. The reported values are the time series 
averages of yearly cross sectional means, medians, standard deviations, and respective percentiles. All 
variables (except indicator variables and probability values) are winsorized annually at the 1st and 99th 
percentile. The column labeled “Model” indicates in which model the variable is used, with NBE meaning 
our negative book equity model, A meaning our accounting model and M meaning our market model. The 
sample period is from 1968 to 2013. Summary statistics are reported for those observations for which all 
variables of any model are available. 
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2.3.2 Method 
Shumway (2001) demonstrates that the likelihood function of hazard models is equal 
to that of logistic regressions with multiple observations per firm. We follow Shumway 
(2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004), and Campbell et al. (2008) and estimate the hazard 
model as a multi-period logistic regression. Thus, the probability of a firm becoming 
bankrupt follows a logistic distribution with the parameters (α, β) and is equal to 
 𝑃𝑡(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1) =  
1
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝛼−𝛽𝑥𝑖,𝑡)
,   (2.5) 
where yit is the bankruptcy dummy that equals one if the firm fails in the following 
twelve months, and zero otherwise, and xi,t is the vector of the explanatory variables 
known at t, that is, three months after the fiscal year-end. The higher α + βxi,t, the greater 
is the estimated probability of bankruptcy. The estimates and their significance levels are 
calculated using a maximum likelihood technique. Shumway (2001) points out that the test 
statistics produced by a logistic regression are incorrect for the hazard model. Calculating 
correct test statistics requires dividing them by the average number of firm-years per firm. 
The statistics reported in this study have been adjusted accordingly. 
Static models (e.g., Altman, 1968; Ohlson, 1980) use a single observation per firm. 
Arbitrarily selecting only one firm-year might entail sample selection bias. In contrast, the 
approach of this study allows the use of entire firm histories. Thus, our estimation 
technique exploits more information and eliminates the sample selection bias. Note that 
applying such a technique to variable sets used by Altman (1968) or Ohlson (1980)  
already improves their performance compared with applying their original estimation 
technique. 
2.4 Empirical results 
2.4.1 Evolution of book equity and earnings around bankruptcy 
In the following, we validate the assumption made for the construction of PNBE that 
negative book equity is a good indicator of bankruptcy in the sense that the book equity of 
bankrupt firms diminishes in the years before bankruptcy and is finally depleted by losses 
in the year of bankruptcy. Table 2.3 reports the means of the variables related to book 
equity and earnings for bankrupt firms as well as for firms that never became bankrupt. For 
2 Predicting Bankruptcy via Cross-Sectional Earnings Forecasts 25 
bankrupt firms, we provide statistics for each of the five years preceding bankruptcy and 
for the year of bankruptcy. For example, year -1 denotes the year one year before 
bankruptcy and year 0 denotes the year of bankruptcy. To avoid confounding effects from 
changes in the sample, we analyze only those 739 bankrupt firms for which we have at 
least five years of data before their bankruptcy.14 Of these firms, only 300 also present a 
balance sheet in the year of their bankruptcy. For comparison we report the statistics for 
the non-bankrupt firms (corresponding to another 168,297 firm-years). 
Table 2.3 Evolution of book equity and earnings in the years around bankruptcy 
 
Bankrupt Firms 
Non-
bankrupt 
Firms 
 
 
Years Relative to Bankruptcy 
 
Variable -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 
 
PNBEt 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.22 0.41 0.61 0.10 
BkEqt 215.00 223.21 198.44 171.59 82.75 -90.07 759.28 
BkEqt/AssTt 0.40 0.38 0.33 0.25 0.03 -0.27 0.48 
NegBEt 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.29 0.55 0.03 
Earnt -0.85 -19.46 -22.92 -45.85 -99.25 -245.63 49.17 
Earnt/AssTt -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 -0.18 -0.37 -0.52 -0.14 
NegEt 0.45 0.49 0.56 0.73 0.89 0.89 0.33 
        
N 739 739 739 739 739 300 168,297 
This table reports the summary statistics of bankrupt firms and of firms that never became bankrupt, 
respectively. For bankrupt firms, we report statistics in the last five years before bankruptcy and in 
the year after bankruptcy to see the evolution. We only include those bankrupt firms with a history of 
at least five years before bankruptcy to ensure that we investigate the same firms over time. For non-
bankrupt firms, we report statistics for all observations. The variables ($ millions for all the values 
except the dummy variables and probability values) are the following: PNBE is the probability that 
losses deplete current book equity, BkEq is book equity, BkEq/AssT is book equity divided by total 
assets, NegBE is a dummy for negative book equity, Earn is the change in retained earnings, 
Earn/AssT is the change in retained earnings divided by total assets, and NegE is a dummy for 
negative earnings. All the variables (except the indicator variables and probability values) are 
winsorized annually at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The sample period is from 1968 to 2013. 
Quantities are reported for those observations for which all the variables are available. 
 
For the non-bankrupt firms, we observe a negative book equity only in 3.0% of the 
firm-years. In contrast, even five years before bankruptcy, 4% of bankrupt firms already 
have negative book equity. This ratio increases monotonically to 29% in year -1, directly 
before bankruptcy. Finally, 55% of bankrupt firms have negative book equity in the year in 
which they go bankrupt (year 0). Note, however, that out of the 739 bankrupt firms only 
                                                 
14 This restriction is only made for this analysis; all other analyses also include bankrupt firms with a history 
of four years or less before bankruptcy. 
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300 are able to present financial statements at that time. Presumably, the situation of the 
others is even worse, so that the ratio over all bankrupt firms would be even higher. 
Accordingly, average book equity five years before bankruptcy is 215.00, which is already 
much smaller than the average of firms that never go bankrupt (759.28). The average book 
equity for bankrupt firms consistently declines from year -4 on, with the most severe fall 
from 171.59 in year -2 to 82.75 in year -1. In the year of bankruptcy, average book equity 
is negative (-90.07). Note that standardizing book equity by total assets does not change 
the tenor of our observations. Thus, our results confirm that a low book equity is a signifier 
of bankruptcy even five years before bankruptcy. 
Moreover, we find a similar pattern for earnings: Only 33% of non-bankrupt firm-
years report negative earnings. In contrast, the ratio of bankrupt firms with negative 
earnings rises from 45% in year -5 to 89% in year -1. The mean earnings five years before 
bankruptcy is -0.85, already much smaller than the mean of firms that never become 
bankrupt (49.17). Average earnings for bankrupt firms show a downward trend from year -
5 on and experience the most significant fall from -45.85 in year -2 to -99.25 in year -1. In 
the year of bankruptcy, average earnings are -245.63 and thus even more negative. Similar 
results apply to the mean of earnings standardized by total assets. Importantly, average 
losses in the year before bankruptcy (-99.25) deplete average book equity in the year of 
bankruptcy (82.75). 
On average, our PNBE is monotonically increasing during the years before 
bankruptcy. In year -5, the mean of the PNBE is 11.7%, which is already higher than the 
average PNBE of non-bankrupt firm-years (10.0%). In year -2, the PNBE of bankrupt 
firms is 22.3% and in the year before bankruptcy, it jumps to 41.2% and finally to 60.6% 
in the year of bankruptcy. 
These results strongly support our overall assumption that book equity diminishes in 
the years before bankruptcy and finally turns negative after bankruptcy. This depletion of 
book equity is explained by earnings that are negative even five years before bankruptcy 
and a further decrease in the years preceding bankruptcy. Book equity and earnings 
experience a dramatic fall, and losses exceed book equity in the year directly before 
bankruptcy. Accordingly, our variable of the PNBE, which also incorporates the volatility 
of the earnings estimate, consistently rises during the years before bankruptcy. By this, we 
find differences between healthy and bankrupt firms already five years before the latter 
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firms go into bankruptcy. That is, diminishing book equity and weak earnings are early 
warning signals for an impending bankruptcy. It may be somewhat surprising that we find 
such a relation between book equity and bankruptcy for U.S. firms even though the U.S. 
bankruptcy law does not require firms to file for bankruptcy when assets fall below 
liabilities. Therefore, further research should be devoted to the question whether this 
relation is even stronger in countries whose law explicitly defines negative book equity to 
trigger a bankruptcy filing.  
2.4.2 Profile analysis of bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms 
Table 2.4 provides a profile analysis. We report the means and standard deviations of 
all variables separately for the group of non-bankrupt firm-years and the group of bankrupt 
firm-years. A bankrupt firm-year is an observation for which the fiscal year-end lies three 
to 15 months before the bankruptcy; in other words, the bankruptcy dummy is equal to 1. 
A non-bankrupt firm is an observation for which the bankruptcy dummy is equal to 0. That 
is, a non-bankrupt firm-year might be an observation of a firm that becomes bankrupt at a 
later point in time. The column labeled “Diff” shows the mean difference between healthy 
firm-years and bankrupt firm-years. We further report the results of Welch’s t-test on mean 
equality.15  
This t-test is significant for all our bankruptcy model variables which suggests that 
the hypothesis that bankrupt and non-bankrupt firm-years have the same mean is rejected 
for all the variables. In firm-years with an impending bankruptcy all the variables 
experience some mean shift. For most variables the observed differences are as expected. 
Most importantly, firms that go bankrupt have an average PNBE of 41.3%, which is 
significantly higher than the probability of 10.4% for the healthy firm group. Thus, the 
PNBE has strong discriminating power. The untabulated median for the bankrupt group is 
39%, close to its mean. However, the distribution of the PNBE is skewed for the non-
bankrupt group. Its untabulated median is 0%, which is much smaller than its mean of 
10%. Only 25% of the observations for non-bankrupt firms have a PNBE higher than 9% 
and only 10% have a PNBE higher than 45%. Furthermore, firms in their last year before 
bankruptcy more often have negative earnings forecasts, a higher leverage ratio, a lower 
amount of paid taxes, lower profitability measured by EBITTA, a lower excess return, a 
                                                 
15 Welch’s t-test is a two-sample test for the hypothesis that two populations have the same mean. Unlike the 
more common Student’s t-test, Welch’s t-test does not assume equal variances or equal sample sizes. 
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higher return standard deviation, and are smaller in size. Unexpectedly, those firms have 
higher capital expenditure relative to total assets. 
Overall, these variables may help to discriminate between bankrupt and non-
bankrupt firm-years; consequently, they directly add to the idea of negative book equity 
and may increase the explanatory power of PNBE. In Section 2.4.3, we therefore include 
these variables into our “accounting” and “market” models and investigate whether they 
are indeed significant predictors of bankruptcy. 
Table 2.4 Profile analysis and t-test for mean equality (N=189,251) 
  
Non-Bankrupt Bankrupt 
   
  
Firm-Years Firm-Years 
   
Variable Model Mean STD Mean STD Diff t-stat 
PNBEt NBE / A / M 0.10 0.20 0.41 0.36 -0.31 -32.83 *** 
NegEarnFrct A / M 0.33 0.47 0.87 0.34 -0.54 -60.20 *** 
BLRt A 0.33 0.35 0.79 0.73 -0.46 -24.38 *** 
CAPXTAt A / M 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.11 -0.01 -4.43 *** 
TXTt A / M 34.71 146.34 4.39 62.28 30.32 18.39 *** 
EBITTAt A / M 0.01 0.34 -0.24 0.63 0.25 15.46 *** 
Sizet A / M 4.83 2.23 4.45 1.96 0.38 7.40 *** 
MLRt M 0.25 0.25 0.58 0.31 -0.33 -40.73 *** 
ERt M 0.02 0.64 -0.45 0.52 0.47 34.90 *** 
STDERt M 0.12 0.08 0.19 0.11 -0.07 -27.18 *** 
         
N 
 
187,761 1,490 
   
This table reports the summary statistics of the following forecast variables ($ millions for all the 
values except the dummy variables and probability values) for the bankrupt and non-bankrupt 
groups, respectively. For more details, see the data construction in Appendix 2.A. PNBE is the 
probability that losses deplete current book equity, NegBE is a dummy for negative book equity, 
NegEarnFrc is a dummy for a negative earnings forecast, BLR is the book leverage ratio, CAPXTA 
is capital expenditures over total assets, TXT is taxes, EBITTA is earnings before interest and taxes 
over total assets, size is the logarithm of sales, MLR is the market leverage ratio, ER is the excess 
return, and STDER is the standard deviation of the return. Each observation represents one particular 
firm in one particular year. The reported values are the time series averages of the yearly cross-
sectional means and standard deviations. All the variables (except the indicator variables and 
probability values) are winsorized annually at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The column labeled 
“Model” indicates in which model the variable is used, with NBE meaning our negative book equity 
model, A meaning our accounting model, and M meaning our market model. The sample period is 
from 1968 to 2013. Quantities are reported for those observations for which all the variables are 
available. The column “Diff” shows the difference in the means of the non-bankrupt group and 
bankrupt group. The t-statistic of Welch’s t-test of mean equality is reported, where an independent 
two-sample and unequal variances are assumed. *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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2.4.3 Estimation results 
We use rolling windows that comprise the most recent ten years of data to calculate 
one-year-ahead out-of-sample predictions. We perform hazard models annually: our first 
estimation uses data from 1968 to 1977 to predict bankruptcies for 1978, and our last 
estimation is based on data from 2003 to 2012 to predict bankruptcies for 2013. As 
outlined in Section 2.3.2, we estimate the hazard model as a multi-period logistic 
regression and adjust the test statistics accordingly. Table 2.5 presents the coefficients of 
these hazard models, along with measures to evaluate their out-of-sample performance. 
Table 2.5 Rolling hazard models of the bankruptcy prediction models 
Panel A: Parameter estimates 
  Negative Book Equity Accounting Market   
Variable Model Model Model   
Constant -5.626 *** -7.449 *** -8.031 ***  
PNBEt 3.684 *** 1.501 *** 1.040 ***  
NegEarnFrct  1.757 *** 1.297 ***  
BLRt   1.001 ***    
CAPXTAt   0.856  1.672 ***  
TXTt   -0.043 *** -0.033 ***  
EBITTAt   -0.920 *** -1.184 ***  
Sizet  0.192 *** 0.111 ***  
MLRt  
 
  3.023 ***  
ERt   
 
  -0.669 ***  
STDERt  
 
  2.656 ***  
Panel B: Goodness-of-fit deciles 
  
Negative 
Book 
Equity 
Accounting Market 
Altman 
(1968) 
Ohlson 
(1980) 
Shumway 
(2001) 
Bharath 
and 
Shumway 
(2008) 
Decile 
1 45.29 55.97 65.66 55.69 50.56 58.01 61.38 
2 13.62 19.45 16.50 14.12 20.22 17.28 16.15 
3 10.60 9.06 6.53 7.58 11.24 8.50 7.23 
4 8.50 5.27 4.07 5.27 5.62 5.41 5.48 
5 6.46 3.58 2.25 4.07 3.37 3.23 2.60 
6 4.42 2.88 1.69 4.63 1.76 2.32 1.90 
7 3.23 1.54 1.19 2.39 2.11 1.40 1.47 
8 2.95 0.98 0.98 2.53 1.33 1.33 1.05 
9 2.11 0.56 0.77 2.11 1.90 1.26 1.69 
10 2.81 0.70 0.35 1.62 1.90 1.26 1.05 
      (continued) 
 
Table 2.5 Rolling hazard models of the bankruptcy prediction models (continued) 
Panel C: Area under the ROC curve 
  Negative Book 
Equity 
Accounting Market 
Altman 
(1968) 
Ohlson 
(1980) 
Shumway 
(2001) 
Bharath and 
Shumway (2008)  
Mean 0.783 0.862 0.892 0.828 0.841 0.859 0.868 
Panel D: Economic value of different misclassification costs 
  Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6 Bank 7 
 
Negative Book 
Equity 
Accounting Market 
Altman 
(1968) 
Ohlson 
(1980) 
Shumway 
(2001) 
Bharath and 
Shumway (2008) 
 
  
Credits 12,316.5 26,834.0 48,459.5 18,472.5 15,194.5 17,792.5 24,841.5 
Market share (%) 7.47% 16.27% 29.38% 11.20% 9.21% 10.79% 15.06% 
Defaults 383 101 75.5 257 183 129.5 139 
Defaults/credits (%) 3.11% 0.38% 0.16% 1.39% 1.20% 0.73% 0.56% 
Avg. credit spread (%) 0.51% 0.35% 0.34% 0.45% 0.42% 0.39% 0.39% 
Revenue ($m) 37.92 57.46 99.34 50.48 38.85 41.69 58.22 
Loss ($m) 117.33 30.94 23.13 78.73 56.06 39.67 42.58 
Profit ($m) -79.41 26.52 76.21 -28.25 -17.22 2.02 15.64 
Return on assets (%) -1.06% 0.16% 0.26% -0.25% -0.19% 0.02% 0.10% 
This table reports the results of the rolling hazard models. Panel A shows the Newey–West (1987) time series averages of the annual regression coefficients for 
our negative book equity model, our accounting model, and our market model to predict bankruptcies. PNBE is the probability that losses deplete current book 
equity, NegBE is a dummy for negative book equity, NegEarnFrc is a dummy for a negative earnings forecast, BLR is the book leverage ratio, CAPXTA is 
capital expenditures over total assets, TXT is taxes, EBITTA is earnings before interest and taxes over total assets, size is the logarithm of sales, MLR is the 
market leverage ratio, ER is the excess return, and STDER is the standard deviation of the return. Panel B shows the goodness-of-fit deciles. For every year, we 
rank firms into deciles based on their fitted bankruptcy probability values, where the firms with the highest values fall into the first decile. We report the 
percentage of bankrupt firms classified into each probability decile. Panel C reports the Newey–West (1987) time series averages of the yearly means of the area 
under the ROC curve (AUC). Panel D shows the results of a competitive credit market. The banks reject firms with scores in the bottom 5% based on their 
respective models, while offering credit to all others at a credit spread derived using equation (2.6). The bank with the lowest credit spread is assumed to grant 
the loan. Firms are assumed to split their loan equally if banks offer the same credit spread. Market share is the total credit granted divided by the total number of 
firm-years. Default is the number of firms to which a loan is granted that went bankrupt. Revenue is market size * market share * average credit spread, and loss 
is market size * prior probability of failure * share of defaulters * loss given default. Profit is revenue - loss. Return on assets are profit divided by market size * 
market share. For illustrative purposes, we assume the market size to be $100 billion, equal sized loans, the loss given default to be 45%, and the credit spread 
for the highest quality customers to be 0.30%. The prior probability of failure is taken to be the same as the ex-post failure rate. *** denotes significance at the 
1% level. 
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Panel A in Table 2.5 reports the Newey and West (1987) time series averages of the 
annual regression coefficients for our three model versions, the negative book equity, the 
accounting, and the market model. The coefficients of our negative book equity model 
confirm that the PNBE on its own is a significant bankruptcy predictor. All the variables 
that are added to our accounting model except for CAPXTA are also statistically 
significant and thus may help increase the predictive power of the PNBE. In our market 
model, all the measures are significant. The fact that the market-based variables are 
significant supports the hypothesis that a combination of accounting- and market-based 
variables can improve the accuracy of bankruptcy prediction models. The signs of most 
coefficients are consistent with economic intuition: Firms with a higher PNBE and firms 
with negative earnings forecasts (NegEarnFrc) are more likely to fail. The higher the book 
leverage ratio (BLR), market leverage ratio (MLR), and volatility of returns (STDER), the 
higher is the estimated probability of bankruptcy. The lower the tax (TXT) and excess 
return (ER), the higher is the estimated probability of bankruptcy. Unexpectedly, higher 
capital expenditure (CAPXTA) and larger size (Size) lead to the assessment that 
bankruptcy is more likely. 
2.4.4 Out-of-sample results 
Panels B, C, and D of Table 2.5 assess the out-of-sample predictive ability of the 
different models. We compare our negative book equity, accounting, and market models 
with the common alternatives of Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980), and Shumway (2001). 
Furthermore, we estimate Merton’s DD model in its best version as found by Bharath and 
Shumway (2008). Note that we re-parametrize all these models using a hazard model and 
the same data to eliminate the effects of statistical methods or different sample periods. 
Differences in the out-of-sample results compared with other studies such as Shumway 
(2001) and Bharath and Shumway (2008) are because we use an augmented period of time 
and a rolling estimation technique. 
2.4.4.1 Goodness-of-fit deciles 
Panel B of Table 2.5 reports the goodness-of-fit deciles. Following Shumway (2001), 
we rank firms into deciles based on their fitted bankruptcy probability values for every 
year of our validation period (1978 to 2013). That is, firms that will most likely default in 
the subsequent year according to the respective model are sorted into the first decile and 
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firms with the lowest estimated default probabilities are assigned to the 10th decile. Since 
our negative book equity model is univariate, there is no difference if the firms are ranked 
with the probability estimated by the hazard model or directly with the PNBE. We report 
the percentages of bankrupt firms that fall into each of the ten probability deciles. A model 
is accurate if it yields high default probability estimates for bankrupt firm-years and thus 
assigns many bankrupt firms into the first decile. 
Our accounting model classifies 55.97% of all bankrupt firm-years into the highest 
default probability decile (decile one). That is, a bank can exclude 55.97% of all 
bankruptcies if it does not lend money to the 10% of firms with the highest expected 
default measures. Based on this, the model outperforms the Altman (55.69%) and Ohlson 
(50.56%) models, which also use accounting information.16 Even our negative book equity 
model identifies 45.29% of bankruptcies correctly (in the first decile). Given that it has 
only one variable, it performs surprisingly well. For the top two deciles (in aggregate), 
75.42% of the bankruptcies are predicted accurately by our accounting model. That is, if a 
bank does not lend money to the 20% of firms with the highest default probabilities, it 
excludes 75.42% of all bankruptcies. Again, our accounting model performs better than the 
Altman (69.80%) and Ohlson (70.79%) models. Importantly, the accounting model 
achieves better out-of-sample performance than all other accounting-based models, i.e., 
other models that do not require market variables.  
If we limit the scope of application of our models by adding market information, we 
can further significantly improve performance; our market model classifies 65.66% of all 
bankrupt firm-years into the highest default probability decile (decile one). In contrast, 
Shumway (2001) and Bharath and Shumway (2008) only classify 58.01% and 61.38% of 
bankrupt firms into the first decile, respectively, For the top two deciles (in aggregate), the 
correct predictions of our market model are 82.16% versus 75.28% for Shumway and 
77.53% for Bharath and Shumway. Importantly, our market model significantly 
outperforms all leading alternatives, including those that also exploit market information. 
Furthermore, the fact that our market model performs significantly better than our 
                                                 
16 The version of the model in Altman (1968) requires stock price information and thus is not purely 
accounting-based. We are aware of the applications of Altman’s (1983) z’-score (e.g., in Altman et al., 
2017) and the applications of Altman, Hartzell, and Peck’s (1995) z’’-score (e.g., in Megginson, Meles, 
Sampagnaro, and Verdoliva, 2016) for private firms in which market equity is replaced by book equity. 
However, we use Altman’s (1968) model because of its wide adoption (e.g., Almamy, Aston, and Ngwa, 
2016) and acceptance. 
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accounting model supports the previous findings of Shumway (2001), Hillegeist et al. 
(2004), and Campbell et al. (2008) that market variables add explanatory power. 
2.4.4.2 Receiver operating characteristics 
An alternative overall classification measure used to evaluate bankruptcy prediction 
models is the area under the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve, also referred 
to as the AUC (area under the curve; see Sobehart and Keenan, 2001). The ROC curve 
plots the true positive rate (the correctly predicted positive cases) of a model against the 
false positive rate (the misclassified positive cases). The AUC is then interpreted as the 
probability that a randomly chosen defaulting firm has a greater predicted probability of 
default than a randomly chosen surviving firm. A value of 0.5 indicates a random model 
with no predictive ability and a value of 1.0 indicates perfect discrimination. Note that the 
AUC evaluates both type I and type II errors. To compute the AUC, we estimate the 
parameters for each model based on the training samples and then use these parameters to 
predict bankruptcies for the subsequent year. 
Panel C of Table 2.5 reports the Newey–West (1987) time series averages of the 
means of the AUC. The AUC results are consistent with the results reported using the 
goodness-of-fit deciles. Our accounting model has an average AUC of 0.862, again 
significantly higher than the average AUCs of 0.828 of Altman’s (1968) model and 0.841 
of Ohlson’s (1980) model. Our accounting model’s performance is even similar to the 
market-based models of Shumway and Bharath and Shumway with average AUCs of 
0.859 with 0.868, respectively. Note that Bharath and Shumway’s model has a higher 
accuracy than Shumway which is in line with the results of Campbell, Hilscher, and 
Szilagyi (2011). Importantly, our market model has the highest average AUC (0.892) and 
thus outperforms all other models. 
2.4.4.3 Economic value for differing misclassification costs 
In practice, the costs associated with type I error and type II error are different. 
Refusing to grant a loan to a non-bankrupt firm leads to the loss of revenue, whereas 
lending money to a firm that turns bankrupt may lead to the loss of the total loan amount. 
To account for the differing misclassification costs, we follow the approach of Agarwal 
and Taffler (2008) to assess the economic impact of using different bankruptcy prediction 
models in a competitive market. To link the power of prediction models and loan pricing, 
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we follow Stein (2005) and Blöchlinger and Leippold (2006) and derive the credit spread 
as a function of the credit score (S) by 
 𝑅 =  
𝑃𝑡(𝑌=1|𝑆=𝑡)
𝑃𝑡(𝑌=0|𝑆=𝑡)
𝐿𝐺𝐷 +  𝑘,    (2.6) 
where R is the credit spread, Pt(Y = 1|S = t) is the conditional probability of 
bankruptcy for a score of t, Pt(Y = 0|S = t) is the conditional probability of non-
bankruptcy for a score of t, LGD is the loan loss given default, and k is the credit spread 
for the highest quality loan. 
We evaluate the economic scenario described in Agarwal and Taffler (2008) and 
Bauer and Agarwal (2014) with a simple loan market worth $100 billion. Each bank uses a 
different bankruptcy prediction model and competes for customers that are represented by 
firms in our sample. We assume that all loans are of the same size and are unsecured senior 
debt (i.e., the loss given default is 45%). Further, we assume the risk premium for a high-
quality customer (k) to be 0.30%. Each year, we rank our sample firms into 20 categories 
based on their fitted bankruptcy probability values. The banks reject those customers that 
fall in the bottom 5%, which is the lowest category, according to the model they use. For 
all other customers, they quote a spread based on equation (2.6). The customer then 
chooses the bank that quotes the lowest spread. If multiple banks quote equal minimum 
spreads, the customer randomly chooses one of those banks (or equivalently, the business 
is split equally). In this regime, some customers may be refused credit by all banks and 
thus the market share may not sum to 1. 
Panel D of Table 2.5 presents the revenue, profitability, and other statistics for all 
banks in the competitive loan market. The bank that uses our market model has clearly the 
largest market share of 29.38% followed by our accounting model (16.27%), Bharath and 
Shumway (15.06%), Altman (11.20%), Shumway (10.79%), Ohlson (9.21%), and our 
negative book equity model (7.47%). That is, the bank that makes its loan decision based 
on our market model holds the greatest amount of loans. In addition, the quality of loans 
granted by our market model is the best: only 0.16% of its customers default compared 
with 0.38% for a bank that uses our accounting model, 0.56% for Bharath and Shumway, 
0.73% for Shumway, 1.20% for Ohlson, 1.39% for Altman, and 3.11% for our negative 
book equity model. The highest amount of loans combined with the highest loan quality 
directly translate into the highest profitability of 0.26% for the bank that uses our market 
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model. In other words, this bank makes a net income of $0.26 per $100 loan. This 
profitability is higher than when using our accounting model (0.16%), Bharath and 
Shumway (0.10%), and Shumway (0.02%). The profitability of banks that use Ohlson (-
0.19%), Altman (-0.25%), and our negative book equity model (-1.06%) is even negative. 
In conclusion, our market model and our accounting model outperform all other models in 
all statistics of the competitive loan market scenario that assumes misclassification costs 
that are different for type I and type II errors.  
In summary, the rolling regression technique yields strong evidence for the better 
performance of our bankruptcy prediction models. Our accounting model performs better 
than Altman and Ohlson with respect to the goodness-of-fit deciles and it has a higher 
average AUC than Altman and Ohlson and even than the market-based model of 
Shumway. For the economic value, our accounting model even outperforms all other 
benchmark models, including those that use market variables. Our market model performs 
best in all three accuracy measures. We conclude that if the model is restricted to 
accounting information, our accounting model performs best and that if we allow for 
market information in the model, our market model performs best.  
2.4.5 Evolution of the out-of-sample results over time 
We use a rolling estimation technique that comprise the most recent ten years of data 
to make one-year predictions. In Section 2.4.4, we evaluate the bankruptcy prediction 
models for the whole evaluation period (1978-2013). In the following, we show the out-of-
sample performance for every year in the evaluation period separately in order analyze the 
development of accuracies over time.  
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Figure 2.1 Development of AUCs for accounting models 
The figure plots the average AUC per year over the evaluation period (1978-2013) for the accounting-based 
models. We use rolling windows that comprise the most recent ten years of data to perform hazard models 
and evaluate the one-year predictions for each model at an annual frequency. Our accounting model performs 
best among accounting models for 24 of 36 years (67%). 
 
Figure 2.2 Development of AUCs for market models 
The figure plots the average AUC per year over the evaluation period (1978-2013) for the market-based 
models. We use rolling windows that comprise the most recent ten years of data to perform hazard models 
and evaluate the one-year predictions for each model at an annual frequency. Our market model performs 
best among market models for 33 of 36 years (92%). 
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Figure 2.1 plots the performance development of accounting-based models by 
reporting the average AUCs for every year. For all models, there is a high accuracy in the 
1970s followed by a downward trend until the mid-1990s and an upward trend from then 
until 2013. Most importantly, our accounting model does not only perform better on 
average but shows a higher performance for the majority of evaluation years. It 
outperforms the models of Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980) for 24 of 36 years (67%). 
Figure 2.2 reports the average AUCs for the market-based models. The performance of 
market-based models is less volatile and higher than that of accounting-based models. We 
find that our market model performs better than Shumway (2001) and Bharath and 
Shumway (2008) 33 of 36 years (92%), i.e., for nearly all years. 
Figure 2.3 shows the accuracy of accounting-based models over time by plotting the 
respective percentage of bankrupt firms classified into the first decile for every year. 
Again, there is a downward trend from the 1970s until the mid-1990s followed by an 
upward trend from then until 2013. In year 2006, the performance of all accounting models 
falls dramatically.17 Again, our accounting model outperforms Altman (1968), Ohlson 
(1980) and our negative book equity model for a majority of evaluation years (53%). Our 
negative book equity model outperforms all other models (including our accounting 
model) for another 8%. That is, our models have the highest performance for 61% of the 
years. Figure 2.4 plots the respective percentage of bankrupt firms classified into the first 
decile for market-based models. Again, their performance is less volatile than that of 
accounting-based models. For example, in 2006, while the performance of accounting 
models has a shock, the performance of models using the market variables remains stable. 
Importantly, our market model shows better performance than Shumway (2001) and 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) for 25 of 36 years (69%). 
                                                 
17 Interestingly, the negative book equity model is most stable in 2006 among the accounting-based models. 
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Figure 2.3 Development of goodness-of-fit deciles for accounting models 
The figure plots the percentage of bankruptcies classified into the highest probability decile per year over the 
evaluation period (1978-2013) for the accounting-based models. We use rolling windows that comprise the 
most recent ten years of data to perform hazard models and evaluate the one-year predictions for each model 
at an annual frequency. Our accounting model performs best among accounting models for 19 of 36 years 
(53%). 
 
Figure 2.4 Development of goodness-of-fit deciles for market models 
The figure plots the percentage of bankruptcies classified into the highest probability decile per year over the 
evaluation period (1978-2013) for the market-based models. We use rolling windows that comprise the most 
recent ten years of data to perform hazard models and evaluate the one-year predictions for each model at an 
annual frequency. Our market model performs best among market models for 25 of 36 years (69%). 
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Furthermore, we find that our negative book equity model, which only incorporates 
information about book equity and earnings forecasts, performs similarly compared to the 
other models throughout the evaluation period. In other words, the performance difference 
between our negative book equity and all other models remains stable for all evaluation 
years. There is no evident difference between the 1970s and recent years. Thus, book 
equity and earnings figures are as valuable for the task of predicting corporate bankruptcies 
as in the 1970s; they are still credit relevant. Many studies claim that earnings have lost 
relevance. For example, Collins, Maydew, and Weiss (1997), Lev and Zarowin (1999), and 
Beisland and Hamberg (2013) show that accounting effects and effects related to new 
types of firms have important consequences for the application of accounting measures as 
predictors. Furthermore, accounting has moved from an earnings-oriented “historical cost 
regime” toward a balance sheet-oriented “fair value regime.” Nissim and Penman (2008) 
claim that in a perfect fair value accounting regime, earnings are nothing more than value 
changes that are expected to follow a random walk. This strand of literature focuses on the 
value relevance of accounting information. We add to the discussion of its credit relevance 
by showing that book equity and earnings are useful predictors of bankruptcy even in 
today’s fair value accounting regime. 
2.4.6 Functional form of PNBE 
To calculate the probability of negative book equity, we use a non-linear functional 
form with three inputs. In the following, we test whether this functional form has 
incremental predictive power compared to its components. To assess the importance of this 
rigid functional form, we compare two models, again using a rolling regression technique. 
Model 1 comprises all the components of the PNBE: current book equity, the earnings 
forecast, and the inverse of its standard deviation. It adds the PNBE, that is, the non-linear 
combination of these variables. Model 2 only comprises the three single components of 
PNBE but does not compress these variables into a single variable. Table 2.6 reports the 
results of these two models. 
  
2 Predicting Bankruptcy via Cross-Sectional Earnings Forecasts 40 
Table 2.6 Functional form of PNBE 
Panel A: Parameter estimates 
Variable Model 1   Model 2   
Constant -6.315 *** -4.248 *** 
PNBEt 3.304 ***   
BkEqt -0.002 ** -0.004 *** 
EarnFrct -0.590 *** -0.835 *** 
1/sigma(EarnFrc) 2.965  -0.398 
 
Panel B: Goodness-of-fit deciles 
Decile Model 1   Model 2   
1 46.14   37.22   
2 13.34  14.68  
3 10.53  9.62  
4 7.65  9.06  
5 6.11  8.57  
6 3.58  6.67  
7 3.30  5.06  
8 4.07  4.21  
9 3.51  3.30  
10 1.76   1.62   
Panel C: Area under the ROC curve 
  Model 1   Model 2   
Mean 0.789  0.754  
Panel D: Economic value of different misclassification costs 
 Bank 1   Bank 2   
  Model 1   Model 2   
Credits 103,077  56,762  
Market share (%) 62.49%  34.41%  
Defaults 528  536  
Defaults/credits (%) 0.51%  0.94%  
Avg. credit spread (%) 0.53%  0.56%  
Revenue ($m) 329.86  191.36  
Loss ($m) 192.77  195.69  
Profit ($m) 137.09  -4.33  
Return on assets (%) 0.22%   -0.01%   
   (continued) 
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Table 2.6 Functional form of PNBE (continued) 
This table shows the importance of the functional form of the PNBE. Panel A shows the Newey–West 
(1987) time series averages of the annual regression coefficients. PNBE is the probability that losses 
deplete current book equity, BkEq is book equity, EarnFrc is the earnings forecast, and 1/sigma(EarnFrc) 
is the inverse value of the earnings forecast’s volatility. Panel B shows the goodness-of-fit deciles. For 
every year, we rank firms into deciles based on their fitted bankruptcy probability values, where the firms 
with the highest values fall into the first decile. We report the percentage of bankrupt firms classified into 
each probability decile. Panel C reports the Newey–West (1987) time series averages of the yearly means 
of the area under the ROC curve (AUC). Panel D shows the results of a competitive credit market. The 
banks reject firms with scores in the bottom 5% based on their respective models, while offering credit to 
all others at a credit spread derived using equation (2.6). The bank with the lowest credit spread is 
assumed to grant the loan. Firms are assumed to split their loan equally if banks offer the same credit 
spread. Market share is the total credit granted divided by the total number of firm-years. Default is the 
number of firms to which a loan is granted that went bankrupt. Revenue is market size * market share * 
average credit spread, and loss is market size * prior probability of failure * share of defaulters * loss 
given default. Profit is revenue - loss. Return on assets are profit divided by market size * market share. 
For illustrative purposes, we assume the market size to be $100 billion, equal sized loans, the loss given 
default to be 45%, and the credit spread for the highest quality customers to be 0.30%. The prior 
probability of failure is taken to be the same as the ex-post failure rate. *** and ** denote significance at 
the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A reports the Newey–West (1987) time series averages of the annual 
regression coefficients for model 1 and model 2. In model 2, firms with lower book equity 
and a lower earnings forecast are more likely to fail. The inverse value of the earnings 
forecast’s volatility is not significant. Model 1 shows the same intuitive signs for book 
equity and the earnings forecast as model 2 and again a non-significant coefficient for the 
forecast’s volatility. Importantly, the PNBE is a significant predictor of bankruptcy, 
although all the components required to construct the PNBE are also included as individual 
variables. This finding suggests that the functional form we use for constructing the 
probability provides value beyond the information contained in the individual variables 
used to calculate it. 
This incremental predictive power of PNBE over its inputs is supported by the out-
of-sample results that are presented in Panels B, C, and D. Panel A shows that model 1 
classifies 46.14% of all bankruptcies into the highest probability decile and thus 
outperforms model 2 (37.22%). This means that adding PNBE increases the out-of-sample 
accuracy although its three components are already included as single variables. 
Accordingly, panel C shows that the average AUC of model 1 (0.789) exceeds that of 
model 2 (0.754). Again, this shows that the closed functional form of PNBE has 
incremental power compared to its inputs. Panel D finally presents statistics for two banks 
in a competitive loan market that use model 1 and model 2, respectively. The bank that 
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makes its loan decisions based on model 1 has a market share of 62.49%, which is far 
larger than that of model 2 (34.41%). In addition, the quality of loans granted by model 1 is 
better, as only 0.51% of their customers default compared with 0.94% of the customers of 
the bank that uses model 2. This translates into a higher profitability of the bank that uses 
model 1 (0.22%) compared to the bank that uses model 2 (-0.01%). Thus, model 1 
outperforms model 2 in all statistics of the competitive loan market scenario. This again 
supports the notion that PNBE has incremental predictive power over its components. In 
conclusion, the results provide support for the concept that the functional form of the 
PNBE is a valuable construct for predicting bankruptcy, beyond the information contained 
in its individual variables. 
2.5 Conclusions 
We develop a new framework for predicting bankruptcies, focusing on the 
economically intuitive idea that future losses deplete a firm’s book equity. Hence, the 
probability that book equity may become negative is a central variable in our model 
versions. Previously, major improvements in bankruptcy prediction models have been 
achieved by the inclusion of stock market data. In contrast, we focus on risk measures 
extracted from accounting data, in particular, earnings risk. This improves the performance 
of bankruptcy predictions without excluding private firms. Nevertheless, for firms listed on 
the stock market we provide a model version that picks stock market information, as well. 
We find that both our accounting and our market models outperform leading alternatives 
that use corresponding information. Our accounting model performs best for predicting the 
bankruptcy of a non-public firm where stock market information is unavailable, while our 
market model produces the best results for predicting the bankruptcy of a publicly traded 
firm. We further show that book equity and earnings have been useful predictors 
throughout the whole evaluation period, including more recent years. By this, we 
contribute to the ongoing discussion whether the credit relevance of accounting measures 
has decreased in the course of the shift from a historical cost accounting regime towards a 
fair value regime.   
We focus on predictions with a horizon of twelve months. However, our analyses 
indicate that a firm’s earnings weakness and negative book equity may signal financial 
distress much earlier. Thus, it appears promising to devote further research to creating 
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multi-period bankruptcy prediction models using multi-period earnings forecasts as 
described in Hou et al. (2012). Alternatively, one could use analysts’ earnings forecasts 
instead of mechanical forecasts to model the changes in book equity. However, this would 
restrict the scope of the application, as analysts only provide earnings forecasts for 
(selected) publicly traded firms. Moreover, further research could account for the dynamic 
aspects of the data, e.g., by using survival analysis techniques whose dependent variable is 
not binary but the number of years in the non-bankrupt group. In addition, further research 
could aim at grasping the imperfect relationship between firms with negative book equity 
and bankrupt firms. First, developing alternative approaches to discriminate between 
bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms with negative book equity appears to be promising. 
Second, one could refrain from using the formal definition of negative book equity as a 
predictor of bankruptcy. Instead, the components that belong to the definition of book 
equity but do not influence bankruptcy could be removed. Furthermore, a cross-country 
comparison of the performance of our models would help to understand to what extent 
specific national regulations, such as the requirement to file for bankruptcy in the case of 
negative book equity, facilitates better bankruptcy predictions. 
2.A Construction of variables of earlier bankruptcy prediction models 
We discuss the construction of variables used in Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980), 
Shumway (2001), Bharath and Shumway’s (2008) best-performing model. 
Altman (1968) obtains a Z-score using a linear weighted sum of five ratios: 
𝑍 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅  𝑊𝐶𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽2 ⋅  𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽3 ⋅  𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽4 ⋅  𝑀𝐸𝑇𝐿 
 +𝛽5 ⋅ 𝑆𝑇𝐴,  (2.7) 
where WCTA is working capital (Compustat item WCAP) divided by total assets 
(AT), RETA is retained earnings (RE) divided by total assets (AT), EBITTA is earnings 
before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets (AT), METL is the market value of 
equity (PRCC_F multiplied by CSHO) divided by the book value of total debt (LT), STA 
is sales (SALE) divided by total assets (AT) and Z is the Z-score (overall index). WCTA is 
a proxy for a firm’s liquidity, RETA is a proxy for firm age, and EBITTA measures 
profitability. METL is a widely used measure of leverage and STA describes the firm’s 
efficiency in using assets to generate sales. The Z-score characterizes the financial strength 
2 Predicting Bankruptcy via Cross-Sectional Earnings Forecasts 44 
of a firm by aggregating the abovementioned five accounting ratios into one figure using 
the estimated coefficients β1, … , β5.  
Ohlson (1980) finds nine variables to be significant and defines his O-score model as 
             O =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽2 ⋅ 𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽3 ⋅ 𝑊𝐶𝑇𝐴 
 + 𝛽4 ⋅ 𝐶𝐿𝐶𝐴 +  𝛽5 ⋅ 𝑂𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽6 ⋅ 𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐴 
 + 𝛽7 ⋅ 𝐹𝑈𝑇𝐿 + 𝛽8 ⋅ 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑊𝑂 + 𝛽9 ⋅ 𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁,   (2.8) 
where Size is the logarithm of total assets (AT), TLTA is total liabilities (LT) over 
total assets (AT), WCTA is working capital (WCAP) over total assets (AT), CLCA is 
current liabilities (LCT) over current assets (ACT), OENEG is a dummy that takes the 
value of one if total liabilities (LT) exceed total assets (AT) and zero otherwise, NITA is 
net income (NI) over total assets (AT), FUTL is funds provided by operations18 (PI plus 
DP) over total liabilities (LT), INTWO is a dummy that takes the value of one if the net 
income (NI) was negative for the past two years and zero otherwise, CHIN is the change in 
net income (NI) and O is the O-score (overall index). WCTA and CLCA measure liquidity. 
NITA, FUTL, INTWO, and CHIN capture the different aspects of profitability. TLTA and 
OENEG describe the capital structure. Size is a measure of firm size. 
In addition to selected financial ratios used by Ohlson, Shumway (2001) adds two 
market variables, the excess return and its standard deviation: 
𝑆 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽2 ⋅ 𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽3 ⋅ 𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐴 
 +𝛽4 ⋅ 𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽5 ⋅ 𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑅,   (2.9) 
where RSIZE is the logarithm of market equity divided by value-weighted market 
equity of the index, TLTA is total liabilities (LT) over total assets (AT), NITA is net 
income (NI) over total assets (AT), ER is excess returns calculated as the difference 
between the previous year’s returns and risk-free rate, STDER is the standard deviation of 
the returns, and S is the S-score (overall index). TLTA measures solvency and describes 
the capital structure. Profitability is captured by NITA. ER measures the profit of an 
investment, where STDER determines the variability of excess returns. Returns are 
calculated as the present year’s adjusted stock price (PRCCD multiplied by TRFD and 
                                                 
18 Funds provided by operations are not reported anymore. We use an approximation by summing pretax 
income and depreciations and amortization. 
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divided by AJEXDI) divided by the previous year’s adjusted stock price minus one. RSIZE 
is a measure of firm size. 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) extend the distance-to-default models that Vassalou 
and Xing (2004) and Hillegeist et al. (2004) construct. Applying Merton’s (1974) option 
pricing theory yields the probability of bankruptcy as 
 𝑃𝐷𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑜𝑛 = 𝑁 (− (
𝑙𝑛(𝑉/𝐹)+(𝜇−0.5𝜎𝑉
2)
𝜎𝑉
)),   (2.10) 
where V is the market value of a firm’s assets, σV its standard deviation, μ is the 
expected return on assets, F is the market value of the firm’s debt, and N(∙) is the 
cumulative standard normal distribution function. Vassalou and Xing (2004) numerically 
compute V and σV by applying an iterative procedure. Bharath and Shumway, however, 
propose a naïve approach. They approximate the market value of debt using the book value 
of debt and thus, calculate F as debt in current liabilities plus one half of long-term debt. 
Furthermore, the volatility of a firm’s debt is approximated by 
 𝜎𝐹 = 0.05 + 0.25 ∙ 𝜎𝐸, (2.11) 
where σE is the volatility of the market return. An approximation of the volatility of 
the firm’s assets is then given by 
 𝜎𝑉 =
𝐸
𝐸+𝐹
𝜎𝐸 +
𝐹
𝐸+𝐹
𝜎𝐹.  (2.12) 
The expected return on assets μ is approximated using the previous year’s return on 
assets. In addition, the market value of assets is approximated by the sum of the market 
value of equity and book value of debt. The best model in Bharath and Shumway is 
constructed as: 
BS =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑃𝐷𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2 ⋅ 𝐿𝑁𝐸 + 𝛽3 ⋅ 𝐿𝑁𝐹 
 + 𝛽4 ⋅ 1/𝜎𝐸 +  𝛽5 ⋅ 𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽6 ⋅ 𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐴,  (2.13) 
where PDMerton is the probability constructed above, LNE is the logarithm of market 
equity E (PRCC_F multiplied by CSHO), LNF the logarithm of the book value of debt F 
calculated as current debt (DLC) plus one half of long-term debt (DLTT), 1/σE is the 
inverse of the volatility of market equity, ER is the excess return calculated as the 
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difference of last year’s return and last year’s value-weighted index return, and NITA as 
the ratio of net income (NI) and total assets (TA). 
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Chapter 3 
The Quality of Bankruptcy Data and 
its Impact on the Evaluation of 
Prediction Models: Creating and 
Testing a German Database*  
3.1 Introduction 
For decades, academics and practitioners have been tasked with the prediction of 
corporate bankruptcies. While considerable efforts have been made to improve the 
methodologies used in bankruptcy prediction models (e.g., Altman, 1968; Ohlson, 1980; 
Shumway, 2001; Vassalou and Xing, 2004), previous studies have paid little attention to 
the quality of the underlying bankruptcy data. In this regard, quality can be defined as the 
completeness and correctness of information of bankruptcy events and explicit bankruptcy 
                                                 
* This chapter is based on Huettemann and Lorsbach (2019). We are grateful to Dieter Hess, Martin Meuter, 
and William Liu for their insightful discussions and suggestions. This paper has also greatly benefitted 
from comments made by seminar participants at the University of Cologne and an anonymous reviewer. 
Moreover, we acknowledge the help from the customer service teams at Bureau van Dijk, Creditreform, 
EQS Group (DGAP) and APA OTS to clarify questions regarding the data availability of bankruptcy 
information. 
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dates. Accurate bankruptcy data is crucial for two main reasons. First, it helps to obtain 
unbiased parameter estimates for bankruptcy models; incorrect data can affect the 
significance and size of the coefficients and, thus, the variable setup of models. Second, the 
validation of bankruptcy prediction models strongly depends on the integrity of the 
bankruptcy data. In fact, inaccurate information can affect the evaluation of out-of-sample 
performance. Thus, we investigate the impact of data quality on the evaluation of 
bankruptcy prediction models. 
Studies commonly use commercial databases to collect bankruptcy information. The 
most common data providers in the U.S. are the SDC Platinum Database, Moody’s Default 
and Recovery Database, and Capital IQ. Of these, Capital IQ includes only bankrupt firms 
that are located in the U.S,19 while the SDC Platinum Database and Moody’s Default and 
Recovery Database contain data on European bankruptcies. However, their data 
availability for non-U.S. firms is relatively sparse: SDC Platinum20 reports only 250 recent 
bankruptcies that are outside the U.S. and Moody’s Default and Recovery Database21 lists 
only 108 bankruptcy events in Germany since 1980. Therefore, we focus on the most 
frequently used European databases: Compustat Global (e.g., Dahiya and Klapper, 2007; 
Tian and Yu, 2017) and Bureau van Dijk (BvD) (e.g., Altman, Iwanicz-Drozdowska, 
Laitinen, and Suvas, 2017; Filipe, Grammatikos, and Michala, 2016; Lohmann and 
Ohliger, 2017). Few studies have examined the quality of these popular bankruptcy 
databases. In fact, BvD deletes bankruptcy information after five years of inactivity. 
Moreover, requesting data directly from Creditreform, BvD’s provider of bankruptcy 
information for German firms, would not rectify this fundamental limitation since 
Creditreform also deletes a firm’s bankruptcy information after bankruptcy proceedings are 
terminated. Therefore, one aim of this study is to quantify the amount of erroneous 
bankruptcy information in the databases largely used in earlier bankruptcy studies. 
Unlike commercial databases such as BvD and Compustat Global, the UCLA-
LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database (BRD)22 consists of U.S. bankruptcy data that is 
retrieved directly from public sources such as court files or Securities and Exchange 
                                                 
19 We directly contacted S&P Global to clarify the availability of bankruptcy events. 
20 Thomson Reuters: https://financial.thomsonreuters.com/en/products/data-analytics/market-data/sdc-
platinum-financial-securities.html (accessed July 20, 2018). 
21 Moody’s Analytics: https://www.moodys.com/sites/products/productattachments/drd_brochure.pdf 
(accessed July 20, 2018). 
22 UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database: http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/ (accessed July 20, 2018). 
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Commission (SEC) filings. However, there are no guidelines for producing such a 
bankruptcy database that derives information from public sources. This study constructs 
these guidelines by describing a methodology to systematically collect accurate bankruptcy 
data from public sources and applying it to the German market. We focus on one country 
because parameter estimates may differ across countries for two reasons. First, the 
definition of bankruptcy may vary depending on regulatory requirements. Second, 
administrative firm-level data and thus, the definition of variables used for bankruptcy 
prediction, differ by country. For example, Altman et al. (2017) argue that differences in 
financial statements can be attributed to variances in fiscal systems across countries. 
Nevertheless, Altman et al. (2017) and other previous studies must use the entire European 
market to obtain sufficient bankruptcy data. We choose Germany as a case country for two 
reasons. First, Germany lacks an academic bankruptcy database that contains data from 
public sources, similar to the U.S. data in the UCLA-LoPucki BRD. Second, Germany is 
one of the largest stock markets in Europe. It is noteworthy that while our methodology 
can be applied to other countries, it is critical that disclosure obligations and their public 
availability be checked when doing so. In the case of the United States and United 
Kingdom, this would mean referring to SEC filings and the Regulatory News Service 
(RNS) as the national news providers, respectively. 
Then, we compare our bankruptcy database (hereafter, HL) with the most commonly 
used databases for German bankruptcies, Compustat Global and BvD. In particular, we 
analyze the completeness and correctness of the information on bankruptcy events and 
dates. We then conduct a two-part empirical analysis of public German firms. In the first 
part, we compare the bankruptcy prediction models of Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980), 
Shumway (2001), Bharath and Shumway (2008), and Hess and Huettemann (2019). There 
is voluminous bankruptcy prediction research, but a majority of existing studies focuses on 
U.S. corporations, while research that presents international evidence remains relatively 
sparse. For example, Altman et al. (2017) assess the performance of Altman’s (1983) Z-
score for 31 European and three non-European countries. Tian and Yu (2017) investigate 
the significance of ratios for bankruptcy prediction in Japan and selected European 
countries, and Dahiya and Klapper (2007) compare key industrial nations. These studies 
use the commercial databases of BvD or Compustat Global. Note that because we have a 
sufficient number of bankruptcy events, we can focus on a single European country, giving 
our study the advantages noted above. In the second part, we investigate how using the HL 
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database, instead of BvD data, affects the results of bankruptcy prediction models. More 
specifically, we analyze the parameter estimates and out-of-sample performance when we 
use our bankruptcy data compared to BvD data. We also compare the ability of the 
respective bankruptcy datasets to produce unbiased parameter estimates by applying the 
estimates to a validation sample with the same bankruptcy dummies. Note that the fact that 
BvD deletes firm information after five years of inactivity does not alter the results of this 
comparison as we restrict our sample to the period with full BvD data coverage. 
The empirical results of this study are as follows. First, more than 80% of all public 
German firms’ bankruptcies can be extracted from easily accessible corporate disclosures. 
Second, HL bankruptcy events are more complete and more accurate than those listed by 
BvD and Compustat Global. While our HL database comprises 277 bankruptcies, BvD and 
Compustat cover only 63 and 27 events, respectively. BvD and Compustat Global’s 
incomplete data applies not only to small- and medium-sized firms but also to large firms. 
For example, BvD does not include the 2009 bankruptcy case of Arcandor AG, a 
warehouse business valued at 500 million euros. Surprisingly, BvD declares bankruptcy 
for firms that never filed for insolvency and continue to exist, such as Suedzucker AG. 
While there are many bankruptcies exclusively captured by HL, only a few events are 
solely captured by Compustat Global or Bureau van Dijk and not by HL. Third, the 
bankruptcy dates for HL-listed events are more accurate than those contained in BvD and 
Compustat Global. For 25% of firms, HL reports bankruptcies two months earlier than 
BvD, and for 50% of firms, HL reports bankruptcies 24 months earlier than Compustat 
Global. Fourth, the choice of bankruptcy database affects parameter estimates. If we use 
the inaccurate bankruptcy events reported in BvD instead of events in HL, the parameters 
change in terms of significance and size. We further show that HL information produces 
more realistic parameter estimates than BvD data. Fifth, we demonstrate that using HL 
data, instead of BvD information, has a major impact on out-of-sample results. When 
researchers use models estimated based on BvD data, they cannot effectively predict true 
bankruptcy outcomes, that is, out-of-sample results for bankruptcies in the HL database. 
For example, using BvD bankruptcy information would yield similar out-of-sample 
performances for the Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980) models. However, using HL’s 
more precise information reveals that Ohlson’s model significantly outperforms that of 
Altman. Finally, we show that, opposed to models that only use accounting-based 
variables, market-based bankruptcy prediction models (Bharath and Shumway, 2008; Hess 
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and Huettemann, 2019; Shumway, 2001) are a better fit for the German market when HL 
data is used. 
For our scope of application, we find that the quality of bankruptcy data has a 
significant impact on the interpretation of results of bankruptcy prediction models. 
Specifically, we speak to the consequences of training bankruptcy models with noisy 
bankruptcy data. For example, using BvD information instead of HL data would suggest 
that other bankruptcy prediction models may be more appropriate. This study is the first to 
show that the frequently used commercial bankruptcy databases of Compustat Global (e.g., 
Dahiya and Klapper, 2007; Tian and Yu, 2017) and BvD (e.g., Altman et al., 2017; Filipe 
et al., 2016; Lohmann and Ohliger, 2017) are inaccurate. We describe a systematic 
methodology to gather more precise bankruptcy information free of charge and create the 
first academic bankruptcy database for Germany. Furthermore, using this database, we are 
the first to compare bankruptcy prediction models for Germany based on valid bankruptcy 
data. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the 
methodology to gather bankruptcy information from public sources. It further compares the 
resulting database with commercial bankruptcy databases. In Section 3.3, we describe our 
sample selection, report the descriptive statistics, and explain our methods. In Section 3.4, 
we present and discuss our empirical results. Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 Our bankruptcy database 
3.2.1 German insolvency proceedings  
According to Germany’s 2009 insolvency statute (“Insolvenzverordnung”), a 
company or a creditor have the right to file a request at the local court (“Amtsgericht”), 
which is the court of first instance, if there are reasons for insolvency.23 Such reasons could 
be a company’s illiquidity (inability to meet the obligations that are due), imminent 
illiquidity, or over-indebtedness (obligations exceed assets). The company is obliged to file 
for insolvency within the first three weeks of experiencing illiquidity or over-indebtedness.  
After a company files for insolvency, the responsible court may take protective 
measures, which include the appointment of an interim insolvency administrator. If the 
                                                 
23 Hereafter, insolvency and bankruptcy are used synonymously. 
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administrator verifies that the company’s funds are sufficient to cover the costs of a 
proceeding, he or she initiates insolvency proceedings; otherwise, the company is 
liquidated. The insolvency administrator takes over the company’s administration and is 
responsible for restructuring measures, liquidating business units, and collecting 
outstanding receivables to partially service creditors’ claims. Exchange-listed firms are 
required to immediately report material events to their stakeholders and the public. They 
must submit ad-hoc statements when insolvency is imminent, or an application is 
submitted to the corresponding court. The corresponding court issues additional statements 
when taking proactive actions, openings, or further information on bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
3.2.2 Extracting German bankruptcy data from public sources  
The most commonly used database for German companies in the finance and 
accounting literature stems from Compustat Global or BvD. However, using both 
databases for bankruptcy prediction raises several issues. For instance, Compustat Global 
only contains delisting dates and the reasons for the delisting. However, a delisting is often 
requested at a later stage during the bankruptcy proceedings. Thus, delisting dates are often 
determined several years after a firm has applied for bankruptcy. More recent studies 
predominantly use the BvD database, which deletes a firm’s financial data when it has not 
published annual reports for five consecutive years. This may apply to firms in bankruptcy 
proceedings and it is likely that the database excludes firms that filed for bankruptcy more 
than five years ago. Evidence of this point is the study conducted by Filipe et al. (2017), 
who use 2000–2009 as the sample period but find no bankruptcies for 2000. In fact, studies 
that apply BvD’s bankruptcy information can use only the training and validation samples 
from the past five years. To obtain a sufficient number of observations for a coherent 
bankruptcy prediction analysis, previous studies have used data from various countries, 
although the definition for bankruptcy events and prediction variables tend to differ by 
country. 
This study is the first to describe a methodology to systematically collect accurate 
bankruptcy data from public sources and apply it in the context of Germany. We aggregate 
our bankruptcy data from multiple online and free-access sources: (i) financial disclosures 
from “Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ad-hoc-Publizität mbH” (DGAP) and “APA 
Originaltext-Service GmbH” (APA OTS), (ii) the German business register, and (iii) 
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InsolNet, which is specifically a bankruptcy online database. Our approach is 
straightforward and follows three steps. First, we parse corporate news releases for 
bankruptcy-related news. Second, we use a web crawler24 on online releases by German 
bankruptcy courts, which are compiled in the German business register. Finally, we 
validate our results by obtaining data from an explicit bankruptcy database. To apply this 
methodology to other countries, it is important to check for public availability of the 
disclosure statements. 
3.2.2.1 Corporate news releases 
In regulated stock markets, companies must immediately inform investors about 
material events, particularly when they apply for bankruptcy. Financial disclosures and 
company news releases are mainly distributed by professional ad-hoc service providers. 
The German market is highly concentrated in the DGAP, which currently distributes 
approximately 98% of all news releases in Germany. Further, we use APA OTS as an 
additional source for corporate news releases because it covered several German firms 
from 2007 to 2011 before it stopped reporting on German firms in 2013. One advantage of 
corporate disclosures and news releases by ad-hoc providers is that they are free of charge. 
In the first step, we use Python, a script-based programming language, to direct web 
queries to the DGAP and APA OTS web servers. We request all news releases and 
download the full-text information of each document. We collect the complete archives for 
both DGAP and APA OTS, containing 363,282 news releases for listed companies from 
1997 to 2016. For each article, we process the full document into tokens of single words to 
evaluate if the wording is related to bankruptcy news. We use dynamic regular expressions 
to test if the root of each word contains insolvency wording. These regular expressions 
create a word list of 150 German words connected to news releases about bankruptcy (see 
Appendix 3.B for the full list). This procedure reduces the overall set of documents to a 
concise sample of 462 disclosures. We then manually check the news releases to aggregate 
the bankruptcy information, most importantly, the dates of bankruptcy filings and 
openings. 
                                                 
24 A web crawler is a computer program used to systemically browse and analyze websites. The General 
Appendix shows an exemplary Python program to crawl the German business register. 
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3.2.2.2 German business register (Unternehmensregister) 
The German business register is a government entity that provides free public access 
to key corporate information such as annual reports, court statements, or register keys. It is 
the central platform for storing company data. The register also serves as a distributor of 
key statements from bankruptcy courts containing information about bankruptcy dates, 
decisions, status, meetings, and further proceedings. Notably, information is available for 
both public and private firms. However, researchers should be aware of the official 
deletion of proceedings of online bankruptcy statements.25 To process this information, we 
automatically create web queries for information about each firm to check for any 
bankruptcy court statements. In addition, we manually review the results obtained from our 
automated web queries. 
3.2.2.3 InsolNet 
As a robustness check, we submit similar web requests for each firm to InsolNet.de’s 
web servers. InsolNet is a commercial data provider that compiles statements from 
bankruptcy courts and presents them in a structured manner. Therefore, we examine the 
correctness and completeness of our bankruptcy data using InsolNet. However, since it 
provides only the opening date for bankruptcy proceedings, we prefer data from other 
sources to obtain the initial dates when bankruptcy information was made public, if 
available. 
Even though this study focuses on companies listed on stock exchanges to include 
bankruptcy prediction models requiring capital market information such as Shumway 
(2001), our data collection approach can be used to extract bankruptcy information for all 
private and public companies in Germany. 
3.2.3 Summary statistics 
We use a straightforward definition for bankruptcy: a firm is bankrupt if it has filed a 
request to initiate an insolvency proceeding. We generally use the date of bankruptcy filing 
as an indicator because it is the earliest mention of a company’s financial distress. Further, 
we exclude firms in liquidation because they may have ceased activities for reasons other 
than failure, for example, shareholder decisions, mergers, or discontinuation of operations 
                                                 
25 Bankruptcy statements are deleted six months after the bankruptcy proceedings are completed.  
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by an allied company or foreign branch. Thus, we only include firms that explicitly 
indicate financial distress.  
Table 3.1 illustrates the bankruptcy data we collected from multiple sources and used 
for our sample. We include the 1,711 securities listed in the Compustat Global company 
and security files, either incorporated or headquartered in Germany. To perform web 
queries with the German business register and InsolNet, we use the international securities 
identification number (ISIN) to merge corporate news releases with the explicit company 
name. Since we focus on public firms, we find that most firms release public statements 
when applying for bankruptcy. Over 80% of our bankruptcy data originates from corporate 
disclosures by the DGAP and APA OTS. This result suggests that researchers should also 
closely examine corporate news in other countries to likewise obtain more reliable data. 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the business register is an interesting source for non-
public firm bankruptcies because it covers all disclosures made by bankruptcy courts. 
Firm-level bankruptcy information data compiled by us is available upon request. 
Table 3.1 HL bankruptcy data sources 
  All Firms  
Sample 
Firms 
ID Source N %   N % 
1 DGAP & APA OTS news releases, Filing date 230 83.0%  135 97.1% 
2 Unternehmensregister, Filing date 9 3.2%  1 0.7% 
3 Unternehmensregister, Earliest date 16 5.8%  3 2.2% 
4 DGAP & APA OTS news releases, Opening date 6 2.2%   0.0% 
5 Unternehmensregister, Opening date 4 1.4%   0.0% 
6 Insolnet, Opening date 8 2.9%   0.0% 
7 Insolnet, Opening date (with historical names) 3 1.1%   0.0% 
8 Web search 1 0.4%     0.0% 
 Total Bankruptcies 277 19.3%  139 20.6% 
  Total Non-bankruptcies 1,434     674   
This table reports the data sources used to create the HL bankruptcy. It shows the number of firm 
bankruptcies that were extracted from the respective source, along with their proportions. The columns 
“All firms” include all entities in Compustat Global that are either incorporated or headquartered in 
Germany (i.e., 1,711). Similarly, the columns “Sample firms” include companies with sufficient 
accounting and stock market data to predict several bankruptcy models. In general, bankruptcy data is 
either from ad-hoc disclosure (e.g., DGAP or APA OTS) or bankruptcy notifications in 
Unternehmensregister or Insolnet. We consistently use the earliest available bankruptcy notification data 
(i.e., filing for bankruptcy proceedings). Since most of our observations are obtained directly from ad-
hoc disclosures, our bankruptcy data commonly refers to the date of filing for insolvency proceedings. 
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3.2.4 Comparison with other bankruptcy databases  
We evaluate our collected bankruptcy data (HL data) against the predominantly used 
data sources, that is, the delistings on Compustat Global and BvD status codes.  
Table 3.2 Number of bankruptcies across databases 
 All firms Sample firms 
 Compustat 
Global 
Bureau van 
Dijk  
HL 
Compustat 
Global 
Bureau van 
Dijk  
HL 
 
Delisting 
(Liquidation, 
Bankruptcy) 
Status Code 
(Bankruptcy 
proceedings) 
Status Code 
(Bankruptcy 
proceedings
) 
Delisting 
(Liquidation, 
Bankruptcy) 
Status Code 
(Bankruptcy 
proceedings) 
Status Code 
(Bankruptcy 
proceedings
) 
1996 1 - - - - - 
1997 1 - 1 - - - 
1998 1 - - - - - 
1999 - - 3 - - - 
2000 1 - 3 - - - 
2001 1 - 23 - - 10 
2002 2 - 44 - - 23 
2003 1 - 20 1 - 11 
2004 2 - 16 2 - 11 
2005 - - 6 - - 5 
2006 3 - 7 2 - 3 
2007 1 - 8 1 - 5 
2008 2 - 16 - - 10 
2009 - 5 27 - 2 15 
2010 1 6 20 - 5 12 
2011 2 6 11 - 4 5 
2012 2 12 15 1 5 6 
2013 2 12 19 - 4 8 
2014 1 10 12 1 3 5 
2015 2 8 16 1 6 6 
2016 1 4 10 - 2 4 
  27 63 277 9 31 139 
This table reports the number of corporate bankruptcies in each year using different databases (i.e., 
Compustat delisting codes, Bureau van Dijk status codes, and HL). Compustat delisting codes for 
liquidation or bankruptcy are obtained from Compustat Global. Bureau van Dijk data is sourced with a 
subscription to the Amadeus database. The HL database is created using the approach described in this 
study. While information from BvD is available only for the most recent years, data from Compustat and 
HL date back to 1996 and cover large bankruptcies that occurred during the recessions of the early 2000s. 
 
Compustat Global provides delisting dates and the reasons for delisting. We follow 
Dahiya and Klapper (2007) and Tian and Yu (2017), who classify bankrupt firms based on 
reason 2 (“bankruptcy”) and reason 3 (“liquidation”). Altman et al. (2017) and Filipe et al. 
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(2016) use BvD’s status code to indicate if firms are in liquidation or bankruptcy 
proceedings. We call a firm bankrupt if it has been assigned the BvD status code “Active 
(insolvency proceedings).” There are two reasons we do not use the status levels “Active 
(default of payment),” “Active (dormant),” “Dissolved,” “Dissolved (liquidation),” or “In 
liquidation,” which also apply to German public firms. The notional reason is that we aim 
for a consistent definition of bankruptcy across all databases, that a firm is bankrupt if it 
has filed for bankruptcy. The practical reason is that BvD does not provide any date for 
status levels other than “Active (insolvency proceeding).” We first examine whether the 
data sources indicate firm bankruptcies correctly and completely and then test the accuracy 
of the bankruptcy dates.  
Table 3.2 summarizes the distribution of bankruptcies from 1996 to 2016. Our 
approach identifies 277 bankrupt firms, whereas BvD comprises 63 bankrupt firms and 
Compustat provides only 27 delistings. Note that, for this study, we gather bankruptcy 
information only for firms covered by Compustat. Thus, the difference in number of 
bankruptcies cannot be attributed to different firm coverage. Our final sample, constructed 
in Section 3.3.1, has 139, 31, and 9 bankruptcies that arise from data collected from HL, 
BvD, and Compustat, respectively. Table 3.2 clearly shows that Compustat Global 
delisting codes cannot be used to conduct a valid bankruptcy prediction analysis. Delisting 
codes are generally a bad proxy for bankruptcies. Foremost, Compustat Global categorizes 
many firms as delisted for “Other reasons” without providing further details. In addition, 
some firms experienced turnaround under bankruptcy administration and restructuring and 
thus, were not delisted. Vice versa, Compustat does not delist several bankrupt firms 
undergoing bankruptcy proceedings because they still trade at penny levels. BvD provides 
somewhat better bankruptcy data, although the coverage is less than 50% of our 
bankruptcy data. BvD deletes firm history five years after bankruptcy and, thus, BvD data 
that is requested in 2017 contains only bankruptcies between 2013 and 2017. Note that this 
limitation does not affect the results of our comparison analysis in Section 3.4.2, since it 
only uses the time period covered by BvD bankruptcies. Since we also have access to 
BvD’s vintage data that we extracted in the years 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016, we can 
artificially extend BvD’s horizon and identify bankruptcies in earlier years. This vintage 
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data can no longer be requested through WRDS or directly from BvD.26 Despite these 
measures, our methodology yields significantly more bankruptcies than those identified in 
Compustat and BvD.  
Table 3.3 Number of bankruptcies not captured by HL 
 All firms Sample firms  
 Compustat 
Global 
Bureau van 
Dijk  
Compustat 
Global 
Bureau van 
Dijk   
 
Delisting 
(Liquidation, 
Bankruptcy) 
Status Code 
(Bankruptcy 
proceedings) 
Delisting 
(Liquidation, 
Bankruptcy) 
Status Code 
(Bankruptcy 
proceedings) 
 
1996 1 - - -  
1997 1 - - -  
1998 1 - - -  
1999 - - - -  
2000 - - - -  
2001 1 - - -  
2002 - - - -  
2003 - - - -  
2004 - - - -  
2005 - - - -  
2006 1 - - -  
2007 - - - -  
2008 2 - - -  
2009 - - - -  
2010 1 - - -  
2011 2 - - -  
2012 - 1 - -  
2013 1 - - -  
2014 - 1 - -  
2015 - - - -  
2016 1 - - -  
  12 2 - -  
This table reports the number of corporate bankruptcies for each year that are listed in Compustat (delisting 
codes) and Bureau van Dijk (status codes) respectively, but that are not captured by the HL database. 
Compustat delisting codes for liquidation and bankruptcy are obtained from Compustat Global. Bureau van 
Dijk data is taken from the Amadeus subscription. The HL database is created using the approach described 
in this study. While information from BvD is available only for the most recent years, data from Compustat 
and HL date back to 1996 and cover large bankruptcies that occurred during the recessions of the early 
2000s. 
 
                                                 
26 In fact, several items of information on German firms within BvD are obtained from Creditreform as the 
original data provider. We also directly contacted Creditreform to request bankruptcy information, 
however, Creditreform also deletes bankruptcy information three years after a firm’s bankruptcy. 
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Table 3.3 shows the number of bankruptcies that are captured by Compustat Global 
and BvD respectively, but that are not by the HL database. Compustat Global reports 12 
such firms27, which means that HL and Compustat share 15 bankruptcies. In other words, 
HL exclusively captures 262 firms. We further find that BvD captures data for two firms 
that are not present in the HL database, which means that HL and BvD have 61 
bankruptcies in common. One of the two companies is Suedzucker AG, a renowned 
MDAX company. An extensive analysis of Suedzucker AG discloses no bankruptcy 
application, filing, or statement for the firm. In other words, HL exclusively captures 216 
firms. In our final sample, neither Compustat Global nor BvD exclusively capture any 
bankruptcy. 
Table 3.4 provides further details on the firms that go bankrupt over the years. We 
report the largest bankrupt firms in terms of market equity at the preceding fiscal year end. 
While Compustat Global delistings do not provide valid bankruptcy data (not even for 
large-scale firms), BvD is somewhat consistent with data for certain years. For example, in 
2013, the largest bankruptcy reported in the BvD database is that of Praktiker AG, and this 
is consistent with our HL database. However, unlike HL, BvD does not account for 
Arcandor AG, which filed for bankruptcy in 2009. We also note that BvD data has some 
serious errors. For Solar Millennium AG, BvD reports 2012 as the bankruptcy year, 
whereas the company went bankrupt in 2011. Similarly, it claims that Suedzucker AG, a 
renowned MDAX company, had been going through bankruptcy proceedings since 2012, 
although it never filed for bankruptcy. The results show that our approach not only 
provides additional bankruptcy data for small-scale firms but also proves that commercial 
data sources are inaccurate for even the largest firms.  
 
  
                                                 
27 Note that Compustat Global reports delistings which may not be due to bankruptcy events. 
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Table 3.4 Comparison across databases (largest bankruptcies) 
Panel A: Largest bankruptcies in Germany - HL versus Bureau van Dijk 
 HL Bureau van Dijk 
 Company name MkEq Company name MkEq 
2001 Kinowelt Medien AG 1,542.2 - - 
2002 Ision Internet AG 775.3 - - 
2003 Media AG 77.0 - - 
2004 Agiv Real Estate AG 108.6 - - 
2005 Pgam Advanced Techn. AG 46.3 - - 
2006 Hucke AG 22.9 - - 
2007 Koehler & Krenzer Fashion AG 35.8 - - 
2008 Thielert AG 354.1 - - 
2009 Arcandor AG 5,188.4 EDOB Abwicklungs AG 478.3 
2010 Primacom AG 189.6 Primacom AG 189.6 
2011 Solar Millennium AG 272.3 Agiv Real Estate AG 108.6 
2012 Centrotherm International AG 570.1 Solar Millennium AG 272.3 
2013 Praktiker AG 79.3 Praktiker AG 79.3 
2014 Hansa Group AG 144.2 MIFA Mitteldeutsche Fahrrad 73.4 
2015 Joyou AG 307.3 Joyou AG 307.3 
2016 KTG Energie AG 72.5 Heliocentris Fuel Energy Sol 53.5 
Panel B: Largest bankruptcies in Germany - HL versus Compustat Global 
 HL Compustat Global 
 Company name MkEq Company name MkEq 
2001 Kinowelt Medien AG 1,542.2 - - 
2002 Ision Internet AG 775.3 - - 
2003 Media AG 77.0 Telesens KSCL AG 616.0 
2004 Agiv Real Estate AG 108.6 Das Werk AG 245.0 
2005 Pgam Advanced Techn. AG 46.3 - - 
2006 Hucke AG 22.9 Umweltkontor Renewable Energy 66.4 
2007 Koehler & Krenzer Fashion AG 35.8 Adori AG 17.3 
2008 Thielert AG 354.1 - - 
2009 Arcandor AG 5,188.4 - - 
2010 Primacom AG 189.6 - - 
2011 Solar Millennium AG 272.3 - - 
2012 Centrotherm International AG 570.1 Phenomedia AG 96.6 
2013 Praktiker AG 79.3 - - 
2014 Hansa Group AG 144.2 Conergy AG 50.3 
2015 Joyou AG 307.3 TRIA IT-solutions AG 3.2 
2016 KTG Energie AG 72.5 - - 
  (continued) 
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Table 3.4 Comparison across databases (largest bankruptcies) (continued) 
This table contrasts the largest bankruptcy in our HL database against existing commercial databases (i.e., 
BvD and Compustat Global) for each calendar year. This analysis exclusively covers our sample firms to 
provide scalable data on the economic relevance and size of bankrupt firms. Most importantly, the test 
provides information on whether the coverage of databases is restricted by size and years and proves that 
the extensive coverage of our HL database is not created by solely considering the bankruptcies of smaller 
firms with less economic relevance. 
 
Table 3.5 highlights the differences in bankruptcy dates by database. Panel A reports 
the results for the full sample, while Panel B contrasts the results for the sample used for 
the bankruptcy models. The median difference in the dates between Compustat and HL is 
24 months for all firms and 35 months for sample firms. That is, for half the firms, 
Compustat reports a bankruptcy date that is more than 24 months (35 months) after the 
bankruptcy date registered in our database. The 75th percentile is 46 months for all firms 
and 59 months for the sample firms. That is, for 25% of the sample firms, Compustat 
reports a delisting date that is 59 months or more after our date. This is because stock 
delistings generally happen several years after a firm files for bankruptcy. For bankruptcy 
events in BvD, half the dates are somewhat congruent with those in our HL database; the 
median distance between the BvD and HL bankruptcy dates is two days for the full sample 
and one day for our sample. This small lag is because BvD relies on court announcements 
that slightly lag the direct corporate announcements that are also used to determine the 
bankruptcy filing dates in the HL database. However, the 75th percentile is 56 days for all 
firms and 69 days for the sample firms; thus, BvD dates substantially lag behind the data 
we collected. Note that we can compare only a few HL events with those in BvD, given the 
poor coverage of the latter. For this comparison, we can use 31 of the 139 bankruptcies 
(22%) in the HL dataset for our sample. The results in Table 3.5 support the idea that 
commercial bankruptcy data is inaccurate in terms of bankruptcy dates.  
Overall, the HL bankruptcy dataset outperforms both BvD and Compustat in terms of 
coverage, correctness of bankruptcy events, and accuracy of bankruptcy dates. This shows 
that our dataset cannot be reproduced by simply gathering information from the two 
commercial bankruptcy databases. In Section 3.4.2, we investigate if this higher quality of 
bankruptcy information influences the interpretation of results of bankruptcy prediction 
models. 
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Table 3.5 Differences in bankruptcy dates across databases 
Panel A: Time differences for all firms  
 Differences in days Differences in month  
 
HL vs. 
Compustat 
Global 
HL vs. 
Bureau van 
Dijk 
HL vs. 
Compustat 
Global 
HL vs. 
Bureau van 
Dijk 
 
Mean 1,064 259 35 9  
P1 145 -95 5 -3  
P25 354 0 12 0  
Median 723 2 24 0  
P75 1,374 56 46 2  
P99 3,870 3,599 129 120  
Std 1,111 817 37 27  
N 15 61 15 61  
Panel B: Time differences for sample firms  
 Differences in days Differences in month  
 
HL vs. 
Compustat 
Global 
HL vs. 
Bureau van 
Dijk 
HL vs. 
Compustat 
Global 
HL vs. 
Bureau van 
Dijk 
 
Mean 1,219 261 35 9  
P1 354 0 12 0  
P25 723 0 12 0  
Median 816 1 35 0  
P75 1,374 69 59 2  
P99 3,870 3,378 59 113  
Std 1,089 787 33 9  
N 9 31 9 31  
This table shows the differences between the reported dates of initial bankruptcy filings across databases. 
We compare the lags in days and months between the explicit dates of bankruptcy announcements by 
different databases. Compustat delisting codes for liquidation or bankruptcy are obtained from Compustat 
Global. Bureau van Dijk data is taken from the Amadeus subscription. The HL database is created using 
the approach described in this study. 
 
3.3 Data and method 
3.3.1 Sample description and summary statistics 
Our initial sample comprises all firms listed in Compustat Global’s company and 
security files that are either incorporated or headquartered in Germany between 1995 and 
2015. We delete observations with missing variables that are required for any bankruptcy 
prediction model. These include the variable sets in Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980), 
Shumway (2001), Bharath and Shumway (2008), and Hess and Huettemann (2019). 
3 The Quality of Bankruptcy Data and its Impact on the Evaluation of Prediction Models: 
Creating and Testing a German Database 63 
Appendix 3.A describes the variable construction for these bankruptcy prediction models. 
To reduce the effect of outliers, we winsorize all variables (except indicator variables and 
probabilities) annually at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Since we require five years of training 
data to perform cross-sectional earnings regressions for Hess and Huettemann (2019), 
which are based on Hou, van Dijk, and Zhang (2012) and Li and Mohanram (2014), our 
sample for bankruptcy prediction begins in 2000.  
For each firm-year observation, we construct twelve monthly observations to enable 
market participants to perform bankruptcy predictions for each month. All bankruptcy 
measures are lagged by three months to ensure that they are observable when used for 
estimation. For example, the first observation for a firm-year with a fiscal year end of 
December 31, 2009 has an estimation date of March 31, 2010, and the last observation for 
the respective firm-year has an estimation date of February 28, 2011. A firm observation is 
defined as bankrupt if the firm files for bankruptcy exactly twelve months after the date of 
estimation; in such cases, the dependent variable equals one and otherwise it equals zero. 
Since we account for bankruptcies until the end of 2016, our sample comprises firm 
months with an estimation date before or at the end of December 2015.  
Table 3.6 provides the summary statistics for all variables used to forecast 
bankruptcy. We report the mean, median, standard deviation, and certain percentiles of 
95,431 firm months with complete data availability for 2000–2015. The results indicate a 
significant cross-sectional variation among these variables. For example, RETA has a 
standard deviation of 1.07. In addition, its 1st and 99th percentiles are −5.95 and 0.60, 
respectively. Interestingly, the probability of book equity becoming negative, PNBE, has a 
mean of 0.21, which is twice that found in Hess and Huettemann’s (2019) study of U.S. 
firms (0.11). This suggests that German firms operate with negative book equity more 
frequently than U.S. firms do. 
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Table 3.6 Summary statistics (N=95,431) 
Variable Model Mean STD 1% 25% Median 75% 99% 
WCTAt A / O 0.22 0.26 -0.52 0.06 0.22 0.38 0.83 
RETAt A -0.14 1.07 -5.95 -0.02 0.03 0.17 0.60 
EBITTAt A / HH 0.01 0.19 -0.78 -0.01 0.05 0.09 0.32 
METLt A 2.86 7.14 0.04 0.45 1.02 2.46 30.27 
STAt A 1.18 0.72 0.02 0.72 1.08 1.48 3.92 
Sizet O / HH 5.21 2.10 1.18 3.77 4.93 6.33 11.55 
TLTAt O / S 0.57 0.24 0.07 0.40 0.58 0.72 1.24 
CLCAt O 0.71 0.61 0.06 0.38 0.59 0.85 3.33 
OENEGt O 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
NITAt O / S / BS -0.03 0.20 -1.02 -0.03 0.02 0.06 0.26 
FUTLt O -0.01 0.63 -2.88 -0.04 0.06 0.17 1.34 
INTWOt O 0.21 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
CHINt O 0.01 0.60 -1.00 -0.36 0.04 0.35 1.00 
RSIZEt S  -25.38 2.64 -31.16 -27.05 -25.54 -23.88 -18.62 
ERt S / BS / HH -0.38 0.73 -1.71 -0.81 -0.40 -0.04 2.18 
STDERt  S / HH 0.12 0.11 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.46 
PNBEt HH 0.21 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.39 0.70 
Neg EarnFrct HH 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
CAPXTAt HH 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.27 
TXTt HH 40.82 169.45 -13.31 0.04 1.50 10.07 979.00 
MLRt HH 0.49 0.25 0.03 0.28 0.49 0.69 0.97 
PD-Mertont BS 0.32 0.32 0.00 0.01 0.22 0.58 1.00 
LNMEt BS 4.59 2.11 0.69 3.11 4.24 5.78 10.48 
LNBDt BS 4.53 2.30 0.02 2.91 4.31 5.83 11.26 
VOLMEt BS 0.73 0.56 0.12 0.38 0.59 0.90 3.23 
This table reports the summary statistics for the following forecast variables (all values except dummy 
variables and probability values are in million dollars). Each observation represents one firm in a given 
year. Specifically, it shows variables used to forecast bankruptcy. For more details, see the data 
construction in Appendix 3.A. WCTA is working capital over total assets, RETA is retained earnings over 
total assets, EBITTA is earnings before interest and taxes over total assets, METL is the market value of 
equity over the book value of total debt, STA is sales over total assets, Size is the logarithm of total assets, 
TLTA is total liabilities over total assets, CLCA is current liabilities over current assets, OENEG is a 
dummy that equals one if total liabilities exceed total assets and zero otherwise, NITA is net income over 
total assets, FUTL is funds provided by operations over total liabilities, INTWO is a dummy that equals 
one if net income has been negative for the past two years and zero otherwise, CHIN is change in net 
income, RSIZE is the logarithm of market equity divided by the value-weighted market equity of the 
index, ER is excess return, STDER is the standard deviation of return, PNBE is the probability that losses 
deplete current book equity, NegEarnFrc is a dummy for negative earnings forecast, CAPXTA is capital 
expenditure over total assets, TXT is taxes, MLR is the market leverage ratio, PD-Merton is the KMV 
probability, LNME is the logarithm of market equity, LNBD is the logarithm of the book value of debt, 
and VOLME is the inverse of market equity volatility. The reported values are the time series averages of 
yearly cross-sectional means, medians, standard deviations, and respective percentiles. To treat extreme 
outliers and data errors, all variables (except indicator variables and probability values) are winsorized 
annually at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The column labeled “Source” indicates the model in which the 
variable is used, where “A” is Altman (1968), “O” is Ohlson (1980), “S” is Shumway (2001), “BS” is 
Bharath and Shumway (2008), and “HH” is Hess and Huettemann (2019). The sample period is 2000–
2015. The summary statistics are reported for observations in which all model variables are available. 
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3.3.2 Method 
Shumway (2001) demonstrates that the likelihood function of hazard models is 
equivalent to that of logistic regressions with multiple observations per firm. We follow 
Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004), and Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) 
and estimate the hazard model as a multi-period logistic regression. Thus, the probability 
of a firm becoming bankrupt follows a logistic distribution with parameters (α, β) and is 
equal to 
 𝑃𝑡(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1) =  
1
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝛼−𝛽𝑥𝑖,𝑡)
,   (3.1) 
where yit is a bankruptcy dummy that equals one if the firm fails in twelve months 
and zero otherwise,28 and xi,t is the vector of explanatory variables that are known at time 
t. The higher the term α + βxi,t, the greater the estimated probability of bankruptcy. The 
estimates and their significance levels are calculated using a maximum likelihood 
technique. Shumway (2001) points out that the test statistics produced by a logistic 
regression are incorrect for the hazard model; correct test statistics are calculated by 
dividing them by the average number of observations per firm. The statistics reported in 
this study have been adjusted accordingly. 
We conduct two empirical analyses. First, we compare the bankruptcy prediction 
models. To produce strictly out-of-sample forecasts, we estimate the parameters using 
2000–2007 data and use the resulting coefficients to predict bankruptcies from 2008 to 
2015. Second, we compare the HL and BvD databases. Given the data restrictions in the 
BvD database, we are limited to a shorter period. We estimate the parameters with 2009–
2012 data and then use the coefficients to predict bankruptcies from 2013 to 2015.  
Static models use a single observation per firm and, thus, result in sample selection 
bias. In contrast, our approach uses all available firm observations to estimate the hazard 
model, exploiting more information and eliminating any sample selection bias. Note that 
applying such a technique to Altman’s (1968) and Ohlson’s (1980) static models already 
improves their performance as compared to adopting the estimation techniques originally 
suggested. 
                                                 
28 We also perform empirical tests that predict bankruptcy for a forecast horizon of one month rather than 
twelve months and find that the results remain robust regardless of the horizon change.  
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3.4 Empirical results 
3.4.1 Comparison across models 
3.4.1.1 Estimation results 
Table 3.7 reports the estimation results for the hazard models of Altman (1968), 
Ohlson (1980), Shumway (2001), Bharath and Shumway (2008), and Hess and 
Huettemann (2019), including the parameter estimates as well as their significance. In 
addition, it presents the likelihood ratio test for each model.  
The likelihood ratio test is significant for each model. Thus, for all models, the 
independent variables have explanatory power. Not all variables are statistically 
significant, which is contrary to studies on U.S. firms. However, if the parameters are 
statistically significant, the signs of these coefficients are consistent with economic 
intuition and those found in previous studies. For Altman (1968), lower profitability 
(EBITTA) yields higher estimated probability of bankruptcy. In the case of Ohlson (1980), 
the probability of bankruptcy rises if net income is negative for the past two years 
(INTWO) and if the change in net income (CHIN) is negative. For Shumway (2001), firms 
that are more leveraged (TLTA), less profitable (NITA), and smaller (RSIZE), are more 
likely to become bankrupt. For Bharath and Shumway (2008), lower excess return (ER), 
lower market equity (LNME), and higher PD-Merton yield higher estimated default 
probability. Finally, for Hess and Huettemann (2019), firms with higher PNBE are more 
likely to fail. The higher the market leverage ratio (MLR) and the lower the tax (TXT) and 
excess return (ER), the greater the estimated probability of bankruptcy.  
3 The Quality of Bankruptcy Data and its Impact on the Evaluation of Prediction Models: 
Creating and Testing a German Database 67 
Table 3.7 Parameter estimates of bankruptcy models 
Variable 
Altman  
(1968) 
Ohlson  
(1980) 
Shumway  
(2001) 
Bharath and 
Shumway 
(2008) 
Hess and 
Huettemann  
(2019) 
Constant -6.16 *** -6.40 *** -12.67 *** -6.78 *** -8.97 *** 
 (622.75)  (71.00)  (77.20)  (145.32)  (211.75)  
WCTAt -0.67 
 -1.05   
 
 
 
 
 
 (2.70)  (1.28)   
 
 
 
 
 
RETAt -0.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (0.02)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EBITTAt -1.39 ***   
 
 
 -0.61  
 (20.47)   
 
 
 
 
 (2.35)  
METLt 0.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1.63)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STAt -0.22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1.59)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sizet   -0.12   
 
 
 -0.02  
   (2.30)   
 
 
 (0.04)  
TLTAt 
  0.87  0.77 *  
 
 
 
   (1.64)  (3.05)   
 
 
 
CLCAt 
  -0.41   
 
 
 
 
 
   (0.91)   
 
 
 
 
 
OENEGt 
  -0.16   
 
 
 
 
 
   (0.07)   
 
 
 
 
 
NITAt 
  0.40  -0.81 ** -0.45   
 
   (0.40)  (6.16)  (1.60)   
 
FUTLt 
  -0.23   
 
 
 
 
 
   (0.99)   
 
 
 
 
 
INTWOt 
  1.18 ***   
 
 
 
   (18.50)   
 
 
 
 
 
CHINt 
  -0.72 ***   
 
 
 
   (12.10)   
 
 
 
 
 
RSIZEt 
  
 
 -0.18 ***   
 
   
 
 (10.94)   
 
 
 
ERt      -1.31 *** -1.04 *** -1.23 *** 
     (49.86)  (38.08)  (35.84)  
STDERt     -0.24    0.15  
 
    (0.34)    (0.10)  
PNBEt 
  
      2.73 *** 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 (10.95)  
Neg EarnFrct 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.07  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 (0.08)  
CAPXTAt 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 2.13  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 (2.69)  
TXTt         -0.01 * 
         (3.13)  
MLRt 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 0.87 * 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 (3.63)  
PD-Mertont      1.06 **   
 
      (4.06)    
LNMEt       -0.23 **   
 
      (6.34)    
LNBDt       0.00    
 
      (0.00)    
VOLMEt       -0.44    
 
      (0.76)    
N 47,738   47,738   47,738   47,738   47,738   
LRT 25.97 *** 56.07 *** 93.25 *** 103.30 *** 112.81 *** 
        (continued) 
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Table 3.7 Parameter estimates of bankruptcy models (continued) 
This table reports the results of the hazard models for the bankruptcy indicators for Altman (1968), Ohlson 
(1980), Shumway (2001), Bharath and Shumway (2008), and Hess and Huettemann’s (2019) market model. 
Parameter estimates for all variables in each model are reported along with their chi-square statistics in 
parentheses. The hazard model is estimated for 2000–2007 with 47,738 observations and 78 bankruptcies. 
The chi-square of the likelihood ratio test for each model is reported in the row labeled LRT. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
3.4.1.2 Out-of-sample results 
Table 3.8 presents the out-of-sample accuracies. Panel A reports the goodness-of-fit 
deciles. To create this table, we rank firms into deciles based on their fitted bankruptcy 
probability values for each year in our validation sample (2008–2015). That is, firms most 
likely to default in the subsequent year are sorted into the first decile and those with the 
lowest estimated default probabilities are assigned to the tenth decile. We report the 
percentage of bankrupt firms that fall under each of the ten probability deciles. A model is 
accurate if it estimates a high default probability for bankrupt firm-years and assigns many 
bankrupt firms into low deciles.  
Hess and Huettemann’s (2019) model classifies 59.02% of all bankrupt firms into the 
highest default probability decile (decile one). That is, a bank can exclude 59.02% of all 
bankruptcies if it does not lend money to the 10% of firms with the highest expected 
default measures. Shumway (2001) and Bharath and Shumway (2008) classify 57.38% and 
54.1% of all bankrupt firms into the first decile, respectively. As a result, models using a 
combination of accounting and market information strongly outperform Altman’s 
(39.34%) and Ohlson’s (32.79%) accounting-based models. For the top two deciles (in 
aggregate), the correct predictions are 81.97% for Shumway (2001), 78.69% for Bharath 
and Shumway (2008), 73.77% for Hess and Huettemann (2019), 57.38% for Ohlson 
(1980), and 50.82% for Altman (1968).  
Panel B reports the distribution of the area under the receiver operating characteristic 
(ROC) curve, also referred to as area under the curve (AUC), for the validation sample. 
The ROC curve plots the true positive rate against the false positive rate for all cut-off 
points. The AUC is measured relative to the area of the unit square. A value of 0.5 
indicates a random model with no predictive ability and a value of 1.0 denotes perfect 
discrimination. To compute the AUC, we estimate the parameters for each model using the 
training sample (2000–2007) and adopt these parameters to predict bankruptcies in our 
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validation sample (2008–2015). Chi-square tests for the differences in the means of the 
AUC across all models are shown in Panel C. 
Table 3.8 Out-of-sample results: Comparison across models 
Panel A: Goodness-of-fit deciles 
Decile 
Altman  
(1968) 
Ohlson  
(1980) 
Shumway 
(2001) 
Bharath and 
Shumway 
(2008) 
Hess and 
Huettemann 
(2019) - 
Market 
1 39.34 32.79 57.38 54.1 59.02 
2 11.48 24.59 24.59 24.59 14.75 
3 9.84 16.39 8.2 9.84 11.48 
4 6.56 6.56 4.92 6.56 6.56 
5 6.56 1.64 0 3.28 1.64 
6 3.28 1.64 3.28 0 1.64 
7 1.64 3.28 0 0 1.64 
8 9.84 1.64 0 0 0 
9 6.56 4.92 0 0 0 
10 4.92 6.56 1.64 1.64 3.28 
Panel B: Area under the ROC curve 
Model   Mean 95% Confidence interval STD 
Altman (1968)  0.675*** 0.597 0.752 0.039 
Ohlson (1980)  0.731*** 0.656 0.804 0.037 
Shumway (2001) 0.851*** 0.804 0.898 0.024 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) 0.854*** 0.810 0.899 0.023 
Hess and Huettemann (2019) 0.842*** 0.789 0.895 0.027 
Panel C: Comparison of Area under the ROC curve 
 
Altman  
(1968) 
Ohlson  
(1980) 
Shumway 
(2001) 
Bharath and 
Shumway 
(2008) 
Hess and 
Huettemann 
(2019) 
 
  
Altman - 
 
0.057 
 
0.176 *** 0.180 *** 0.167 *** 
Ohlson  -0.057  -  0.120 *** 0.123 *** 0.111 *** 
Shumway -0.176 *** -0.120 *** - 
 
0.003 
 
-0.009 
 
Bharath and Shumway -0.180 *** -0.123 *** -0.003 
 
- 
 
-0.012 
 
Hess and Huettemann -0.167 *** -0.111 *** 0.009   0.012   -   
This table compares the out-of-sample accuracy of various bankruptcy prediction models. Parameter 
estimates from the training sample (2000–2007) are used to predict bankruptcies for the validation period 
2008–2015. This validation sample includes 47,693 firm-years and 61 bankruptcies. All models are 
estimated with a hazard model. For Panel A, firms are ranked into deciles based on their fitted bankruptcy 
probability values for every year, where firms with the highest values fall into the first decile. We report the 
percentage of bankrupt firms that are classified into each probability decile. Panel B reports the mean of the 
area under the ROC curve (AUC) along with its significance to be greater than 0.5, its standard deviation, 
and the 95% Wald confidence interval. Panel C compares the means of the AUC across models reporting 
their mean differences and their significance. *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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For each model we test the hypothesis that the AUC is equal to 0.5, that is, that the 
model is a purely random classifier. This hypothesis is rejected for all models. Bharath and 
Shumway’s (2008) model has an average AUC of 0.854, which is non-significantly higher 
than 0.851 in Shumway (2001) and 0.842 in Hess and Huettemann (2019). The market-
based models significantly outperform the accounting-based ones in Ohlson (1980) and 
Altman (1968) with an average AUC of 0.731 and 0.675, respectively. These results are 
consistent with those reported using goodness-of-fit deciles: Shumway (2001), Bharath and 
Shumway (2008), and Hess and Huettemann (2019) have a similar out-of-sample 
performance for German firms, followed by Ohlson (1980) and Altman (1968). This 
study’s results are consistent with those in studies such as Shumway (2001), Hillegeist, 
Keating, Cram, and Lundstedt (2004), and Campbell et al. (2008), who demonstrate that 
market variables can improve the accuracy of bankruptcy predictions. In contrast, for 
example, Reisz and Perlich (2007), and Agarwal and Taffler (2008) show that accounting-
based models have similar performance. 
3.4.2 Comparison across bankruptcy databases 
We analyze the effect of different bankruptcy databases on parameter estimation and 
validation of bankruptcy prediction models. Since the BvD database deletes firm histories, 
we reduce our sample period to 2009–2015. While this eliminates the effect of BvD’s 
deletion procedure on the analysis results and ensures a fair test, the test includes fewer 
bankruptcy events for both estimation and validation. In addition, we exclude Compustat 
Global because it has only two delisting events for this period, which is not sufficient for a 
reasonable analysis. 
3.4.2.1 Estimation results 
Table 3.9 reports the hazard model results for all models when using the HL or BvD 
bankruptcy databases for parameter estimation. In addition, it presents the parameter 
estimates, their significance, and the likelihood ratio test. 
For each model, the chi-square statistic of the likelihood ratio test is higher if we use 
the HL bankruptcies as opposed to the BvD bankruptcies. For example, in Shumway 
(2001), HL data yields a chi-square statistic of 70.74 and BvD data produces a value of 
24.84. 
Table 3.9 Parameter estimates by bankruptcy database  
  Altman  
(1968) 
Ohlson  
(1980) 
Shumway  
(2001) 
Bharath and Shumway  
(2008) 
Hess and Huettemann  
(2019)    
Variable HL   BvD   HL   BvD   HL   BvD   HL   BvD   HL   BvD   
Constant -5.80 *** -6.85 *** -10.50 *** -13.40 *** -14.46 *** -12.68 *** -5.11 *** -5.98 *** -10.10 *** -10.88 *** 
 (236.56)  (183.98)  (73.95)  (63.49)  (53.40)  (25.17)  (30.92)  (28.61)  (153.57)  (111.31)  
WCTAt -0.96 
 -0.23  1.04  3.40 **  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1.66)  (0.05)  (0.77)  (5.26)   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
RETAt -0.07 
 -0.05   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (0.30)  (0.07)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
EBITTAt -1.57 
 -1.24   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 -0.08  0.20  
 (2.26)  (0.62)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  
METLt -0.78 ** -0.57 *  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (6.27)  (2.98)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
STAt 0.01 
 0.25   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (0.00)  (0.82)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sizet 
   -0.05  0.09   
 
 
  
 
 0.01  0.20  
    (0.24)  (0.56)   
 
 
  
 
 (0.13)  (1.85)  
TLTAt    5.09 *** 6.41 *** 1.62 *** 1.74 **    
 
 
 
 
 
    (18.09)  (14.76)  (8.06)  (5.12)    
 
 
 
 
 
CLCAt 
   0.33  0.69 **  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    (1.51)  (5.50)   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
OENEGt 
   -2.81 *** -3.86 **  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    (8.31)  (6.39)   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
NITAt 
   -0.07  -0.16  -0.60  -0.13  -1.13 * -0.89   
 
 
 
    (0.01)  (0.01)  (1.02)  (0.02)  (3.64)  (1.00)   
 
 
 
FUTLt 
   -0.46  -0.10        
    (1.25)  (0.01)   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTWOt 
   0.62  1.08 *  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    (1.99)  (3.65)   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHINt 
   -0.35  -0.48   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    (1.23)  (1.33)   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
RSIZEt 
   
 
 
 
 -0.22 *** -0.14    
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 (8.24)  (1.98)    
 
 
 
 
 
ERt       -1.32 *** -0.95 ** -1.42 *** -1.25 ** -0.86 *** -0.60  
      (14.68)  (4.87)  (12.79)  (6.09)  (6.80)  (2.03)  
                (continued)  
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Table 3.9 Parameter estimates by bankruptcy database (continued) 
 
STDERt      3.46 *** 3.24 **    2.87 ** 2.22  
 
     (9.01)  (3.94)    (5.22)  (1.51)  
PNBEt          1.60 * 2.37 ** 
 
         (3.76)  (5.21)  
NegEarnFrct          0.51  -0.10  
 
         (0.97)  (0.02)  
CAPXTAt 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 2.43  -3.07  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 (0.52)  (0.25)  
TXTt          -0.01  -0.01  
          (0.80)  (0.98)  
MLRt          3.26 *** 3.11 ** 
 
         (8.94)  (4.93)  
PD-Mertont        -0.61  -1.35    
 
       (0.41)  (1.15)    
LNMEt        -0.72 *** -0.73 ***    
 
       (25.13)  (15.30)    
LNBDt        0.56 *** 0.72 ***    
 
       (16.66)  (16.00)    
VOLMEt        -3.09 ** -2.64 *    
 
                (6.24)  (3.61)    
LRT 32.88 *** 11.18 *** 47.84 *** 30.49 *** 70.74 *** 24.84 *** 83.03 *** 34.80 *** 81.10 *** 36.77 *** 
Wilks' 
Lambda F-
value 2.59 ** 2.94 ** 7.46 *** 5.22 *** 4.48 *** 
This table reports the results of the hazard models of the bankruptcy indicators for the market models proposed by Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980), Shumway (2001), 
Bharath and Shumway (2008), and Hess and Huettemann’s (2019) market model. Parameter estimates for all variables in each model are reported along with their chi-
square statistics in parentheses. The hazard model is estimated for 2009–2012 with 24,578 observations. In the training sample, there are 31 bankruptcies for the HL 
database and 18 bankruptcies for the BvD database. The chi-square of the likelihood ratio test for the hypothesis that each parameter is equal to zero is reported. 
Furthermore, the F-value of Wilks’ Lambda for the hypothesis that the parameter estimates created by HL data and BvD data are equal is reported. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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For Ohlson (1980), the variables WCTA, CLCA, and INTWO are only significant if 
we use the BvD database for the estimation. As for Shumway (2001), the variable RSIZE 
is significant if we use HL bankruptcy events for estimation, but not if we use BvD 
bankruptcies. In Bharath and Shumway (2008), the variable NITA is significant if we use 
HL for parameter estimation, but not if we use BvD data. In Hess and Huettemann (2019), 
the variables ER and STDER are significant if we use HL for parameter estimation, while 
they are not significant, if we use BvD for estimation.  
We conduct formal tests on the differences of the coefficients across the two training 
samples. We test the hypothesis that parameters emerging from use of the HL data equal 
those from the use of the BvD data. This hypothesis is rejected for all bankruptcy 
prediction models. That is, the choice of bankruptcy database affects the parameter 
estimates. If we use the inaccurate BvD bankruptcy events instead of HL data, the 
parameters are different in terms of significance and size. In the next subsection, we 
investigate if these different parameter estimates translate into different out-of-sample 
performances, that is, if the parameters estimated using the HL data outperform those 
estimated by BvD. 
3.4.2.2 Out-of-sample results 
Table 3.10 presents the out-of-sample accuracies for all models. The parameters are 
estimated using a training sample and the accuracy is evaluated with a validation sample. 
Both samples warrant bankruptcy dummies as the dependent variable. Dummies that 
emerge from the two bankruptcy databases, HL and BvD, are used for both parameter 
estimation and validation of the models. Thus, we have four out-of-sample results for each 
model, with which we conduct two empirical tests.  
First, we evaluate the ability of each database to produce unbiased parameter 
estimates. If the parameter estimates from the bankruptcy dummies of one dataset yield 
better out-of-sample results, we can conclude that this bankruptcy dataset produces better 
parameter estimates. To derive this information, we compare the two results obtained using 
different bankruptcy dummies in the training sample but the same HL bankruptcy dummies 
in the validation sample. 
Table 3.10 Out-of-sample results: Comparison across bankruptcy databases 
Panel A: Goodness-of-fit deciles 
  
Altman (1968) Ohlson (1980) Shumway (2001) 
Bharath and Shumway 
(2008) 
Hess and Huettemann 
(2019) - Market Decile 
Training HL BvD HL BvD HL BvD HL BvD HL BvD HL BvD HL BvD HL BvD HL BvD HL BvD 
Validation HL BvD HL BvD HL BvD HL BvD HL BvD 
1 40 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 20 25 16.67 60 53.33 75 66.67 46.67 33.33 58.33 41.67 46.67 33.33 50 41.67 
2 6.67 13.33 8.33 8.33 20 20 25 16.67 13.33 20 8.33 16.67 20 26.67 16.67 25 20 6.67 25 8.33 
3 6.67 6.67 0 0 26.67 20 25 16.67 13.33 6.67 8.33 8.33 6.67 13.33 0 8.33 13.33 26.67 0 16.67 
4 6.67 6.67 8.33 8.33 0 0 0 0 0 13.33 0 0 6.67 13.33 8.33 8.33 13.33 20 16.67 25 
5 6.67 6.67 8.33 8.33 6.67 13.33 0 16.67 6.67 0 0 0 13.33 6.67 8.33 8.33 0 6.67 0 0 
6 6.67 6.67 8.33 16.67 0 13.33 8.33 16.67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.67 6.67 8.33 8.33 
7 13.33 20 16.67 8.33 0 0 0 0 6.67 0 8.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 6.67 0 8.33 8.33 0 6.67 0 8.33 0 6.67 0 8.33 6.67 0 8.33 0 0 0 0 0 
9 6.67 6.67 8.33 8.33 6.67 6.67 8.33 8.33 0 0 0 0 0 6.67 0 8.33 0 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 0 6.67 0 8.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Panel B: Area under ROC curve           
Model     Mean              
Training   HL BvD   HL BvD               
Validation   HL Diff BvD Diff           
Altman (1968)   0.670 0.682 -0.011  0.622 0.630 -0.008            
Ohlson (1980)   0.733 0.673 0.060 * 0.690 0.630 0.060 **           
Shumway (2001)   0.841 0.827 0.014  0.870 0.861 0.010            
Bharath and Shumway (2008) 0.800 0.782 0.017  0.821 0.795 0.026 **           
Hess and Huettemann (2019) 0.831 0.775 0.056 ** 0.842 0.803 0.039 *           
This table compares the out-of-sample accuracy for various bankruptcy prediction models with yearly observations. We estimate and validate the sample with HL and 
BvD bankruptcy events. The parameter estimates from the training sample (2009–2012) are used to predict bankruptcies for the validation period 2013–2015. This 
validation sample includes 16,629 firm-years and 15 bankruptcies in the HL database and 12 bankruptcies in the BvD database. All models are estimated using a hazard 
model. For Panel A, firms are ranked into deciles based on their fitted bankruptcy probability values for every year, where firms with the highest values are categorized 
as the first decile. We report the percentage of bankrupt firms that are classified into each probability decile. Panel B reports the mean of the area under the ROC curve 
(AUC), the differences, and the significance of the differences. ** and * denote significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
3
 T
h
e Q
u
a
lity o
f B
a
n
kru
p
tcy D
a
ta
 a
n
d
 its Im
p
a
ct o
n
 th
e E
va
lu
a
tio
n
 o
f P
red
ictio
n
 M
o
d
els: 
C
rea
tin
g
 a
n
d
 T
estin
g
 a
 G
erm
a
n
 D
a
ta
b
a
se
 
 7
4
 
3 The Quality of Bankruptcy Data and its Impact on the Evaluation of Prediction Models: 
Creating and Testing a German Database 75 
Panel A shows the goodness-of-fit deciles. If we use the HL dummies for validation, 
the rate of bankrupt firms in the highest default probability decile estimated in Altman’s 
(1968) model is 40.00% when using the HL parameter estimates and 33.33% with the BvD 
estimates. Thus, estimating the parameters with HL rather than BvD bankruptcies produces 
greater accuracy. Likewise, in Ohlson (1980), the proportion of bankrupt firm-years in 
decile one is 33.33% if we estimate the parameters with HL dummies, which is higher than 
the 20% obtained if we estimate parameters with BvD information. We observe the same 
pattern for Shumway (2001) (HL: 60%, BvD: 53.33%), Bharath and Shumway (2008) 
(HL: 46.67%, BvD: 33.33%), and Hess and Huettemann (2019) (HL: 46.67%, BvD: 
33.33%).  
Panel B reports the mean of the area under the ROC curve (AUC) for all models. 
Again, we use HL information for the validation sample. We also conduct chi-square tests 
on whether the AUCs differ significantly when the training sample consist of different 
bankruptcy dummies. Ohlson (1980) has an average AUC of 0.733 if we estimate the 
parameters with HL data, which significantly exceeds the average AUC of 0.673 when 
parameters are estimated with BvD data. For Hess and Huettemann (2019), the average 
AUC is 0.831 with HL estimates, which is significantly higher than the AUC of 0.775 
obtained using BvD estimates. The chi-square tests for the differences in AUC in 
correlated samples show that these two differences are statistically significant. We find the 
same pattern for Shumway (2001) (HL: 0.841, BvD: 0.827) and Bharath and Shumway 
(2008) (HL: 0.800, BvD: 0.782). An exception is Altman (1968), where the average AUC 
is 0.670 with HL estimates and slightly lower than with BvD estimates (0.682).  
All in all, we observe higher accuracy when we use HL data instead of BvD data for 
parameter estimation. Note that we obtain consistent results when using BvD dummies 
instead of HL dummies in the validation sample. We conclude that the more accurate 
bankruptcy information in the HL database produces more realistic parameter estimates. 
This analysis speaks to the consequences of training bankruptcy models with noisy 
bankruptcy data. When models are estimated using BvD data, researchers cannot 
effectively predict true bankruptcy outcomes, that is, out-of-sample results for bankruptcies 
in the HL database. 
Second, we compare the out-of-sample results when using HL and BvD information 
for both parameter estimation and validation, respectively. When performing parameter 
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estimation and validation with the more accurate HL database, Shumway (2001) has the 
highest average AUC of 0.841, followed by Hess and Huettemann (2019), Bharath and 
Shumway (2008), Ohlson (1980), and Altman (1968) with 0.831, 0.800, 0.733, and 0.670, 
respectively. If we perform bankruptcy predictions using the inaccurate BvD database, 
Shumway (2001) has the highest average AUC of 0.861, followed by Hess and 
Huettemann (2019) with 0.803, Bharath and Shumway (2008) with 0.795, and Ohlson 
(1980) and Altman (1968) equally with 0.630.  
Thus, previous studies that use BvD information would conclude that Altman and 
Ohlson’s models have the same out-of-sample performance and are equally effective in 
predicting bankruptcies. However, we reach a different conclusion when using more 
accurate HL information: Ohlson has significantly higher performance and, thus, is the 
more effective bankruptcy prediction model. Likewise, studies using BvD data would 
conclude that Shumway (2001) significantly outperforms Hess and Huettemann (2019). In 
reality, however, if we use HL data, both models perform almost equally well. Specifically, 
data quality significantly affects the reliability of results for bankruptcy prediction models 
and the inferences from comparing alternative model specifications. 
3.5 Conclusions 
In this study, we show that the quality of bankruptcy data has a significant impact on 
the estimation and the evaluation of bankruptcy prediction models. We introduce an 
alternative database of German bankruptcies by systematically collecting information from 
public sources. In doing so, we show that our bankruptcy database has more complete and 
more accurate data on bankruptcy events and dates than the most frequently used 
databases, BvD and Compustat Global. In other words, our bankruptcy database cannot be 
reproduced using these two commercial databases. To the best of our knowledge, we are 
the first to make a comprehensive comparison of several bankruptcy prediction models for 
the German market using an appropriate database. Most importantly, in our analysis of 
German public firms, we demonstrate that the higher quality of our bankruptcy database 
translates into significantly better parameter estimates and better out-of-sample results for 
bankruptcy prediction models compared to the use of BvD information. 
The implication for studies that use bankruptcy information is huge. It is likely that 
previous studies that use incorrect bankruptcy information provided by BvD or Compustat 
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present biased parameters for factors that are supposed to drive a company’s financial 
condition. As a result, the out-of-sample assessment based on these biased parameters is 
not informative. For example, BvD information would recommend a model whose 
performance deteriorates when we use more accurate HL data. Therefore, the conclusions 
drawn in previous studies may need to be revised in light of accurate bankruptcy data. In 
addition, accurate bankruptcy information is crucial to several other applications, such as 
analyzing systemic risks or credit spreads. 
Further research could compile the bankruptcy events of German non-public firms 
and extend our methodology to extract complete bankruptcy information for other 
countries if regulatory requirements are fulfilled. Furthermore, investigating whether data 
quality affects results in other countries as well may be of special interest. 
3.A Construction of variables for earlier bankruptcy prediction models 
We discuss the construction of variables used in Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980), 
Shumway (2001), Bharath and Shumway’s (2008) most effective model, and Hess and 
Huettemann’s (2019) market model. 
Altman (1968) obtains a Z-score using a linear weighted sum of five ratios: 
𝑍 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅  𝑊𝐶𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽2 ⋅  𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽3 ⋅  𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽4 ⋅  𝑀𝐸𝑇𝐿 
 +𝛽5 ⋅ 𝑆𝑇𝐴,   (3.2) 
where WCTA is working capital (Compustat item WCAP) divided by total assets 
(AT), RETA is retained earnings (RE) divided by total assets (AT), EBITTA is earnings 
before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets (AT), METL is the market value of 
equity (PRCC_F multiplied by CSHO) divided by the book value of total debt (LT), STA 
is sales (SALE) divided by total assets (AT), and Z is the Z-score (overall index). WCTA 
is a proxy for a firm’s liquidity, RETA is a proxy for firm age, and EBITTA measures 
profitability. METL is a widely used measure of leverage and STA describes the firm’s 
efficiency in using assets to generate sales. The Z-score characterizes the financial strength 
of a firm by aggregating these five accounting ratios into one figure using the estimated 
coefficients β1, … , β5.  
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Ohlson (1980) finds nine variables to be significant and defines his O-score model as 
 O =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽2 ⋅ 𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽3 ⋅ 𝑊𝐶𝑇𝐴 
 + 𝛽4 ⋅ 𝐶𝐿𝐶𝐴 +  𝛽5 ⋅ 𝑂𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽6 ⋅ 𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐴 
 + 𝛽7 ⋅ 𝐹𝑈𝑇𝐿 + 𝛽8 ⋅ 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑊𝑂 + 𝛽9 ⋅ 𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁,   (3.3) 
where Size is the logarithm of total assets (AT), TLTA is total liabilities (LT) over 
total assets (AT), WCTA is working capital (WCAP) over total assets (AT), CLCA is 
current liabilities (LCT) over current assets (ACT), OENEG is a dummy that takes the 
value of one if total liabilities (LT) exceed total assets (AT) and zero otherwise, NITA is 
net income (NI) over total assets (AT), FUTL is funds provided by operations29 (PI plus 
DP) over total liabilities (LT), INTWO is a dummy that takes the value of one if net 
income (NI) is negative for the past two years and zero otherwise, CHIN is the change in 
net income (NI), and O is the O-score (overall index). WCTA and CLCA measure 
liquidity. NITA, FUTL, INTWO, and CHIN capture the different aspects of profitability. 
TLTA and OENEG describe the capital structure and Size is a measure of firm size.  
In addition to selected financial ratios used by Ohlson, Shumway (2001) adds two 
market variables, the excess return and its standard deviation: 
 𝑆 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽2 ⋅ 𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽3 ⋅ 𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐴 
 +𝛽4 ⋅ 𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽5 ⋅ 𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑅,   (3.4) 
where RSIZE is the logarithm of market equity divided by the value-weighted 
market equity of the index, TLTA is total liabilities (LT) over total assets (AT), NITA is 
net income (NI) over total assets (AT), ER is excess returns calculated as the difference 
between the previous year’s returns and the risk-free rate, STDER is the standard deviation 
of the returns, and S is the S-score (overall index). TLTA measures solvency and describes 
the capital structure, and profitability is captured by NITA. ER measures the profit of an 
investment, where STDER determines the variability of excess returns. Returns are 
calculated as the present year’s adjusted stock price (PRCCD multiplied by TRFD and 
divided by AJEXDI) divided by the previous year’s adjusted stock price minus one. RSIZE 
is a measure of firm size.  
                                                 
29 Since funds provided by operations are no longer reported, we perform an approximation by summing 
“pretax income” and “depreciation and amortization.” 
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Bharath and Shumway (2008) extend the distance-to-default models that Vassalou 
and Xing (2004) and Hillegeist et al. (2004) construct. Applying Merton’s (1974) option 
pricing theory yields the probability of bankruptcy as 
 𝑃𝐷 − 𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑜𝑛 = 𝑁 (− (
𝑙𝑛(𝑉/𝐹)+(𝜇−0.5𝜎𝑉
2)
𝜎𝑉
)),   (3.5) 
where V is the market value of a firm’s assets, σV is its standard deviation, μ is the 
expected return on assets, F is the market value of firm debt, and N(∙) is the cumulative 
standard normal distribution function. Vassalou and Xing (2004) numerically compute V 
and σV by applying an iterative procedure. Bharath and Shumway, however, propose a 
naïve approach. They approximate the market value of debt using the book value of debt 
and, thus, calculate F as debt in current liabilities plus one half of long-term debt. 
Furthermore, the volatility of a firm’s debt is approximated by 
 𝜎𝐹 = 0.05 + 0.25 ∙ 𝜎𝐸,   (3.6) 
where σE is the volatility of market equity. Market equity is denoted by E and 
calculated as the product of share price at the end of the month and the number of 
outstanding shares. Accordingly, an approximation for the volatility of the firm’s assets is 
denoted by 
 𝜎𝑉 =
𝐸
𝐸+𝐹
𝜎𝐸 +
𝐹
𝐸+𝐹
𝜎𝐹.   (3.7) 
The expected return on assets, μ, is approximated using the previous year’s return on 
assets. In addition, the market value of assets is approximated by the sum of the market 
value of equity and book value of debt.  
Bharath and Shumway’s most effective model includes PD-Merton as constructed 
above; the logarithm of market equity E (PRCC_F multiplied by CSHO); the logarithm of 
the book value of debt F, calculated as current debt (DLC) plus one half of long-term debt 
(DLTT); the inverse of market equity volatility; excess returns calculated as the difference 
between the previous year’s returns and the risk-free rate measured by the return on a one-
year Treasury Bill from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve system; and NITA 
computed as the ratio of net income (NI) to total assets (AT). 
The key idea of Hess and Huettemann’s (2019) models is that a firm becomes 
bankrupt if its book equity becomes negative. Thus, the key bankruptcy predictor is the 
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probability that the sum of a firm’s current book equity and earnings forecast for the 
subsequent month is negative. This probability for firm i at time t can be expressed as 
 𝑃𝑁𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 1 − 𝛷 (
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1̂ +𝐵𝑘𝐸𝑞𝑖,𝑡 
𝜎(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1̂ )
),    (3.8) 
where BkEqi,t denotes the current book equity for the previous quarterly or yearly 
report, Earni,t+1 is the expected earnings for the subsequent month, σ(Earni,t+1̂ ) is the 
corresponding volatility of the individual earnings forecast, and Φ(⋅) is the cumulative 
distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Book equity is equal to 
stockholder’s equity (SEQ). If SEQ is missing, they include common equity (CEQ) plus 
the value of preferred stock (PSTK). If CEQ or PSTK are missing, book equity is 
evaluated as total assets (AT) minus total liabilities (LT) minus minority interest (MIB). 
Earnings are the change in retained earnings, which equals net income (NI) minus dividend 
payments (DVT). 
To calculate the earnings forecasts and their volatilities, Hess and Huettemann 
(2019) use cross-sectional models. More specifically, they adopt a rolling regression 
technique with accounting data from the past five years to estimate the parameters they use 
for forecasting.  
Hess and Huettemann’s (2019) market model contains PNBE, the probability that 
book equity becomes negative; NegBkEq, a dummy that equals one if book equity is 
negative and zero otherwise; NegEarnFrc, a dummy that equals one if the earnings forecast 
is negative and zero otherwise; CAPXTA as capital expenditures (CAPX) divided by total 
assets (AT); TXT as paid taxes (TXT); EBITTA as profitability calculated as earnings 
before interest and taxes (EBIT) over total assets (AT); Size measured by the logarithm of 
total assets (AT); and the market leverage ratio (MLR), calculated as the sum of long-term 
debt (DLTT) and current debt (DLC) divided by the sum of long-term debt, current debt, 
and market equity. Market equity is the fiscal year-end equity price (PRCC_F) multiplied 
by the number of common outstanding shares (CSHO). It adds excess returns calculated as 
the difference between the previous year’s returns and the risk-free rate (ER) and the 
standard deviation of returns (STDER). 
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3.B List of German words related to bankruptcy 
Insolvenzantragspflicht Insolvenzrecht Insolvenzgesetzes 
Insolvenzankündigung Insolvenzplänen Insolvenzgutachtens 
lnsolvenz insolvenzantrag Insolvenzverfahren 
Insolvenzfällen Insolvenzantragsgründe Insolvenzerwaltung 
Insolvency Insolvenzfrist Insolvenzanfechtungs 
lnsolvenzverfahrens Insolvenzgefährdung Insolvenzplans 
Insolvenzeröffhung Insolvenzanmeldung Insolvenzgericht 
Insolvenzgrund Insolvenzgeschichte Insolvenzantrag 
Insolvenzverwalterin insolvenzrechtlich Insolvenzverwaltern 
Insolvenzkanzlei Insolvenzverwalters Insolvenzjahr 
Insolvenzgerichten insolvencies Insolvenzwirtschaft 
insolvenzphase Insolvenzszenario Insolvenzgefahr 
Insolvenzfälle Insolvenzen Insolvenzplanes 
Insolvenzeröffnungsgutachten Insolvenzursachen Insolvenzverfahrens 
Insolvenzverordnung insolvenzverfahrensgestützten insolvenzgefährdet 
insolvenzverfahrens insolvency Insolvenzverwaltung 
Insolvenzquote Insolvenzrechtes Insolvenzverfähren 
Insolvenzabwicklung Insolvenzmassen insolvenzbedingte 
Insolvenzverwalter Insolvenzbüro Insolvenzbedingte 
Insolvenzforderung Insolvenzgeldvorfinanzierung insolvenzbekanntmachungen 
Insolvenaverwalter Insolvenzantrags Insolvenzanträge 
insolvenzliches Insolvenzplan Insolvenzverschleppung 
Insolvenzvertreter Insolvenzwelle Insolvenzzahlen 
Insolvenzantrages Insolvenzstatus Insolvent 
insolvenzsichere insolvenzähnliche insolvenzlichen 
Insolvenzreife Insolvenzeröffnung Insolvenzplanteilnehmer 
Insolvenzausfallgeld Insolvenz Insolvenzrisiken 
Insolvenzgerichts Insolvenzsituationen Insolvenzantragsverfahren 
Insolvenzeröffnungsverfahrens Insolvenztatbestände Insolvenzmanagement 
Insolvenzgeldes Insolvenzantragsprüfung insolvenzverwalter 
Insolvenzgläubigerversammlung Insolvenzlage Insolvenzschuldnerin 
insolvenzrechtliche Insolvenzantragverfahrens Insolvenverfahrens 
Insolvenzentwicklung Insolvenzausgleichsfonds Insolvenzpläne 
insolvent insolvenzen Insolvenzplanverfahren 
Insolvenzexpertin Insolvenzgutachten Insolvenzgründe 
Insolvenzantragstellung Insolvenzprozesses Insolvenzplanverfahrens 
insolvenzverfahren insolventer Insolvenzrisiko 
Insolvente Insolvenzantragsgründen insolvenzplans 
insolvenzabwendenden Insolvenzsituation insolvenzbefangene 
Insolvenzsanierungsplan Insolvenzeröffnungs Insolvenzmasse 
insolvenztypische Insolvenzer Insolvenzkapitel 
Insolvenzgläubigern Insolvenzantragsverfahrens insolvenzrechtlichen 
insolvenzgefährdeten Insolvenztabelle Insolvenzgläubiger 
Insolvenzrechts Insolvenzanträgen Insolvenzantragspflichten 
Insolvenzfordcrungen insolvenz Insolvenzrechtlich 
Insolvenzbedingter Insolvenzforderungen Insolvenzspezialisten 
Insolvenzordnung insolvente Insolvenzschutz 
insolvenzbedingten insolventen Insolvenzeröffnungsverfahren 
Insolvenzeröffnungsbilanz Insolvenzgeld Insolvenzgerichtes 
Insolvenzverewalter Insolvenzgeschäft Insolvenzplansanierung 
This list of German words is extracted from all corporate news releases by using dynamic regular expressions 
to test if the root of each word contains insolvency wording. It is then used to identify the corporate news 
releases of DGAP and APA OTS that might be related to a firm's bankruptcy. 
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Chapter 4 
Bankruptcy Proceedings, Annual 
Report Timing, and Bankruptcy 
Prediction: Crawling the German 
Business Register* 
4.1 Introduction 
Bankruptcies are events that may have major negative effects on different groups of 
stakeholders, such as shareholders, creditors, and competitors. Several studies have made 
efforts to improve the methodology of predicting corporate bankruptcies (e.g., Altman, 
1968; Ohlson, 1980; Shumway, 2001; Bharath and Shumway, 2008). Thus, these studies 
analyze the time period until a firm has filed for bankruptcy. However, not many have 
addressed a firm’s actions after bankruptcy has already been filed. Specifically, few studies 
have investigated the characteristics of a bankruptcy proceeding, such as the type and the 
timing of those events that happen after the bankruptcy opening. For example, Crhova and 
                                                 
* This chapter is based on Huettemann (2019). I am grateful to Dieter Hess, Tobias Lorsbach, and William 
Liu for their insightful discussions and suggestions. This paper has also greatly benefitted from comments 
made by the seminar participants at the University of Cologne. 
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Pasekova (2013) compare proceedings in France, Germany, and Slovakia by describing 
national insolvency laws. However, they do not analyze these proceedings empirically. 
Moreover, literature on bankruptcy has a clear focus on publicly traded firms. Early 
bankruptcy prediction models (e.g., Altman, 1968) rely on accounting-based variables. 
However, recent models require market-based variables, and, by this, can only be applied 
to public firms (e.g., Bharath and Shumway, 2008; Chava and Jarrow, 2004; Hillegeist, 
Keating, Cram, and Lundstedt, 2004; Vassalou and Xing, 2004). Thus, recent bankruptcy 
prediction literature has neglected privately held firms. However, considering the relatively 
small number of listed and the huge number of non-listed firms, one can posit that an 
economy greatly depends on private firms. Altman, Iwanicz-Drozdowska, Laitinen, and 
Suvas (2017) highlight the importance of predicting private firms’ bankruptcies, since, for 
example, managing large loan portfolios requires models that can also assess small and 
medium-sized firms, which are commonly non-public. 
This study aims at filling both of these gaps in the literature: first, by empirically 
analyzing German firms’ bankruptcy proceedings, and second, by using both public and 
private firms. I perform a web crawler30 on the German business register to collect a 
database containing German firms’ bankruptcy events; this database is then used in several 
analyses. First, I compare the number of bankruptcy events extracted from the business 
register with official numbers from Destatis (“Statistisches Bundesamt”) and with the 
number of bankruptcy events of the database of Bureau van Dijk (BvD), a common 
provider of European financial and bankruptcy information. Second, I analyze the events 
listed in the business register, such as protective measures, openings, or decisions, in terms 
of the number of each event type, the order of events, and the time span between certain 
events. Third, I crawl the business register to extract annual reports’ publication dates and 
merge them with the bankruptcy dates. This allows me to investigate the effect of 
bankruptcies on annual reports’ publication dates. Fourth, I broadly compare accounting-
based bankruptcy prediction models for German firms. Many studies conduct bankruptcy 
predictions among U.S. corporations. However, there is comparatively little research 
analyzing firms in other countries. For example, Tian and Yu (2017) produce ratios for 
bankruptcy prediction in Japan and selected European countries, Dahiya and Klapper 
(2007) compare key industrial nations, and Altman et al. (2017) evaluate Altman’s (1983) 
                                                 
30 A web crawler is a computer program used to systemically browse and analyze websites. The General 
Appendix shows an exemplary Python program to crawl the German business register. 
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Z-score for 31 European and three non-European countries. Of these studies, Altman et al. 
(2017) is the only study that includes private firms. Fifth, I split the sample into 
subsamples of small, medium-sized, and large firms measured by total assets. I separately 
perform bankruptcy predictions on each subsample to analyze the impact of firm size on 
prediction results. 
The empirical results are as follows. First, crawling the business register for 
bankruptcy events creates a bias, since the law requires that bankruptcy statements must be 
deleted six months after the bankruptcy proceedings have been terminated. Accordingly, 
the register’s coverage is relatively poor for earlier years, and it improves over time. In 
2017, the number of openings comes close to the official number from Destatis; thus, 
crawling the business register yields nearly all events.31 Importantly, in recent years, the 
business register covers more bankruptcy events than BvD. Moreover, the business 
register’s coverage is greater for joint-stock firms than for limited liability firms. Second, 
analyzing the proceedings I find that compared to limited liability firms, only a few joint-
stock firms are refused bankruptcy proceedings due to insufficient assets. Furthermore, 
approximately 90% of all firms start with either an opening event or an event stating 
protective measures. On average, bankruptcy proceedings open 75.5 days after the court 
takes protective measures; this lag is higher for joint-stock firms. Third, 14.8% of all firms 
publish annual reports after bankruptcy proceedings have been opened. On average, firms 
need 425.9 days to publish their annual reports after their fiscal year-end. This interval 
increases by 81.4 days for the time after the bankruptcy opening. Fourth, Hess and 
Huettemann’s (2019) bankruptcy prediction model outperforms the models by Altman 
(1968) and Ohlson (1980) for the scope of private and public German firms. Fifth, each 
model predicts large firms’ bankruptcies more accurately than small and medium-sized 
firms’ bankruptcies. Thus, the size of a firm has an impact on the results of prediction 
models. 
Crawling the German business register makes a detailed analysis of public 
bankruptcy information possible. By this, I can interpret the type and number of 
bankruptcy events and analyze typical bankruptcy proceedings. As the sample includes 
both joint-stock and limited liability firms, this study can show differences between these 
firm types. For example, joint-stock firms tend to have a longer lasting proceeding, a 
                                                 
31 Note that Destatis provides no firm-individual information, and thus, cannot be used in individual firm 
analyses. 
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longer duration between protective measures and the opening, and are refused an opening 
due to insufficient funds less often. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to 
combine bankruptcy dates and annual report dates, which facilitates identification of the 
impact of bankruptcy proceedings on annual reports’ publication dates. Furthermore, I 
quantify the business register bias that arises due to legal deletion requirements. 
Researchers learn how many bankruptcies are covered when they use business register 
data. Simultaneously, this study indicates that for recent years, this methodology yields 
more bankruptcy events than the BvD data. Finally, I find that Hess and Huettemann’s 
(2019) accounting model performs best for public and private German firms. While Hess 
and Huettemann (2019) base their empirical analysis solely on public firms, I test their 
model also on privately held firms. By this, I validate that their accounting model indeed 
outperforms existing accounting-based models for both public and private firms. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the 
methodology to collect information on bankruptcies and annual reports from the German 
business register. In Section 4.3, we describe the limitations of our bankruptcy database, 
describe our sample selection, report the descriptive statistics, and explain our methods. In 
Section 4.4, we present and discuss our empirical results. Section 4.5 concludes. 
4.2 Collecting data of bankruptcies and annual reports 
4.2.1 Bankruptcy database 
4.2.1.1 German bankruptcy proceedings 
As stated in Huettemann and Lorsbach (2019), a company is obliged to file for 
bankruptcy (“Insolvenzantrag”) at the first instance court (“Amtsgericht”) within the first 
three weeks after experiencing a reason for insolvency according to Germany’s 2009 
insolvency statute (“Insolvenzverordnung”).32 These reasons include a company’s 
illiquidity, i.e., its inability to serve its due obligations, its imminent illiquidity, or its over-
indebtedness, i.e., if its obligations exceed its assets.  
After a company files for insolvency, the responsible court may take protective 
measures (“Sicherungsmaßnahmen”), which include the appointment of an interim 
insolvency administrator. If this administrator verifies that the company’s funds are 
                                                 
32 “Insolvency” and “bankruptcy” are used synonymously in this study. 
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sufficient to cover the costs of a proceeding, he or she opens an insolvency proceeding 
(“Insolvenzeröffnung”); otherwise, an opening is refused due to insufficient assets 
(“Abweisung mangels Masse”) and the company is liquidated. If the proceeding is opened, 
the insolvency administrator takes over the company’s administration and is responsible 
for restructuring measures, liquidating business units, and collecting outstanding 
receivables to partially serve creditors’ claims. Further, the following may occur: an 
appointment (“Termine”); miscellaneous (“Sonstiges”); a distribution schedule 
(“Verteilungsverzeichnisse”); a supervised insolvency plan (“Überwachte 
Insolvenzpläne”); or a decision in the proceeding (“Entscheidung im Verfahren”), in the 
residual debt discharge (“Entscheidung im Restschuldbefreiungsverfahren”), or after 
termination (“Entscheidung nach Aufhebung des Verfahrens”). These events are all 
directed by the courts, published online on the German business register 
(“Unternehmensregister”) and deleted six months after the proceeding has been 
terminated. 
4.2.1.2 Extracting German bankruptcy data from public sources 
To obtain data for bankruptcies of German companies, studies commonly use the 
BvD database. However, BvD deletes a firm’s financial data when the firm has not 
published an annual report for five consecutive years. As this may apply to firms in 
bankruptcy proceedings, it is likely that the database does not include firms that filed for 
bankruptcy more than five years ago. This fact is documented in previous studies, such as 
Filipe, Grammatikos, and Michala (2016), who use a sample period of 2000 to 2009, but 
find no bankruptcies in 2000. 
As stated in Huettemann and Lorsbach (2019), the German business register is a 
government entity that provides public access to key corporate information, such as annual 
reports, court statements, or register keys. It is the central platform for company data 
storage, and serves as a distributor of key statements from bankruptcy courts that contain 
information on bankruptcy dates, decisions, status, meetings, and further proceedings. I 
systematically collect bankruptcy data by crawling free access online releases published by 
the bankruptcy courts. Specifically, I create web queries to the website of the German 
business register. The crawler automatically searches for all firms and all courts to check 
for any statements. If there are search results, the crawler saves the company name, the 
court, the register number, the status, the event name, and the event date. Finally, it 
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aggregates the structured information from all events in a comma-separated values (CSV) 
file. 
4.2.2 Extracting annual reports’ publication dates 
I then extract the annual reports’ publication dates to merge them with the 
bankruptcy event dates as follows: In a first step, I use a web crawler to browse through the 
German business register. It automatically enters search queries for all available annual 
reports for every available year, and then saves the HTML codes of all search result pages 
as text files. In a second step, I use regular expressions to examine these text files: I extract 
structured information on the annual reports, such as unique company identifiers (i.e., its 
name, its register number, and the court) as well as the fiscal years, and the respective 
annual reports’ publication dates. The crawler saves a CSV file in which one line 
represents one annual report. In total, I find 7,167,611 annual reports of 1,152,119 firms. 
4.3 Data and method 
4.3.1 Usability of business register bankruptcy data  
The business register must by law delete bankruptcy statements six months after the 
bankruptcy proceeding has been terminated or refused to open due to insufficient assets. 
Thus, analyzing bankruptcy data that is extracted ad-hoc from the business register comes 
with a limitation. Consequently, when using the business register, one cannot conduct 
analyses that require a complete bankruptcy database. For example, one cannot compute 
insolvency ratios or analyze the evolution of the number of refusals due to insufficient 
assets over the years. 
Nevertheless, bankruptcy data extracted from the business register can be used for 
several analyses that do not necessarily require full coverage. For example, one can 
analyze the typical features of proceedings, and one can conduct profile analyses to 
compare firm-years before the bankruptcy opening with firm-years after the opening. 
Alternatively, a valid analysis may focus on the sample period for which the business 
register’s coverage is complete. For example, one can analyze the number of opening 
refusals due to insufficient assets for the most recent six months. Finally, regularly 
crawling the business register for bankruptcy events creates a complete dataset that 
overcomes these limitations. 
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4.3.2 Sample description and summary statistics 
The initial sample comprises all observations in BvD’s financial files for very large, 
large, and medium-sized firms incorporated in Germany.33 Firms include joint-stock 
companies (company types “AG,” “KGaA,” “AG & Co. KGaA,” and “GmbH & Co. 
KGaA”) and limited liability companies (company types “GmbH” and “UG”). BvD only 
provides information from the ten most recent years. However, this study also uses vintage 
data requested through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) at year-ends 2013 to 
2017, which increases the sample period to span 2004 to 2017. Note that this vintage data 
can no longer be requested through WRDS or directly from BvD.34 I then delete 
observations with missing variables that are used in the bankruptcy prediction models of 
Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980), and Hess and Huettemann (2019).  Appendix 4.A describes 
the variable construction for these bankruptcy prediction models in detail. The effect of 
outliers is reduced by winsorizing all variables (except the indicator variables and 
probabilities) annually at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The sample for bankruptcy prediction 
starts in 2009, as Hess and Huettemann’s (2019) cross-sectional earnings regressions, 
based on Hou, van Dijk, and Zhang (2012) and Li and Mohanram (2014), require five 
years of training data. All bankruptcy measures are lagged by three months to ensure that 
they are observable when used for the estimation. For example, an observation for a firm-
year with a fiscal year end of December 31, 2009, has an estimation date of March 31, 
2010.  
I extract all bankruptcy events from the business register for all available legal 
entities, and merge them with the BvD sample using unique company identifiers, i.e., the 
commercial register number and the court in charge. I identify bankruptcies in the sample 
by combining the BvD events with those extracted from the business register. I define a 
firm as bankrupt if it has filed for bankruptcy, and use the earliest event date as the 
bankruptcy date. A firm observation is defined as bankrupt if the firm becomes bankrupt in 
the subsequent twelve months after the estimation date, in which case the dependent 
variable equals one; otherwise, it equals zero. As I account for bankruptcies until the end 
of 2017, the sample comprises observations with an estimation date before or at the end of 
December 2016.  
                                                 
33 As this study focuses on traditional corporate bankruptcies and not on those of individuals, the “HRB” 
section in the commercial register (legal entities) is used rather than the “HRA” section (private 
partnerships). 
34 I am grateful to Dieter Hess for providing me with this vintage Bureau van Dijk data. 
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Table 4.1 Summary statistics (N=213,455) 
Variable Model Mean STD 1% 25% Median 75% 99% 
PNBEt HH 0.24 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.43 0.86 
NegEarnFrct HH 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
BLRt HH 0.68 0.28 0.08 0.49 0.70 0.88 1.59 
TXTt HH 504.58 1612.08 -182.25 7.36 55.65 310.69 8453.80 
FIEXTAt HH 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.12 
EBITTAt HH / A 0.08 0.13 -0.37 0.02 0.06 0.12 0.55 
Sizet HH / O 15.94 1.82 12.10 14.63 15.92 17.20 20.30 
WCTAt A / O 0.23 0.25 -0.29 0.03 0.18 0.41 0.85 
RETAt  A 0.23 0.29 -0.80 0.03 0.20 0.41 0.88 
BETLt  A 1.05 2.11 -0.38 0.14 0.42 1.06 13.00 
STAt  A 2.17 1.92 0.01 0.80 1.77 2.98 10.06 
TLTAt  O 0.68 0.28 0.07 0.49 0.70 0.88 1.60 
CLCAt  O 0.99 3.05 0.01 0.32 0.61 0.92 11.76 
OENEGt  O 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
NITAt  O 0.05 0.12 -0.43 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.45 
FUTLt  O 0.16 0.35 -0.60 0.01 0.07 0.21 1.93 
INTWOt  O 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
CHINt  O 0.03 0.57 -1.00 -0.28 0.03 0.37 1.00 
This table reports the summary statistics of the following forecast variables (all values except 
dummy variables and probability values are in million dollars). Each observation represents one firm 
in a given year. In particular, it shows variables used to forecast bankruptcy. For more details, see the 
data construction in Appendix 4.A. PNBE is the probability that losses deplete current book equity, 
NegEarnFrc is a dummy for a negative earnings forecast, BLR is the book leverage ratio, TXT are 
taxes, FIEXTA are financial expenses over total assets, EBITTA are earnings before interest and 
taxes over total assets, size is the logarithmic sales, WCTA is working capital over total assets, 
RETA is retained earnings over total assets, BETL is book equity over total liabilities, STA is sales 
over total assets, TLTA is total liabilities over total assets, CLCA is current liabilities over current 
assets, OENEG is a dummy that takes the value of one if total liabilities exceed total assets and zero 
otherwise, NITA is net income over total assets, FUTL is funds provided by operations over total 
liabilities, INTWO is a dummy that takes the value of one if the net income was negative for the past 
two years and zero otherwise, CHIN is the change in net income. The reported values are the time 
series averages of yearly cross-sectional means, medians, standard deviations, and respective 
percentiles. All variables (except indicator variables and probability values) are winsorized annually 
at the 1st and 99th percentile. The column labeled “Model” indicates the model in which the variable 
has been used, where "HH" is Hess and Huettemann (2019), “A” is Altman (1968) and “O” is 
Ohlson (1980). The sample period is 2009–2016. The summary statistics are reported for 
observations in which all models’ variables are available. 
 
Table 4.1 provides the summary statistics for all variables used to forecast a 
bankruptcy. I report the mean, median, standard deviation, and certain percentiles for 
213,455 firm-years with complete data availability for 2009 to 2016. The probability of 
book equity becoming negative (PNBE) has a median of 0.24, which is higher than that 
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noted in Huettemann and Lorsbach’s (2019) study of German public firms (0.17). This 
supports the notion that private firms have a higher distress risk than public firms. 
4.3.3 Method 
I follow Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004), and Campbell, Hilscher, and 
Szilagyi (2008) to predict bankruptcies by estimating the hazard model as a logistic 
regression with multiple observations per firm. Thus, the probability of a firm’s bankruptcy 
follows a logistic distribution with parameters (α, β), and is equal to 
 𝑃𝑡(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1) =  
1
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝛼−𝛽𝑥𝑖,𝑡)
,   (4.1) 
where yit is a bankruptcy dummy, which equals one if the firm fails in the following 
twelve months and zero otherwise, and xi,t is the vector of explanatory variables known at 
time t, that is, three months after the end of the fiscal year. The higher α + βxi,t, the greater 
is the estimated probability of bankruptcy. The estimates and their significance levels are 
calculated using a maximum likelihood technique. Shumway (2001) points out that the test 
statistics produced by a logistic regression are incorrect for the hazard model. Calculating 
the correct test statistics requires dividing them by the average number of firm-years per 
firm. The statistics reported in this study have been adjusted accordingly. 
For predicting bankruptcies, I use rolling hazard models to account for coefficients 
that may change over time. The rolling windows comprise the most recent three years of 
data to calculate one-year-ahead, out-of-sample bankruptcy predictions. The first 
estimation period comprises data from 2009 to 2011 and predicts bankruptcies for 2012, 
and the last estimation period comprises data from 2013 to 2015 to predict bankruptcies for 
2016. Thus, the rolling technique evaluates models for the years 2012 to 2016. 
4.4 Empirical results 
4.4.1 Number of bankruptcies across databases 
I compare the number of bankruptcy events listed in the German business register 
with the BvD database and with official numbers from Destatis. The database on the 
business register is created using the methodology described above. The BvD database is 
frequently used by extant research to predict bankruptcies (e.g., Altman et al., 2017; Filipe 
et al., 2016). To be in line with the bankruptcy definition, which only considers firms in 
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bankruptcy proceedings, for BvD I count firms that have a status of “active (insolvency 
proceedings),” and omit those with statuses of “active (default of payment),” “active 
(dormant),” “dissolved,” “dissolved (liquidation),” or “in liquidation,”. For these status 
BvD does not provide dates for German firms anyway. Note that BvD deletes the entire 
firm history five years after its bankruptcy; thus, the BvD data requested in 2017 only 
contain bankruptcies between 2013 and 2017. However, by using historic, vintage BvD 
data for 2013 to 2016, we come up with bankruptcies from 2009 (this vintage data can no 
longer be requested through WRDS or directly from BvD). Moreover, Destatis is a federal 
German authority responsible for collecting, processing, presenting, and analyzing 
statistical information concerning the economy, society, and the environment. Destatis 
provides official numbers regarding bankruptcy proceedings that have opened in Germany. 
In contrast to the business register and BvD, Destatis only provides macroeconomic 
variables, and no individual firm information. Thus, Destatis cannot be used to conduct 
firm-specific analyses.  
Table 4.2 reports the number of bankruptcies for each database. Panel A in Table 4.2 
illustrates the quarterly and annual number of bankruptcy proceeding openings and refusals 
due to insufficient assets for the years 2007 to 2017. Destatis states that 83,801 proceeding 
openings occurred from 2007 to 2017; of these, the business register covers 41,832 and 
BvD covers 16,384 openings for the period of 2009 to 2017. Figure 4.1 plots the number of 
openings over time, and a peak can be observed in 2009 for Destatis’ official numbers. 
Importantly, the business register coverage steadily increases over time. According to its 
aforementioned limitation, crawling the business register on February 23, 2018, discloses 
no openings for proceedings that were terminated before August 23, 2017. Thus, the 
business register’s coverage of openings increases over time. In 2007, the business register 
includes 573 of 6,536 openings (8.8%), and in 2017 the business register includes 6,475 of 
6,797 openings (95.3%). While the business register lists nearly all openings for 2017, it 
covers approximately half of all openings for 2012 (3,829 of 8,006). BvD covers fewer 
bankruptcy openings than the business register in nearly all quarters. Even for 2010, where 
crawling the business register only discloses proceedings that last seven years or more, 
BvD reports 1,877 openings which is less 2,149 in the business register. The coverage of 
BvD data relative to the business register even decreases over the years; in 2017, BvD has 
1,462 openings, while the business register shows 6,475 openings.  
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Table 4.2 Number of bankruptcies across databases 
Panel A: All firms 
 
Openings of bankruptcy proceedings 
Refusals due to insufficient 
assets 
 
 
Business register BvD Destatis 
Business 
register 
Destatis  
2007 573 8.8%   6,536 2 0.0% 4,643 
Q1 93 5.9%   1,580 0 0.0% 1,150 
Q2 140 8.7%   1,601 0 0.0% 1,196 
Q3 157 9.9%   1,592 1 0.1% 1,232 
Q4 183 10.4%     1,763 1 0.1% 1,065 
2008 982 14.0%   7,031 3 0.1% 4,109 
Q1 227 13.7%   1,661 0 0.0% 1,024 
Q2 240 13.1%   1,834 0 0.0% 1,036 
Q3 249 13.9%   1,796 2 0.2% 1,101 
Q4 266 15.3%   1,740 1 0.1% 948 
2009 1,971 22.1% 392 4.4% 8,925 8 0.2% 4,476 
Q1 391 19.4% 0 0.0% 2,011 1 0.1% 1,057 
Q2 503 21.0% 0 0.0% 2,394 2 0.2% 1,134 
Q3 549 22.6% 95 3.9% 2,425 4 0.3% 1,200 
Q4 528 25.2% 297 14.2% 2,095 1 0.1% 1,085 
2010 2,149 26.2% 1,877 22.9% 8,195 1 0.0% 4,657 
Q1 490 23.5% 426 20.5% 2,082 0 0.0% 1,250 
Q2 564 26.5% 408 19.2% 2,129 1 0.1% 1,152 
Q3 563 27.6% 480 23.6% 2,038 0 0.0% 1,123 
Q4 532 27.3% 563 28.9% 1,946 0 0.0% 1,132 
2011 2,892 35.9% 2,172 26.9% 8,062 10 0.2% 4,327 
Q1 614 31.7% 603 31.1% 1,938 3 0.3% 1,049 
Q2 755 35.7% 547 25.8% 2,117 1 0.1% 1,106 
Q3 785 38.1% 507 24.6% 2,063 3 0.3% 1,093 
Q4 738 38.0% 515 26.5% 1,944 3 0.3% 1,079 
2012 3,829 47.8% 2,234 27.9% 8,006 8 0.2% 4,177 
Q1 869 42.7% 597 29.4% 2,033 0 0.0% 1,089 
Q2 980 46.8% 533 25.4% 2,095 0 0.0% 1,075 
Q3 989 50.0% 563 28.5% 1,977 5 0.5% 1,076 
Q4 991 52.1% 541 28.5% 1,901 3 0.3% 937 
2013 5,114 62.1% 2,398 29.1% 8,233 2 0.0% 4,216 
Q1 1,222 59.0% 678 32.8% 2,070 0 0.0% 1,069 
Q2 1,291 61.4% 612 29.1% 2,102 1 0.1% 1,041 
Q3 1,318 62.9% 537 25.6% 2,096 1 0.1% 1,086 
Q4 1,283 65.3% 571 29.1% 1,965 0 0.0% 1,020 
2014 5,553 72.9% 2,127 27.9% 7,622 13 0.3% 4,119 
Q1 1,320 68.1% 647 33.4% 1,937 3 0.3% 1,098 
Q2 1,390 71.8% 467 24.1% 1,937 4 0.4% 1,029 
Q3 1,466 77.4% 517 27.3% 1,894 3 0.3% 1,021 
Q4 1,377 74.3% 496 26.8% 1,854 3 0.3% 971 
2015 5,905 78.4% 2,108 28.0% 7,534 26 0.6% 4,088 
Q1 1,563 82.9% 620 32.9% 1,885 14 1.4% 1,036 
Q2 1,572 81.3% 506 26.2% 1,934 6 0.6% 1,063 
Q3 1,633 85.5% 534 28.0% 1,910 3 0.3% 1,010 
Q4 1,137 63.0% 448 24.8% 1,805 3 0.3% 979 
        (continued) 
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Table 4.2 Number of bankruptcies across databases (continued) 
2016 6,389 93.1% 1,714 25.0% 6,860 12 0.3% 3,731 
Q1 1,550 91.4% 513 30.3% 1,695 2 0.2% 929 
Q2 1,671 92.9% 385 21.4% 1,799 4 0.4% 956 
Q3 1,623 92.0% 395 22.4% 1,765 3 0.3% 954 
Q4 1,545 96.5% 421 26.3% 1,601 3 0.3% 892 
2017 6,475 95.3% 1,462 21.5% 6,797 1,031 27.1% 3,798 
Q1 1,532 91.9% 463 27.8% 1,667 4 0.4% 989 
Q2 1,632 95.5% 358 20.9% 1,709 11 1.2% 931 
Q3 1,622 97.2% 350 21.0% 1,668 307 31.2% 983 
Q4 1,689 96.3% 291 16.6% 1,753 709 79.2% 895 
  41,832 49.9% 16,484 19.7% 83,801 1,116 2.4% 46,341 
Panel B: BvD-covered Firms 
 
 All BvD-covered firms Sample Firms  
 
Business 
register 
BvD 
Business 
register 
BvD  
 
 
 Bankruptcy 
Event 
Status Code 
(Bankruptcy 
proceedings) 
Bankruptcy 
Event 
Status Code 
(Bankruptcy 
proceedings)  
2009 234 392 9 2  
2010 822 1,877 10 7  
2011 1,264 2,172 74 105  
2012 1,656 2,234 418 527  
2013 1,898 2,398 565 718  
2014 1,869 2,127 435 443  
2015 1,885 2,108 500 472  
2016 2,083 1,714 619 476  
2017 2,191 1,462 584 347  
  13,902 16,484 3,214 3,097  
This table reports the numbers of bankruptcy events listed in different databases (business register 
events, Destatis (“Statistisches Bundesamt”), and Bureau van Dijk status codes). Panel A shows the 
numbers of openings of bankruptcy proceedings and the number of refusals of bankruptcy 
proceeding due to insufficient assets of corporates in each quarter, along with the percentage with 
regard to Destatis. The business register database is created with the approach described in this 
study. Due to the legal deletion requirement, the coverage of business register rises by time. 
Destatis provides official statements on the number of openings and refusals. Bureau van Dijk data 
is taken from the Amadeus subscription and does not provide data on refusals. Due to its deletion 
process, BvD data is available only from 2009. As the BvD bankruptcies are restricted to firms 
covered by BvD, Panel B compares the numbers of bankruptcies of the business register and BvD 
for all firms covered by BvD and for those firms covered by BvD that are included in our sample as 
constructed in Section 4.3.2 (sample firms). 
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Figure 4.1 Openings of bankruptcy proceedings 
 
The figure plots the numbers of openings of bankruptcy proceedings as found in the business register, 
Destatis and BvD. 
 
Note that bankruptcies in the BvD database are restricted to the firms it covers. Thus, 
the comparison of BvD’s numbers with the absolute numbers of the business register as 
conducted in Panel A of Table 4.2 is only valid when you consider research that does not 
require BvD financial information, for example, when you use other financial databases, or 
when you analyze systemic risk. However, when you require BvD’s financial data, you can 
only use bankruptcies of firms covered by BvD. Thus, it is fair to compare the business 
register’s number of bankruptcies for firms covered by BvD to the number of BvD 
bankruptcies. Accordingly, Panel B in Table 4.2 compares the numbers of bankruptcy 
events in the business register and BvD for all firms covered by BvD as well as for our 
sample firms. Considering all firms covered by BvD, more bankruptcies are extracted from 
BvD (16,484) than from the business register (13,902). However, BvD includes less 
bankruptcies in recent years. For example, in 2012 BvD covers 2,234 events, and the 
business register only comprises 1,656 events. In contrast, the business register 
demonstrates greater coverage in more recent years: In 2016, more events were found in 
the business register (2,083) than in BvD (1,714); in 2017, there is an even greater 
difference between the business register’s coverage (2,191) and BvD’s (1,462).  
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For the firms in our sample, crawling the business register yields 3,214 bankruptcy 
events, more than when using BvD (3,097). From 2011 to 2014, BvD includes more events 
than the business register. From 2015, BvD includes fewer events; this may be because it 
does not incorporate all bankruptcy openings, or because incorporating a new status takes 
time. Note that relatively few bankruptcies occur in 2009 and 2010, as the BvD data we 
use only covers firms that published annual reports for 2009 onwards. Firms that became 
bankrupt in 2009 or 2010 may not have published this report. 
It has become evident that the business register includes more bankruptcies than BvD 
in the two or three most recent years, even if the sample is restricted to BvD-listed firms. 
Consequently, one can build a more complete bankruptcy database by regularly crawling 
the business register, and, thus, circumventing its deletion process. 
Table 4.3 Number of bankruptcies in 2017 
 Openings of bankruptcy 
proceedings 
Refusals due to insufficient 
assets 
 
 
 
 
Business  
Register 
Destatis 
Business  
Register 
Destatis   
 
January 456 91.4% 499 1 0.3% 352  
February 503 92.8% 542 0 0.0% 276  
March 573 91.5% 626 3 0.8% 361  
April 520 99.6% 522 2 0.7% 282  
May 556 93.1% 597 1 0.3% 331  
June 556 94.2% 590 8 2.5% 318  
July 521 102.4% 509 17 5.0% 337  
August 578 96.0% 602 74 22.6% 328  
September 523 93.9% 557 216 67.9% 318  
October 553 100.0% 553 202 68.5% 295  
November 597 94.8% 630 287 82.5% 348  
December 539 94.6% 570 220 87.3% 252  
2017 6,475 95.3% 6,797 1,031 27.1% 3,798  
This table reports the numbers of openings of bankruptcy proceedings and the number of refusals of 
bankruptcy proceeding due to insufficient assets of corporates in 2017 listed in business register events 
and Destatis (“Statistisches Bundesamt”), along with the percentage with regard to Destatis. Destatis 
provides official statements on the number of openings and refusals. The business register database is 
created with the approach described in this study. It has been crawled end of February 2018. By law, the 
business register deletes bankruptcy statements six months after the bankruptcy proceedings have been 
completed. That is, we find all openings whose proceedings have not been terminated by end of August 
2017, and all refusals after end of August. Consequently, we find nearly all bankruptcy openings for 2017 
and refusals from September 2017. 
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Table 4.2 also reports the number of bankruptcy filings for which proceedings did 
not open due to insufficient assets. As BvD provides no information for this event, only the 
official numbers from Destatis and the business register’s results can be compared. 
According to its limitations, crawling the business register does not yield any notable 
number of refusals due to insufficient assets before 2017. Table 4.3 shows that the 
coverage of refusals due to insufficient assets is high only from September 2017 onwards. 
This confirms that the information is indeed deleted six months after the refusal; thus, BvD 
does not violate the legal deletion requirements. Table 4.3 also indicates the monthly 
number of openings for 2017: 6,475 of 6,797 openings, in other words, nearly all openings, 
are found in the business register for 2017. All 553 openings in October 2017 are covered 
by the business register, while the register displays 539 of 570 openings for December 
2017. This high coverage occurs because very few proceedings that opened in 2017 were 
terminated before August 23, 2017, six months before the crawling date. 
Table 4.4 Number of bankruptcy openings by company type 
 
Joint-stock firms Limited liability firms  
 
Business 
Register 
Destatis BvD 
Business 
Register 
Destatis BvD  
 
 
2007 20 148 
 553 6,388   
2008 34 153 
 948 6,878   
2009 99 235 24 1,872 8,690 391  
2010 75 191 73 2,074 8,004 1,910  
2011 89 166 92 2,803 7,896 2,379  
2012 124 197 113 3,705 7,809 2,647  
2013 138 182 114 4,976 8,051 2,838  
2014 137 163 94 5,416 7,459 2,569  
2015 101 132 76 5,804 7,402 2,239  
2016 101 108 72 6,288 6,752 1,759  
2017 110 124 56 6,365 6,673 1,673  
  1,028 1,799 714 40,804 82,002 18,405  
This table reports the numbers of openings of bankruptcy proceedings per company type in each year 
listed in different databases (business register events, Destatis (“Statistisches Bundesamt”), and Bureau 
van Dijk status codes). Joint-stock companies include the following German types: AG, KGaA, AG & Co. 
KGaA, and GmbH & Co. KGaA. Limited liability companies include the following German types: GmbH, 
and UG. The business register database is created with the approach described in this study. Due to the 
legal deletion requirement, the coverage of business register rises by time. Destatis provides official 
statements on the number of openings. Bureau van Dijk data is taken from the Amadeus subscription. Due 
to its deletion process, BvD data is available only from 2009. 
 
Table 4.4 shows the number of openings across the databases for joint-stock and 
limited liability firms separately. Over the entire sample period, the business register 
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includes 1,028 of 1,799 bankruptcies, or 57.14% of the openings for joint-stock firms. For 
limited liability firms, crawling the register yields 40,804 of 82,002 openings, or 49.76%. 
Thus, the business register has a higher coverage for joint-stock firms than for limited 
liability firms. This higher coverage is more evident in earlier years; in recent years, 
limited liability and joint-stock firms exhibit similar coverage. One explanation could be 
that bankruptcy proceedings of limited liability firms are terminated more quickly than 
proceedings of joint-stock firms. Furthermore, the BvD database’s coverage relative to that 
of the business register is higher for joint-stock firms than for limited liability firms. This 
may support the notion that commercial databases are biased toward information from 
firms that is of more interest to their customers. 
4.4.2 Bankruptcy proceedings in the German business register  
In the following, I aim at identifying typical bankruptcy proceedings in Germany; 
Table 4.5 reports summary statistics of bankruptcy events extracted from the German 
business register. Panel A in Table 4.5 shows the number of events: the business register 
contains 159,696 events from 48,717 firms. Of these, 41,832 are openings (26.2%), and 
thus, not all firms have an opening event in the business register. This may be because the 
proceedings had not yet opened and only a filing had occurred so far, or because an 
opening was refused due to insufficient assets. 36,795 events are appointments (23.0%), 
30,308 involve proceedings’ decisions (19.0%), and 28,179 contain protective measures 
(17.6%). Furthermore, 15,269 events are miscellaneous (9.6%), 5,829 contain distribution 
schedules (3.7%), and 1,116 are refusals due to insufficient assets (0.7%). For joint-stock 
firms, there are 1,097 decisions in proceeding for 1,211 firms (90.7%), while for limited 
liability firms, there are only 29,211 proceeding decisions for 47,506 firms (61.5%). For 
joint-stock firms, there are no decisions after termination (0.0%); for limited liability firms, 
there are 69 decisions after termination (0.2%). Notably, only twelve refusals occurred due 
to insufficient assets for the 1,211 joint-stock firms (0.1%), which is significantly lower 
than the rate of 1,104 refusals for the 47,506 limited liability firms (2.3%). This shows that 
fewer joint-stock firms have insufficient funds for covering proceeding costs.35 
                                                 
35 Note that these comparisons are valid despite the business register’s limitation, as this limitation applies to 
both joint-stock and limited liability firms.  
Table 4.5 Business register events 
Panel A: Total number of events 
 All firms  
(N=48,717) 
Joint-stock firms 
(N=1,211) 
Limited liability firms 
(N=47,506) 
 Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Openings 41,832 26.2% 1,028 21.0% 40,804 26.4% 
Appointments 36,795 23.0% 1,231 25.1% 35,564 23.0% 
Decisions in proceeding 30,308 19.0% 1,097 22.4% 29,211 18.9% 
Protective measures 28,179 17.6% 824 16.8% 27,355 17.7% 
Miscellaneous  15,269 9.6% 514 10.5% 14,755 9.5% 
Distribution schedule 5,829 3.7% 187 3.8% 5,642 3.6% 
Refusals due to insufficient assets 1,116 0.7% 12 0.2% 1,104 0.7% 
Decision in residual debt discharge 214 0.1% 8 0.2% 206 0.1% 
Insolvency plan 85 0.1% 1 0.0% 84 0.1% 
Decision after termination 69 0.0% 0 0.0% 69 0.0% 
Total 159,696 100.0% 4,902 100.0% 154,794 100.0% 
Panel B: Order of Events         
 First Events     
 Number Percentage  
 
  
Openings 17,499 35.9%     
Appointments 2,427 5.0%     
Decisions in proceeding 1,657 3.4%     
Protective measures 24,934 51.2%     
Miscellaneous  1,008 2.1%     
Distribution schedule 138 0.3%     
Refusals due to insufficient assets 950 2.0%     
Decision in residual debt discharge 26 0.1%     
Insolvency plan 51 0.1%     
Decision after termination 27 0.1%     
Total 48,717 100.0%     
 (continued)     
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Table 4.5 Business register events (continued)  
Panel C: Time span between protective measures and opening 
 
  All firms Joint-stock firms 
Limited liability 
firms 
 
N 22,667 638 22,029  
 
   
 
Mean 75.53 86.05 75.23  
1% 9 8 9  
10% 33 36 33  
25% 47 52 47  
Median 64 70 63  
75% 83 89 83  
90% 124 140 123  
99% 381 510 379  
This table reports summary statistics of the events in the business register database which is created with the 
approach described in this study. Joint-stock companies include the following German types: AG, KGaA, 
AG & Co. KGaA, and GmbH & Co. KGaA. Limited liability companies include the following German 
types: GmbH, and UG. Panel A lists the total number of the events for all firms, joint-stock firms, and 
limited liability firms. Panel B shows the number of events that are first events. Panel C reports summary 
statistics of the days between protective measures and openings for all, joint-stock, and limited liability 
firms. 
 
Panel B in Table 4.5 accounts for the chronological order of events in a typical 
bankruptcy proceeding, indicating the number of events that represent a firm’s first event. 
Of all firms listed in the business register, 51.2% start with protective measures, while 
35.9% of all first events are openings. Thus, these two events together constitute nearly 
90% of all first events. 
Panel C in Table 4.5 shows the distribution of the time spans between protective 
measures and opening. On average, an opening occurs 75.53 days after the responsible 
court takes protective measures. For half the firms, this time span is 64 days or less; for 
only 10% of these firms, the opening occurs 124 days or more after the protective 
measures. For joint-stock firms, the average duration between protective measures and the 
opening is 86.05 days, and thus, longer than for limited liability firms (75.23 days); the 
median for joint-stock firms (70 days) is also higher than for limited liability firms (63 
days). This supports the notion that joint-stock firms’ proceedings are more complex. 
4.4.3 Bankruptcy proceedings dates versus annual report dates 
Table 4.6 compares the bankruptcy event dates and annual report publication dates. 
Panel A in Table 4.6 shows that 6,029 of the 40,710 firms (14.8%) publish annual reports 
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after bankruptcy proceedings have opened. These firms have a median of one annual report 
after the opening. However, the distribution is skewed, with an average of 2.70; 10% of 
these firms with at least one report after the opening publish seven or more annual reports. 
Panel B in Table 4.6 analyzes the time span between the fiscal year-end and publishing 
date of annual reports. On average, firms need 425.91 days to publish their annual reports, 
with a median of 390 days. Only 10% of the firms manage to publish their reports 261 days 
or less after the fiscal year-end.  
In the following, I analyze the relationship between annual report publishing and 
bankruptcy timing. When the sample is split into firm-years before and after the opening, 
there are significant differences in the means. After a bankruptcy opens, firms on average 
take 81.36 days more than before the opening to publish their annual reports. This mean 
difference is explained by the 90th percentiles, as publication dates lie 870 days or more 
after the fiscal year-end for 10% of the firm-years after opening; for firm-years before 
opening, the 90th percentile is only 563 days. A comparison of joint-stock firms and limited 
liability firms discloses no significant difference in the means or any percentile of the time 
span between the fiscal year-end and publishing date. 
4.4.4 Bankruptcy prediction models 
Table 4.7 displays the estimation and out-of-sample results from the models of 
Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980), and Hess and Huettemann (2019). Note that I re-estimate 
all models using a hazard model and an identical sample to eliminate the effects of 
statistical methods or different sample periods. 
4.4.4.1 Estimation results 
Panel A in Table 4.7 reports the estimation results for the hazard models, including 
both the parameter estimates and their significance. 
 
Table 4.6 Bankruptcy event dates versus annual report dates (N=40,710) 
Panel A: Number of annual reports after bankruptcy opening  
  N Mean    1% 10% 25% Median 75% 90% 99% 
Firms with report after bankruptcy 6,029 2.70  1 1 1 1 3 7 14 
Panel B: Difference between annual report date and fiscal year end date 
 N Mean  
 1% 10% 25% Median 75% 90% 99% 
All firm-years 165,156 425.91   108 261 354 390 454 586 1,284 
           
Firm-years before bankruptcy opening 149,025 417.97  108 265 355 390 452 563 1,115 
Firm-years after bankruptcy opening 16,131 499.32  110 236 337 387 489 870 2,241 
Difference  -81.36 ***        
           
Joint-stock firms 4,089 427.33  99 176 312 394 469 629 1,537 
Limited liability firms 161,067 425.88  109 264 354 390 454 585 1,276 
Difference  1.46         
This table analyzes the relation between bankruptcy event dates and annual report dates listed in the business register. Both databases are created with the 
respective approach described in this study. Panel A reports summary statistics of the number of annual reports that are published after the bankruptcy opening for 
all bankrupt firms and firms with at least one report after the opening, respectively. Panel B shows summary statistics of the time span between the annual report 
and the fiscal year end for all firm-years, firm-years before the bankruptcy opening, firm-years after the opening, for firm-years of joint-stock firms and for firm-
years of limited liability firms, respectively. *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 4.7 Rolling hazard models of bankruptcy prediction models 
Panel A: Parameter estimates 
  Hess and Huettemann 
(2019) 
Altman  
(1968) 
Ohlson  
(1980) Variable 
Constant -5.96 *** -5.60 *** -5.41 *** 
PNBEt 0.91 ***     
NegEarnFrct 0.40 **     
BLRt 0.86 **     
TXTt 0.00 **     
FIEXTAt 9.17 **     
EBITTAt -1.36 *** -2.95 ***   
Sizet -0.08 ***   -0.13 *** 
WCTAt  
 
0.29 * 0.26 *** 
RETAt   
 
0.05    
BETLt   
 
-1.08 **   
STAt   
 
0.04 ***   
TLTAt   
 
 
 
1.79 *** 
CLCAt   
 
 
 
-0.06  
OENEGt   
 
 
 
-0.29  
NITAt   
 
 
 
-0.06  
FUTLt   
 
 
 
-2.18 *** 
INTWOt   
 
 
 
0.28 ** 
CHINt   
 
 
 
0.17 
 
Panel B: Goodness-of-fit deciles       
  Hess and 
Huettemann 
(2019) 
Altman 
(1968) 
Ohlson 
(1980) 
   
 
   
Decile    
1 33.44 34.06 30.94    
2 21.88 16.56 21.25    
3 13.13 13.44 13.44    
4 12.50 14.38 15.00    
5 6.25 5.00 6.56    
6 4.69 6.88 3.75    
7 2.81 3.44 4.06    
8 1.88 2.81 2.50    
9 1.56 2.50 2.19    
10 3.44 2.50 1.88    
  (continued)    
 
  
4 Bankruptcy Proceedings, Annual Report Timing, and Bankruptcy Prediction: Crawling 
the German Business Register 103 
Table 4.7 Rolling hazard models of bankruptcy prediction models (continued) 
Panel C: Area under the ROC curve 
  
Hess and 
Huettemann  
(2019) 
Altman  
(1968) 
Ohlson  
(1980) 
Mean 0.746 0.737 0.749 
Panel D: Economic value of different misclassification costs 
 
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 
 Hess and 
Huettemann  
(2019) 
Altman  
(1968) 
Ohlson  
(1980)   
Credits 45,425.83 40,565.83 42,971.33 
Market share (%) 34.38% 30.70% 32.52% 
Defaults 74 120 92 
Default/credits (%) 0.16% 0.30% 0.21% 
Avg. credit spread (%) 0.36% 0.39% 0.35% 
Revenue ($m) 122.98 118.35 114.70 
Loss ($m) 28.64 46.45 35.61 
Profit ($m) 94.34 71.91 79.10 
Return on asset (%) 0.27% 0.23% 0.24% 
This table reports the results of the rolling hazard models. Panel A shows the Newey-West (1987) time 
series averages of annual regression coefficients for Hess and Huettemann (2019), Altman (1968) and 
Ohlson (1980) to predict bankruptcies. PNBE is the probability that losses deplete current book equity, 
NegEarnFrc is a dummy for a negative earnings forecast, BLR is the book leverage ratio, TXT are taxes, 
FIEXTA are financial expenses over total assets, EBITTA are earnings before interest and taxes over total 
assets, size is the logarithmic sales, WCTA is working capital over total assets, RETA is retained earnings 
over total assets, BETL is book equity over total liabilities, STA is sales over total assets, TLTA is total 
liabilities over total assets, CLCA is current liabilities over current assets, OENEG is a dummy that takes 
the value of one if total liabilities exceed total assets and zero otherwise, NITA is net income over total 
assets, FUTL is funds provided by operations over total liabilities, INTWO is a dummy that takes the 
value of one if the net income was negative for the past two years and zero otherwise, CHIN is the change 
in net income. Panel B shows the goodness-of-fit deciles. For every year, we rank firms into deciles based 
on their fitted bankruptcy probability values, where the firms with the highest values fall into the first 
decile. We report the percentage of bankrupt firms that are classified into each probability decile. Panel C 
reports the Newey-West (1987) time series averages of the yearly means of the area under the ROC curve 
(AUC). Panel D shows the results of a competitive credit market. The banks reject firms with score in the 
bottom 5% based on their respective models while offering credit to all others at a credit spread derived 
using equation (4.2). The bank with the lowest credit spread is assumed to grant the loan. Firms are 
assumed to split their loan equally if banks offer the same credit spread. Market share is the total number 
of credits granted divided by total number of firm-years, defaults is the number of firms to whom a loan is 
granted that went bankrupt. Revenue is market size * market share * average credit spread, and Loss is 
market size * prior probability of failure * share of defaulters * loss given default. Profit is Revenue - 
Loss. Return on assets is profit divided by market size * market share. For illustrative purposes, we 
assume the market size to be $100 billion, equal size loans, loss given default to be 45%, and credit spread 
for the highest quality customers to be 0.30%. The prior probability of failure is taken to be the same as 
the ex-post failure rate. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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For Altman (1968), a lower profitability (EBITTA), a higher liquidity (WCTA), a 
lower leverage calculated as book value of equity divided by the book value of total debt 
(BETL), and a higher ratio of sales and total assets (STA) yield a higher estimated 
probability of bankruptcy. The signs of the coefficients for the variables WCTA and STA 
are inconsistent with Altman’s original study of US firms. For Ohlson (1980), the 
probability of bankruptcy increases if the firm’s size decreases (Size), liquidity increases 
(WCTA), the ratio of total liabilities and total assets (TLTA) increases, the profitability 
(FUTL) decreases, and if net income has been negative for the past two years (INTWO). 
The coefficient sign for WCTA is inconsistent with Ohlson’s study of US firms. For Hess 
and Huettemann (2019), firms are more likely to fail with a higher probability that losses 
will deplete the current book equity (PNBE) and negative earnings forecasts (NegEarnFrc). 
The higher the financial expenses (FIEXTA), the lower the profitability (EBITTA) and the 
lower the size (Size), the greater the estimated probability of bankruptcy. The signs of all 
coefficients are as expected and consistent with previous studies on German public firms, 
such as with the results from Huettemann and Lorsbach (2019). 
4.4.4.2 Out-of-sample results 
4.4.4.2.1 Goodness-of-fit deciles  
To evaluate the quality of bankruptcy prediction models, I follow Shumway (2001) 
and rank firms into deciles based on their fitted bankruptcy probability values for every 
year of the validation sample (2012 to 2016). Specifically, the firms that will most likely 
default in the subsequent year according to each respective model are sorted into the first 
decile, and firms with the lowest estimated default probabilities are assigned to the tenth 
decile. I report the percentages of bankrupt firms that fall into each of the ten probability 
deciles. A model is accurate if it yields high default probability estimates for bankrupt 
firm-years, and thus, assigns many bankrupt firms into the first deciles. 
Panel B in Table 4.7 reports the goodness-of-fit deciles. Altman’s (1968) model 
classifies 34.06% of all bankrupt firms into the highest default probability decile. That is, a 
bank can exclude 34.06% of all bankruptcies if it does not lend money to the 10% of firms 
with the highest expected default measures. The performance of Altman’s model is similar 
to that of Hess and Huettemann’s (2019) model, with a score of 33.44%, and Ohlson’s 
(1980) model, with 30.94%. For the top two deciles in aggregate, the percentage of correct 
predictions is as follows: 55.31% for Hess and Huettemann, 52.19% for Ohlson, and 
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50.63% for Altman. The results are consistent with those from public firms in Huettemann 
and Lorsbach (2019) in terms of the percentage of correct predictions. 
4.4.4.2.2 Receiver operating characteristics 
I consider both type I and type II errors by using an alternative measure to evaluate 
bankruptcy prediction models: the area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) 
curve, also referred to as the area under the curve (AUC) (e.g., Sobehart and Keenan; 
2001). The AUC is interpreted as the probability that a randomly chosen defaulting firm 
has a greater predicted probability of default than a randomly chosen surviving firm. A 
value of 0.5 indicates a random model with no predictive ability, and a value of 1.0 
indicates perfect discrimination. Panel C in Table 4.7 reports the Newey-West (1987) time-
series averages of the means of the AUC. Ohlson (1980) has an average AUC of 0.749, 
which is similar to the average of 0.746 from Hess and Huettemann (2019) and 0.737 from 
Altman (1968). 
4.4.4.2.3 Economic value for differing misclassification costs  
To account for differing type I and type II error costs, I use Agarwal and Taffler’s 
(2008) approach to assess the economic impact of using different bankruptcy prediction 
models in a competitive market. To link the power of prediction models and loan pricing, I 
follow Stein (2005) and Blöchlinger and Leippold (2006) to derive the credit spread as a 
function of the credit score (S) by 
 𝑅 =  
𝑃𝑡(𝑌=1|𝑆=𝑡)
𝑃𝑡(𝑌=0|𝑆=𝑡)
𝐿𝐺𝐷 +  𝑘,   (4.2) 
where R is the credit spread, Pt(Y = 1|S = t) is the conditional probability of 
bankruptcy for a score of t, Pt(Y = 0|S = t) is the conditional probability of non-
bankruptcy for a score of t, LGD is the loss in a loan given default, and k is the credit 
spread for the highest quality loan. 
I then evaluate an economic scenario as described by Agarwal and Taffler (2008) and 
Bauer and Agarwal (2014) under a simple loan market worth $100 billion. Each bank uses 
a different bankruptcy prediction model and competes for customers that are represented 
by the sample firms. I assume that all loans are of the same size and are unsecured senior 
debt; specifically, the loss given default is 45%. Further, I assume the risk premium for a 
high-quality customer (k) is 0.30%. I rank the sample firms for each year into 20 categories 
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based on their fitted bankruptcy probability values. The banks reject customers that fall in 
the bottom 5%, the lowest category, according to the respective prediction model they use. 
They quote spreads for all other customers based on equation (4.2), and the customer 
chooses the bank that quotes the lowest spread. If multiple banks quote equal minimum 
spreads, the customer randomly chooses one of these banks, or equivalently, the business is 
split equally. As this regime may include customers who are refused credit by all banks, 
the market share may not sum to one. 
Panel D in Table 4.7 presents the revenue, profitability, and other statistics for all 
banks in the competitive loan market. The bank that uses Hess and Huettemann’s model 
has the largest market share of 34.38%, followed by Ohlson (1980) with 32.52%, and 
Altman (1968) with 30.70%. Additionally, loans granted by the bank that uses Hess and 
Huettemann’s model have the best quality, as only 0.16% of their customers default; this is 
lower than the banks that use Ohlson’s (0.21%) and Altman’s models (0.30%). The high 
market share of the bank that uses Hess and Huettemann’s model, combined with low 
default losses due to the high-quality portfolio, translates into the highest profit ($94.34 
million) and highest return on assets (0.27%). The revenue for the bank that uses Ohlson’s 
model is similar, due to similar market share and similar average credit spread. However, 
using Ohlson’s and Altman’s models causes banks to experience greater losses, which 
translates into a lower profit for Ohlson’s ($71.19 million) and Altman’s ($79.10 million) 
models, as well as a lower return on assets for both (Ohlson: 0.23% and Altman: 0.24%).  
When considering only type I errors, or when assuming equal type I and type II error 
costs, all three models show similar out-of-sample performance. However, when allowing 
for differing misclassification costs, Hess and Huettemann’s (2019) accounting model 
outperforms both Altman’s (1968) and Ohlson’s (1980). 
4.4.5 Bankruptcy prediction models for different firm sizes 
For each year, firms are ranked into three equally-sized groups according to the 
amount of their total assets. Combining each of the three groups that contain the firms with 
the smallest, medium-sized, and largest total assets over the whole sample period yields 
subsamples with small, medium-sized, and large firms, respectively. I separately perform 
rolling hazard models for the Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980), and Hess and Huettemann 
(2019) models using these three subsamples. 
Table 4.8 Rolling hazard models of bankruptcy prediction models split into firm sizes 
Panel A: Parameter estimates 
 
Hess and Huettemann (2019) Altman (1968) Ohlson (1980) 
Variable 
  Small Medium Large Small Medium Large Small Medium Large 
Constant -9.71 *** 3.05 * -4.36 ** -5.29 *** -5.39 *** -6.06 *** -9.35 *** 2.28  -4.96 ** 
PNBEt -1.50 ** -2.24 *** -0.06                 
NegEarnFrct 0.45 * 0.32 ** 0.91 ***               
BLRt 1.52 *** 2.90 *** 0.78 **               
TXTt 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00                 
FIEXTAt 3.98  9.94 *** 15.11 ***               
EBITTAt -0.57 ** -1.33 ** -3.71 *** -2.05 *** -3.23 *** -6.24 ***       
Sizet 0.25 * -0.69 *** -0.19 *         0.17  -0.65 *** -0.17  
WCTAt        0.27  0.39 *** -0.60 *** 0.29 * 0.34 *** -0.49 *** 
RETAt         0.68  0.91 *** -0.84 ***       
BETLt         -1.44 * -2.25 *** -0.26 *       
STAt         0.02 ** -0.03 * 0.07 **       
TLTAt                 1.60 *** 2.23 *** 1.95 *** 
CLCAt                 -0.03  -0.09 ** -0.05 ** 
OENEGt                 -0.24  -0.02  -0.54  
NITAt                 -0.53  0.34  -0.58  
FUTLt                 -1.07 * -3.30 *** -3.17 ** 
INTWOt                 0.35 *** -0.21 * 0.60 ** 
CHINt                      0.30 ** 0.19   -0.20   
             (continued) 
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Table 4.8 Rolling hazard models of bankruptcy prediction models split into firm sizes (continued) 
Panel B: Goodness-of-fit deciles  
 
Hess and Huettemann (2019) Altman (1968) Ohlson (1980) 
 
Decile  
  Small Medium Large Small Medium Large Small Medium Large  
1 27.08 36.61 46.38 29.17 29.46 46.38 27.78 26.79 42.03  
2 20.83 23.21 18.84 15.97 16.96 18.84 16.67 21.43 18.84  
3 18.75 13.39 13.04 15.97 14.29 5.80 12.50 16.96 8.70  
4 8.33 11.61 1.45 7.64 12.50 11.59 11.11 13.39 10.14  
5 6.25 5.36 7.25 11.81 10.71 0.00 9.72 9.82 5.80  
6 5.56 5.36 0.00 6.94 6.25 2.90 9.03 3.57 5.80  
7 6.94 0.00 4.35 5.56 0.89 2.90 6.25 2.68 2.90  
8 3.47 0.89 2.90 3.47 6.25 4.35 2.78 2.68 0.00  
9 0.00 0.89 2.90 0.69 2.68 1.45 0.69 0.89 4.35  
10 2.78 2.68 2.90 2.78 0.00 5.80 3.47 1.79 1.45  
Panel C: Area under the ROC curve  
  
Hess and Huettemann (2019) Altman (1968) Ohlson (1980) 
 
   
  Small Medium Large Small Medium Large Small Medium Large  
Mean 0.729 0.765 0.785 0.734 0.710 0.781 0.720 0.706 0.769  
        (continued)  
4
 B
a
n
kru
p
tcy P
ro
ceed
in
g
s, A
n
n
u
a
l R
ep
o
rt T
im
in
g
, a
n
d
 B
a
n
kru
p
tcy P
red
ictio
n
: C
ra
w
lin
g
 
th
e G
erm
a
n
 B
u
sin
ess R
eg
ister 
1
0
8
 
Table 4.8 Rolling hazard models of bankruptcy prediction models split into firm sizes (continued) 
 
Panel D: Economic value of different misclassification costs  
 
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3  
  Hess and Huettemann (2019) Altman (1968) Ohlson (1980)  
  Small Medium Large Small Medium Large Small Medium Large  
Credits 17,251.00 15,261.17 16,673.83 15,908.00 15,458.67 13,477.83 10,197.00 12,542.17 12,796.33  
Market share (%) 39.17% 34.65% 37.86% 36.12% 35.10% 30.60% 23.15% 28.48% 29.06%  
Defaults 43.00 26.50 16.83 48.00 42.00 15.33 48.00 34.50 24.83  
Default/credits (%) 0.25% 0.17% 0.10% 0.30% 0.27% 0.11% 0.47% 0.28% 0.19%  
Avg. credit spread (%) 0.38% 0.36% 0.32% 0.39% 0.38% 0.32% 0.39% 0.34% 0.33%  
Revenue ($m) 148.60 123.75 122.31 141.21 132.09 99.36 90.59 97.83 96.94  
Loss ($m) 45.52 29.44 20.82 50.81 46.67 18.97 50.81 38.33 30.72  
Profit ($m) 103.08 94.30 101.49 90.40 85.42 80.39 39.78 59.50 66.22  
Return on asset (%) 0.26% 0.27% 0.27% 0.25% 0.24% 0.26% 0.17% 0.21% 0.23%  
This table reports the results of the rolling hazard models for small, medium-sized and large firms respectively. Each year, the firms are ranked into groups based on the 
amount of their total assets. The group containing the firms with the smallest, medium and largest amount of total assets constitutes the group of small, medium-sized and 
large firms, respectively. Panel A shows the Newey-West (1987) time series averages of annual regression coefficients for Hess and Huettemann (2019), Altman (1968) 
and Ohlson (1980) to predict bankruptcies. PNBE is the probability that losses deplete current book equity, NegEarnFrc is a dummy for a negative earnings forecast, 
BLR is the book leverage ratio, TXT are taxes, FIEXTA are financial expenses over total assets, EBITTA are earnings before interest and taxes over total assets, size is 
the logarithmic sales, WCTA is working capital over total assets, RETA is retained earnings over total assets, BETL is book equity over total liabilities, STA is sales over 
total assets, TLTA is total liabilities over total assets, CLCA is current liabilities over current assets, OENEG is a dummy that takes the value of one if total liabilities 
exceed total assets and zero otherwise, NITA is net income over total assets, FUTL is funds provided by operations over total liabilities, INTWO is a dummy that takes 
the value of one if the net income was negative for the past two years and zero otherwise, CHIN is the change in net income. Panel B shows the goodness-of-fit deciles. 
For every year, we rank firms into deciles based on their fitted bankruptcy probability values, where the firms with the highest values fall into the first decile. We report 
the percentage of bankrupt firms that are classified into each probability decile. Panel C reports the Newey-West (1987) time series averages of the yearly means of the 
area under the ROC curve (AUC). Panel D shows the results of a competitive credit market. The banks reject firms with score in the bottom 5% based on their respective 
models while offering credit to all others at a credit spread derived using equation (4.2). The bank with the lowest credit spread is assumed to grant the loan. Firms are 
assumed to split their loan equally if banks offer the same credit spread. Market share is the total number of credits granted divided by total number of firm-years, 
defaults is the number of firms to whom a loan is granted that went bankrupt. Revenue is market size * market share * average credit spread, and Loss is market size * 
prior probability of failure * share of defaulters * loss given default. Profit is Revenue - Loss. Return on assets is profit divided by market size * market share. For 
illustrative purposes, we assume the market size to be $100 billion, equal size loans, loss given default to be 45%, and credit spread for the highest quality customers to 
be 0.30%. The prior probability of failure is taken to be the same as the ex-post failure rate. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Panel A in Table 4.8 reports the parameter estimates and their significance for the 
hazard models of the three models. The coefficients of all three models differ when applied 
to firms of different sizes. For example, liquidity (WCTA) is a highly significant predictor 
when Altman’s model is applied to medium-sized or large firms, whereas it is not 
significant for small firms. The same pattern applies for CLCA, another measure of 
liquidity, for Ohlson’s model. One reason for this observation might be the positive 
relationship between firm size and liquidity (e.g., Gupta, 1969): as small firms tend to have 
low liquidity anyway, its power to discriminate between bankrupt and non-bankrupt small 
firms is low. 
Panel B in Table 4.8 reports the goodness-of-fit deciles. For all three models, the 
percentage of correct predictions in the first decile is higher for large firms than for small 
and medium-sized firms. Altman’s (1968) re-estimated model classifies 46.38% of all 
bankrupt firms into the highest default probability decile for large firms. The percentage of 
correct predictions for small (29.17%) and medium-sized firms (29.46%) is lower. 
Ohlson’s (1980) model assigns 42.03% of all large firms’ bankruptcies into the first decile, 
which is higher than for small (27.78%) and medium-sized firms (26.79%). The same 
pattern applies to Hess and Huettemann’s (2019) model (small firms: 27.08%; medium-
sized firms: 36.61%; large firms: 46.38%). Interestingly, Hess and Huettemann (2019) 
outperform both other models for medium-sized firms, whereas its performance for small 
and large firms is similar. 
Panel C in Table 4.8 reports the Newey-West (1987) time-series averages of the 
means of the AUC. Altman (1968) has an average AUC of 0.781 for large firms which is 
larger than for small (0.734) and medium-sized firms (0.710). Applying Ohlson (1980) to 
large firms yields an average AUC of 0.769, which exceeds the average AUC for small 
(0.720) and medium-sized firms (0.706). The same pattern is observed when applying Hess 
and Huettemann’s (2019) model (small firms: 0.729; medium-sized firms: 0.765; large 
firms: 0.785). Again, Hess and Huettemann (2019) outperform the other models when 
predicting medium-sized firms’ bankruptcies. 
Panel D in Table 4.8 presents revenue, profitability, and other statistics for all banks 
in the competitive loan market. While goodness-of-fit deciles and areas under the ROC 
curve (AUC) measure the predictive abilities of models in absolute terms, this experiment 
assumes a competitive market and, thus, measures the predictive power of a bankruptcy 
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prediction model relative to other models. Thus, its results can be used to compare 
different models for each firm size. However, these results cannot be used to compare the 
impact of firm sizes for the same model. For small firms, applying Hess and Huettemann’s 
(2019) model yields the highest market share of 39.17% (Altman: 36.12%; Ohlson: 
23.15%) and the best loan quality, as only 0.25% of their customers default compared to 
0.30% for Altman and 0.47% for Ohlson. This translates into the highest profit of $103.08 
million compared to Altman ($90.40 million) and Ohlson ($39.78 million). The return on 
assets for Hess and Huettemann’s model is 0.26% and thus similar to Altman’s (0.25%) 
and higher than Ohlson’s (0.17%). The same pattern is observed in its application to large 
firms, in which Hess and Huettemann has the highest market share of 37.86% (Altman: 
30.60%; Ohlson: 29.06%) and the lowest default rate of 0.10% (Altman: 0.11%; Ohlson: 
0.19%). However, the return on assets is similar for all models (Altman: 0.26%; Ohlson: 
0.23%; Hess and Huettemann: 0.27%). For medium-sized firms, the bank that uses Hess 
and Huettemann’s model again has the best-quality loans with a default rate of 0.17% 
compared to 0.27% and 0.28% for Altman’s and Ohlson’s models, respectively, and the 
highest profit of 94.30 million (Altman: $85.42 million; Ohlson: $59.50 million). This 
time, the highest absolute profit also translates into the highest return on assets of 0.27% 
compared to 0.24% and 0.21% for Altman and Ohlson, respectively. 
Taken together, firm size has an impact on the coefficients and results of prediction 
models. In particular, each model provides better accuracy when applied to large firms 
compared to small and medium-sized firms. Thus, large firms’ bankruptcies can be 
predicted more easily. In addition, Hess and Huettemann’s (2019) model outperforms both 
other models in predicting bankruptcies of medium-sized firms. 
4.5 Conclusions 
By crawling the German business register, this study creates a bankruptcy database 
for German firms that includes more bankruptcy events in recent years and more details 
about the proceedings than the BvD database. Simultaneously, this study quantifies the 
bias of using ad-hoc data requests from the business register, which are limited due to the 
legal deletion requirement; however, this bias can be eliminated by regularly crawling the 
business register and storing data requests. Analyzing this dataset helps interpret the 
typical German procedures for bankruptcy proceedings by identifying first events and by 
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analyzing the event order. Furthermore, it shows differences in the proceedings of joint-
stock and limited liability firms as joint-stock firms typically have a longer lasting 
proceeding, a longer duration between protective measures and the opening, and are 
refused an opening due to insufficient funds less often. By combining bankruptcy dates and 
annual report dates, I compute the ratio of firms that publish annual reports after 
bankruptcy. Furthermore, I show that opening a bankruptcy proceeding decelerates annual 
report publication. Finally, this study compares bankruptcy prediction models for a broad 
range of German public and private firms. It also shows that predictions for large firms are 
more accurate than those for small and medium-sized firms which means that firm size has 
an impact on the prediction results. 
This study has substantial implications for researchers who analyze or use typical 
bankruptcy procedures. Bankruptcy prediction models could be improved based on the 
results of this study. First, further research could use bankruptcy data extracted from the 
business register instead of BvD status codes to gather more events. Second, annual report 
publication dates could be empirically tested to serve as an indicator of a bankruptcy filing. 
Future research could also further investigate the properties of typical bankruptcy 
proceedings by calculating additional summary statistics or by applying regression setups, 
if appropriate. Moreover, further research could gather publicly available bankruptcy event 
information for other countries, and thus, analyze country-specific typical bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
4.A Construction of variables for bankruptcy prediction models 
The appendix discusses the construction of variables used in Altman (1968), Ohlson 
(1980), and Hess and Huettemann’s (2019) accounting model. 
Altman (1968) obtains a Z-score using a linear weighted sum of five ratios: 
𝑍 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅  𝑊𝐶𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽2 ⋅  𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽3 ⋅  𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽4 ⋅  𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐿 
 +𝛽5 ⋅ 𝑆𝑇𝐴,   (4.3) 
where WCTA is working capital (BvD item WKCA) divided by total assets (TOAS), 
RETA is retained earnings36 (OSFD) divided by total assets (TOAS), EBITTA is earnings 
                                                 
36 Since BvD does not have a variable for retained earnings, I approximate the variable by using “Other 
Shareholders Funds”. 
4 Bankruptcy Proceedings, Annual Report Timing, and Bankruptcy Prediction: Crawling 
the German Business Register 113 
before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets (TOAS), BETL37 is the book value 
of equity (SHFD) divided by the book value of total debt (NCLI plus CULI), STA is sales 
(TURN) divided by total assets (TOAS) and Z is the Z-score (overall index). WCTA is a 
proxy for a firm’s liquidity, RETA is a proxy for firm age, and EBITTA measures 
profitability. BETL is a widely used measure of leverage and STA describes the firm’s 
efficiency in using assets to generate sales. The Z-score characterizes the financial strength 
of a firm by aggregating the abovementioned five accounting ratios into one figure using 
the estimated coefficients β1, … , β5.  
Ohlson (1980) finds nine variables to be significant and defines his O-score model as 
 O =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽2 ⋅ 𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽3 ⋅ 𝑊𝐶𝑇𝐴 
 + 𝛽4 ⋅ 𝐶𝐿𝐶𝐴 +  𝛽5 ⋅ 𝑂𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽6 ⋅ 𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐴 
 + 𝛽7 ⋅ 𝐹𝑈𝑇𝐿 + 𝛽8 ⋅ 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑊𝑂 + 𝛽9 ⋅ 𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁,   (4.4) 
where Size is the logarithm of total assets (TOAS), TLTA is total liabilities (NCLI 
plus CULI) over total assets (TOAS), WCTA is working capital (WKCA) over total assets 
(TOAS), CLCA is current liabilities (CULI) over current assets (CUAS), OENEG is a 
dummy that takes the value of one if total liabilities (NCLI plus CULI) exceed total assets 
(TOAS) and zero otherwise, NITA is net income (PL) over total assets (TOAS), FUTL is 
funds provided by operations38 (PLBT) over total liabilities (NCLI plus CULI), INTWO is 
a dummy that takes the value of one if the net income (NI) was negative for the past two 
years and zero otherwise, CHIN is the change in net income (PL) and O is the O-score 
(overall index). WCTA and CLCA measure liquidity. NITA, FUTL, INTWO, and CHIN 
capture the different aspects of profitability. TLTA and OENEG describe the capital 
structure. Size is a measure of firm size.  
The key idea of Hess and Huettemann’s (2019) models is that a firm becomes 
bankrupt if its book equity turns negative. Thus, the key predictor of bankruptcy is the 
probability that the sum of a firm’s current book equity and earnings forecast for the 
subsequent month is negative. This probability for firm i at time t can be expressed as 
                                                 
37 The version of the model in Altman (1968) requires stock price information and thus is not purely 
accounting-based. I use Altman’s (1983) z’-score applications (e.g., in Altman, 1993 and Altman et al., 
2017) and Altman, Hartzell, and Peck’s (1995) z’’-score applications (e.g., in Megginson, Meles, 
Sampagnaro, & Verdoliva, 2016) for private firms where market equity is replaced by book equity. 
38 Since funds provided by operations are no longer reported, I perform an approximation by using “profit 
before taxation”. 
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 𝑃𝑁𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 1 − 𝛷 (
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1̂ +𝐵𝑘𝐸𝑞𝑖,𝑡 
𝜎(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1̂ )
),     (4.5) 
where BkEqi,t denotes the current book equity, Earni,t+1 is the expected earnings for 
the subsequent month, σ(Earni,t+1̂ ) is the corresponding volatility of the individual 
earnings forecast, and Φ(⋅) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution. Book equity is equal to shareholders’ funds (SHFD). Earnings are net income 
(PL). To calculate the earnings forecasts and their volatilities, Hess and Huettemann (2019) 
use cross-sectional models. More specifically, they adopt a rolling regression technique 
with accounting data from the past five years to estimate parameters they use for 
forecasting.  
Hess and Huettemann’s (2019) accounting model contains PNBE, the probability 
that book equity turns negative; NegEarnFrc, a dummy that assumes the value of one if the 
earnings forecast is negative and zero otherwise; FIEXTA39 as financial expenses (FIEX) 
divided by total assets (TOAS); TXT as paid taxes (TAXA); EBITTA as profitability 
calculated by earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) over total assets (TOAS); Size 
measured by logarithmic total assets (TOAS); book leverage ratio (BLR) calculated as total 
liabilities (NCLI plus CULI) divided by the sum of total liabilities (NCLI plus CULI), and 
book equity. 
 
                                                 
39 Hess and Huettemann (2019) use capital expenditures. As this variable is not included in BvD, I use 
financial expenses instead. 
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General Appendix: Python Code for a 
Web Crawler 
This appendix illustrates the overall methodology of a web crawler by showing an 
exemplary program that crawls the German business register. It is written in the 
programming language Python.  
This program automatically starts a web browser and opens the search mask for 
bankruptcy events of the business register. The program then fills in certain arrays of this 
mask: the company name, the court and search time period. The company name is read in 
from a list from a text file, the court is read in from a list inside the code and the dates are 
directly set within the code. The program submits a search request for every possible 
combination of company name and court. It extracts the information whether any 
bankruptcy event was found for the corresponding combination and finally exports this 
information into a csv-file. 
1. import mechanicalsoup   
2. from datetime import datetime   
3.    
4. import urllib   
5. import string   
6. import os   
7. import sys   
8. import time   
9. import csv   
10. import re   
11. from urllib.request import FancyURLopener   
12. from bs4 import BeautifulSoup   
13.    
14. # User defined output file   
15. OUTPUT_FILE = r'Path/File1.csv'   
16. OUTPUT_FIELDS = ['Company Name', 'Amtsgericht', 'Results']   
17.    
18. # User defined tab-delimited list of Company Names   
19. COMN_FILE = r'Path/File2.txt'   
20.    
21. a = [   
22. "Aachen", "Aalen", "Alzey", "Amberg", "Ansbach", "Arnsberg", "Aschaffenburg", "Au
gsburg", "Aurich",   
23. "Bad Hersfeld", "Bad Homburg", "Bad Kreuznach", "Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler", "Baden-
Baden", "Bamberg", "Bayreuth", "Bersenbrück", "Betzdorf", "Bielefeld", "Bingen am
 Rhein", "Bitburg", "Bochum", "Bonn", "Braunschweig", "Bremen", "Bremerhaven", "B
ückeburg",   
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24. "Celle", "Charlottenburg", "Chemnitz", "Cloppenburg", "Coburg", "Cochem", "Cottbu
s","Crailsheim", "Cuxhaven",    
25. "Darmstadt", "Deggendorf", "Delmenhorst", "Dessau", "Detmold", "Dortmund", "Dresd
en", "Duisburg", "Düsseldorf",    
26. "Erfurt", "Eschwege", "Essen", "Esslingen", "Eutin",    
27. "Flensburg", "Frankfurt", "Frankfurt/Oder", "Freiburg", "Friedberg", "Fritzlar", 
"Fulda", "Fürth",    
28. "Gera", "Gießen", "Gifhorn", "Göppingen", "Goslar", "Göttingen",    
29. "Hagen", "Halle/Saalkreis", "Hamburg", "Hameln", "Hanau", "Hannover", "Hechingen"
, "Heidelberg", "Heilbronn", "Hildesheim", "Hof", "Hohenschönhausen", "Holzminden
", "Husum",    
30. "Idar-Oberstein", "Ingolstadt", "Itzehoe",    
31. "Kaiserslautern", "Karlsruhe", "Kassel", "Kempten", "Kiel", "Kleve", "Koblenz", "
Köln", "Königstein", "Konstanz", "Köpenick", "Korbach", "Krefeld",    
32. "Landau in der Pfalz", "Landshut", "Leer", "Leipzig", "Lichtenberg", "Limburg", "
Lingen", "Lörrach", "Lübeck", "Ludwigsburg", "Ludwigshafen am Rhein", "Lüneburg",
    
33. "Magdeburg", "Mainz", "Mannheim", "Marburg", "Mayen", "Meiningen", "Meldorf", "Me
mmingen", "Meppen", "Mitte", "Mönchengladbach", "Montabaur", "Mosbach", "Mühldorf
", "Mühlhausen", "München", "Münster",    
34. "Neu-
Ulm", "Neubrandenburg", "Neukölln", "Neumünster", "Neuruppin", "Neustadt an der W
einstraße", "Neuwied", "Niebüll", "Nordenham", "Norderstedt", "Nordhorn", "Nördli
ngen", "Nürnberg",    
35. "Offenbach", "Offenburg", "Oldenburg", "Osnabrück", "Osterode",    
36. "Paderborn", "Pankow/Weißensee", "Passau", "Pforzheim", "Pinneberg", "Pirmasens",
 "Potsdam",    
37. "Ravensburg", "Regensburg", "Reinbek", "Rosenheim", "Rostock", "Rottweil",    
38. "Saarbrücken", "Schöneberg", "Schwarzenbek", "Schweinfurt", "Schwerin", "Siegen",
 "Spandau", "Stade", "Stendal", "Stralsund", "Straubing", "Stuttgart", "Syke",    
39. "Tempelhof-
Kreuzberg", "Tiergarten", "Tostedt", "Traunstein", "Trier", "Tübingen",    
40. "Uelzen", "Ulm",    
41. "Vechta", "Verden", "Villingen-Schwenningen",    
42. "Waldshut-
Tiengen", "Walsrode", "Wedding", "Weiden", "Weilheim", "Wetzlar", "Wiesbaden", "W
ilhelmshaven", "Wittlich", "Wolfratshausen", "Wolfsburg", "Worms", "Wuppertal", "
Würzburg",    
43. "Zweibrücken"   
44. ]   
45.            
46. class MyOpener(FancyURLopener):   
47.     version = 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.17 (KHTML, like Gecko
) Chrome/24.0.1312.57 Safari/537.17'   
48.    
49. myopener = MyOpener()   
50. url = 'https://www.unternehmensregister.de/ureg/search1.7.html;jsessionid=0446F6E
C73AA04F2909204697AB9DB40.web02-1'   
51.    
52. def CheckInsolNet(com_name, A_Gericht):   
53.        
54.     # Catch errors from server timeouts       
55.     number_of_tries = 5   
56.     sleep_time = 10     
57.    
58.     for i in range(1, number_of_tries + 1):   
59.         try:   
60.             # initialise browser  
61.             br = mechanicalsoup.StatefulBrowser()   
62.             br.addheaders = [('User-agent', 'Firefox')]   
63.             br.open('https://www.unternehmensregister.de/ureg/search1.7.html')   
64.            
65.             print(br)   
66.                
67.             # fill in web form of website with options from above     
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68.             br.select_form('#searchInsolvencyForm')   
69.             br['searchInsolvencyForm:bankruptciesCourtId'] = A_Gericht   
70.             br['searchInsolvencyForm:bankruptciesDepitorName'] = com_name   
71.             br['searchInsolvencyForm:bankruptciesPublicationsStartDateDay'] = 1   
72.             br['searchInsolvencyForm:bankruptciesPublicationsStartDateMonth'] = 1
   
73.             br['searchInsolvencyForm:bankruptciesPublicationsStartDateYear'] = 20
07  
74.             br['searchInsolvencyForm:bankruptciesPublicationsEndDateDay'] = 31   
75.             br['searchInsolvencyForm:bankruptciesPublicationsEndDateMonth'] = 12 
  
76.             br['searchInsolvencyForm:bankruptciesPublicationsEndDateYear'] = 2017
   
77.             br.submit_selected()       
78.             page = br.get_current_page()   
79.             page = str(page)   
80.    
81.             # HTML Cleaner       
82.             soup = BeautifulSoup(page, "html.parser")     
83.             clean_data = soup.get_text()         
84.             return clean_data   
85.                
86.         except Exception as exc:   
87.             if i == 1:   
88.                 print('\n==>urlretrieve error in download_to_file.py')   
89.             print('  {0}. _url:  {1}'.format(i, com_name))   
90.             print('  {0}. _url:  {1}'.format(i, A_Gericht))   
91.             print('     Warning: {0}  [{1}]'.format(str(exc), time.strftime('%c')
))  
92.             if '404' in str(exc):   
93.                 break   
94.             print('     Retry in {0} seconds'.format(sleep_time))   
95.             time.sleep(sleep_time)   
96.             sleep_time += sleep_time   
97.    
98.     return   
99.    
100. def main():   
101.      
102.     f_out = open(OUTPUT_FILE, 'w')   
103.     wr = csv.writer(f_out, lineterminator='\n')   
104.     wr.writerow(OUTPUT_FIELDS)       
105.        
106.     with open(COMN_FILE) as f_in:   
107.         for line in f_in:    
108.             print(line)   
109.                
110.             line = re.sub(r'\n',' ', line)   
111.                
112.             # We run the request for each Amtsgericht               
113.             j = 0 # Amtsgericht   
114.             jmax = len(a)   
115.                             
116.             for j in range(0, jmax):   
117.                    
118.                 _odata = [0] * 4   
119.                    
120.                 #Save Company Name;               
121.                 _odata[0] = line                               
122.                 _odata[1] = a[j]   
123.                                           
124.                 Insolrequest = CheckInsolNet(line, a[j])   
125.                 if Insolrequest:   
126.                     m = re.search('No data found for entered search  
127.                                    criteria', Insolrequest)   
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128.                     if m:   
129.                         _odata[2] = 0   
130.                     else:   
131.                         _odata[2] = 1   
132.                 else:   
133.                     _odata[2] = 2   
134.                    
135.                 print(_odata)   
136.                 wr.writerow(_odata)   
137.       
138. if __name__ == '__main__':       
139.     main()   
 
 
 
